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This research addresses questions of policy transfer, specifically, policy uploading – the 
upward transfer of national policies to the European level. It contributes to three bodies of 
literature, namely, institutional theory, new governance, and European Union politics. The 
questions it addresses are why and how European Union member countries use the Council 
Presidency to upload their national policies, and what are the conditions needed for policy 
uploading to be successful. To answer these questions I use the case studies method and compare 
the Council Presidencies of the United Kingdom (2005), France (2008), the Czech Republic 
(2009), Sweden (2009), and Belgium (2010). For each case, specific national policies are looked 
at and I use process-tracing to identify the variables at play for successful uploading to occur.  
Based on qualitative data, I find that the reasons explaining why countries attempt to 
upload their national policies during their Council Presidency supports what has been identified 
in the literature on venue shopping. In addition, many variables are important in explaining the 
occurrence of successful policy uploading. First, the country holding the Council Presidency 
needs to have the intent to upload its national policy and be committed to it, and it needs to be 
considered a superior option to the status quo. Second, being able to set the agenda, to shape 
policy content as well as possess a strong policy capacity contribute to the successful uploading 
of national policies. Although other variables may not be necessary for successful policy 
uploading to occur, they strongly influence it. The legal format the policy will take once it is 
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 v 
adopted influences the willingness the other Member have to make compromises. The distinction 
is made between soft law and hard law modes of governance. Another variable making the 
uploading of national policy easier is the convergence of interests on the proposal. This is true 
under all decision-making rules, but it is especially significant under more restrictive decision-
making rules such as unanimity. Finally, the stage at which the proposal is presented matters. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
As European integration progresses and more policy sectors fall within the Communities’ 
decision realm, many authors have argued that Member states are losing their capacity to 
influence the policy process at the European level (Scharpf 1994, Marks, et al. 1996, Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1997, Hooghe and Marks 2001). Their arguments are based on the multi-level nature 
of the European Union, which has created a dispersion of decision-making authority usually 
reserved to the states, and the empowerment of supranational actors. On the other hand, some 
scholars argue that the Member states have remained powerful (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1998). 
This study speaks to this debate by looking at how Member states can still manage to steer the 
European policy process in their favour while they hold the Council Presidency by focusing 
more particularly on policy uploading. 
Peters and Pierre (2005) identifies two ways Member states act in the multi-level policy-
making structure of the European Union: they can transfer their policy capacity to EU 
institutions, or they can engage in multi-level governance processes to regain some of their lost 
policy capacity. By focusing on the Council Presidency, this research project is concerned with 
the latter. The Council represents the Member states in the European Union and it acts to 
safeguard their interests in the European policy process. Every six months, a country holds the 
Council Presidency. This position entails extensive responsibilities for the country holding it, 
especially prior to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.  
 2 
During its Presidency semester, the Member state chairs Council and European Council 
meetings and represents the European Union during international summits (before Lisbon). Most 
countries holding the Council Presidency respect, to some extent, the impartiality principle, and 
are committed to a higher European goal when in this position. Despite these ideals and the 
criticisms the country holding the presidency may face when it violates the principle, many EU 
members decide to pursue their national interests while holding the Presidency (Tallberg 2006, 
Bunse 2009, Panke 2010b). I concentrate on this issue by looking more precisely at policy 
uploading.  
Why is a Council Presidency trying to upload national policies? What are the conditions 
shaping the successful uploading of policies? These are the questions this study seek to answer. 
I conceptualize policy uploading as the upward transfer of national policies to the 
European level. In essence, policy uploading is the opposite of Europeanization, commonly 
understood as the influence of Europe on national polities. Instead, with policy uploading, the 
relationship of interest focuses more generally on the influence of national elements on European 
politics and polity; and on policy, specifically. However, in contrast to Europeanization, policy 
uploading has received little attention in the literature. Given the multi-level nature of the EU, 
and the scope that exists for moving policies up, it is important to understand how the process 
works. This study seeks to contribute to this. 
The Council Presidency is the most logical institution to look at for the study of policy 
uploading. With its ability to manage the agenda, the county holding the presidency can gain 
substantial powers and has opportunities that are usually not available to it. Moreover, the 
presidency is an important institution in both the Council of the European Union, in which 
ministers take decisions according to their policy area, and the European Council, in which heads 
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of state or government decide. These institutions represent the member countries in EU policy-
making.  
Scholars disagree on how powerful the Presidency of the Council really is. Some authors 
have argued that it is not powerful because of the role of the European Commission in policy-
making, the limited time a country holds the presidency, and the administrative burden it 
represents (De Bassompierre 1988, Nugent 1994). On the other hand, in recent years, scholars 
have devoted more attention to the role of the chairmanship, how the presidency can influence 
decision outcomes, and how it may not exactly be neutral in conducting its role (Elgström 2003, 
Kollman 2003, Tallberg 2003, 2004, 2006, Thomson and Holsi 2006, Thomson 2008, Bunse 
2009, Panke 2010b). As a basis for this study, I use this argument and consider that holding the 
EU Presidency for six months creates a window of opportunity for the uploading of national 
policies to the European level. 
Using a rational choice institutionalism approach, the literature identifies roles and 
strategies that Member states holding the chairmanship can use to shape the outcomes of 
negotiations. Three types of behaviour of the chairmanship have been developed by Tallberg 
(2006): the EU presidency as an agenda shaper, as a broker, and as a representative. As the 
agenda manager, the presidency delimits and structures the agenda. It allows the Presidency to 
prioritize according to its political concerns. The role of brokerage facilitator emanates directly 
from the idea of the neutrality of the chair for managing discussions and negotiations among the 
members in order to facilitate the emergence of a compromise. However, it is possible for the 
chairmanship to steer towards its preferred outcome through unique access to information which 
can influence bilateral bargaining and concessions others are willing to make, by keeping in or 
out components of the texts, and deciding on the speed and frequency of meetings related to the 
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negotiations. Finally, the chairmanship is also delegated by the members of the Council the role 
of representation vis-à-vis third parties. These functions of the chairmanship are argued to have 
originated from functional needs (Tallberg 2006).  
In the same vein, Bunse (2009) has shown that small EU states are able to influence 
bargaining outcomes while they hold the Council Presidency. Small states are defined according 
to their population: they are those with less than 40 million inhabitants.1 She demonstrates that 
the political environment surrounding the Presidency, the existing preferences in the Council, the 
Presidency relations with the other two Communities’ institutions (the European Commission 
and the European Parliament), as well as the skills of the office-holder are important in 
determining the Presidency’s ability to pursue its interests and to adopt compromises acceptable 
to all Member States. Hence, holding Council Presidency can contribute to alleviating power 
differences between Member states within the Council. 
Although Bunse has used a definition of small states based on the number of inhabitants, 
no consensus on what constitutes a small state exists in the literature. For example, Panke (2010) 
focused on the ‘less than average’ number of votes in the Council (less than 12.78 votes under 
the Nice Treaty) to study the influence small states have on the EU policy process and how they 
achieve it (but without focusing on the Council). Formal voting weight in the Council would in 
fact suggest that larger states are more powerful than smaller ones, when considered only as a 
single actor. However, other elements weigh in the equation such as the policy area under which 
a proposal falls because it would imply different decision-making rules (unanimity, qualified 
majority).  
                                                 
1 According to her definition, the small states in the EU are the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Portugal, 
Hungary, Sweden, Austria, Slovakia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Romania, and Bulgaria. In other words, all Member States except for six: France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Spain, and 
Poland. 
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The adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 brought with it institutional changes that 
will further affect the relative power of Member states whether they hold the Council Presidency 
or not.2 One of the most important changes affecting the Council is the creation of the ‘semi-
permanent’ Council Presidency for the European Council. Instead of been held by the head of 
government of a Member state, an individual is selected by the European Council for a mandate 
of 2.5 years in order to chair the meetings, coordinate the work of the European Council and to 
assure the external representation of the EU. Preliminary assessment on the effect of this new 
position in the European Council held by Van Rompuy from 2009 to 2014 (his mandate was 
renewed) suggests that it has tempered national grandstanding, solved the issue of uneven 
presidential performance, and of weak leadership (Dinan 2013). In addition, the Treaty brought 
with it changes in voting procedures depending on the policy area. The number of areas falling 
under qualified majority voting in the Council and the co-decisional procedure (with the 
European Parliament) have been increased. These institutional changes have potential to affect 
policy uploading.  
Some of the lacunae of the work of scholars studying the EU Presidency show are the 
exclusion of domestic politics and the reliance on the approach that the member state is a single 
actor. Moreover, as Bunse (2009) points out, most of these studies have relied also on the study 
of formal powers. Discussions on the EU Presidency only look at the negotiations taking place 
between countries at the European level, only as a one-level game. By dismissing the dynamics 
taking place between the supranational and the national levels, and the complexity of actors 
involved in the achievement of national interests at the European level, scholars have set aside 
                                                 
2 Until October 31, 2014, voting arrangements remained the same as under the Nice Treaty. 
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variables that can be very useful in understanding how countries use the presidency differently 
and why.  
One of the objectives of this research project is to bring the national level into the 
analysis of the Council Presidency and policy uploading. In order to do that, I will focus on the 
concept of policy capacity from the governance approach. This concept allows me to take into 
consideration the national capacities a Member state has for influencing the policy process, 
through the uploading of its national policy, while holding the Council Presidency. Even if a 
country is pushing for its interests while holding the Presidency, it cannot be considered the same 
thing as pushing for its policies, although policies do reflect interests. Many viable policy outputs 
can exist for any given interest. Hence, I look at specific national policies for each of my cases. 
In order to answer my research questions, I look at three main case studies: the French 
Council Presidency of 2008, the Czech Republic Council Presidency of 2009, and the Swedish 
Council Presidency of 2009. For each of these, I look at two policy areas. For the French case I 
examine immigration and environmental policies, the Czech case focuses on energy and 
immigration policies, and finally, I look at active labour market policies and at carbon taxation 
for the Swedish case.  I supplement these cases with two shadow cases. The first one takes place 
during the 2005 United Kingdom Council Presidency, and is the negotiations on the Working 
Time Directive. The final case I look at is Belgium’s Council Presidency in 2010, for the 
information it can provide on the modifications brought by the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty. For each case, I used official documents, speeches, news coverage, and élite interviews 
to investigate the developments taking place in the different policy areas. 
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1.1 THE FINDINGS IN BRIEF 
According to the findings, policy uploading as defined in this research project does not occur 
very often. They might even constitute exceptional cases. But there is some value in studying 
exceptional cases such as these because they can help us to better understand the underlying 
dynamics and processes at play and might support the original relationships posited in the 
literature, thus increasing their generalizability. But more importantly, they can help to uncover 
factors that were hidden or overlooked. In this study, successful policy uploading occurred only 
in two cases out of eight: under the French Council Presidency with the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum, and under the Swedish Council Presidency with the discussions on 
Europe 2020. It also partly occurred with the Carbon tax case (Sweden) with the adoption of the 
eco-efficiency approach (but not the tax). 
The comparative analysis of the case studies in this book revealed interesting findings. 
The reasons explaining why countries attempt to upload their national policies during their 
Council Presidency supports what has been already identified in the literature on venue 
shopping. Countries holding the EU Presidency can engage in uploading based on the domestic 
situation they face with regard to the specific policy area (this was the case for France) in order 
to legitimize their choices (Guiraudon 2000). On the other hand, it is also possible for a country 
to engage in a change of venue out of concern for the common good (Princen 2009). This was 
the case of Sweden.  
Many variables are important in explaining the occurrence of successful policy 
uploading. First, the country holding the Council Presidency needs to have the intent to upload 
its national policy and be committed to it. In addition, the uploading of its national policy needs 
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to be considered a superior option than the status quo. This constitutes the first necessary but not 
sufficient condition for policy uploading to occur. 
Second, being able to set the agenda, to shape policy content and possessing a strong 
policy capacity contribute effectively to the success in uploading national policies. These 
variables are also considered to be necessary, but not sufficient. More precisely, the findings 
show that the earlier in the policy process the country holding the Presidency will push for its 
national policy, the more likely it is to be successful. Working on the content of the policy 
proposal and initiating the policy process without the European Commission proved to be very 
important for the Council Presidencies to maximize national policy uploading. How effective the 
administrative and political structures are (policy capacity), especially in the policy area one 
country is trying to upload in, are very important for policy uploading to take place. Specifically, 
the coordination of European policy at the national level, policy expertise and experience of high 
public officials and politicians, and the independence in the conduct of country’s Presidency 
from the European institutions, are essential for enabling the country’s Council Presidency to 
steer towards the uploading of its national policy. 
Although other variables may not be necessary for successful policy uploading to occur, 
they strongly influence it. The legal format the policy will take once it is adopted influences the 
willingness the other Member have to make compromises. Policy proposals using soft law modes 
of governance at the European level are adopted more easily than harder forms. Another variable 
making the uploading of national policy easier is the convergence of interests on the proposal. 
This is true under all decision-making rules, but it is especially significant under more restrictive 
decision-making rules such as unanimity. Finally, the stage at which the proposal is presented 
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matters. The successful cases in this study have taken place at the beginning of the EU policy 
process. 
Two variables did not play an important role in influencing the prospects for uploading: 
the concentration of executive power and governmental instability. In the former, power was 
sometimes shared between politicians in the various Council formation. In the latter, the general 
performance of the EU Presidencies facing governmental instability during their semester was 
not affected by this situation. They were able to conduct their day-to-day business, and push for 
their interests if intended. 
These findings contribute to three bodies of literature, namely new institutionalism, 
governance, and European Union politics. My study contributes to the literature on European 
Union politics by furthering the knowledge we have on the roles and influence the Council 
Presidency can have on the European policy process. Holding the Council Presidency during the 
pre-Lisbon Treaty period created a window of opportunity for countries willing to use it for the 
uploading of their national policies.  In addition, my findings highlight the importance of 
national variables for understanding how some member states have the capacity to directly 
influence the European policy process, through the uploading of their national policies. 
Interestingly, the distinction between large and small member states does not reflect an increase 
in the likelihood of successful policy uploading (for bigger countries), rather the policy capacity 
of a country holding the Presidency is more important; thus, reinforcing the importance of 
national elements into the analysis.  
The concept of policy capacity, originating from the literature on governance, has not 
been used before to look at the European Union policy process, and with regard to policy 
transfer. This is another contribution of my book. Furthermore, by combining the usage of this 
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concept with new institutionalism to look into EU policy transfer, and more precisely, policy 
uploading, I offer to the existing literature a less restrictive approach to analyze how member 
states can directly influence the policy process. 
1.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The next chapter presents the conceptual and theoretical framework employed in this study, 
which is based on new institutionalism and governance theories and concepts. The chapter first 
starts by describing the institutional setting in which EU policy-making takes place. I then offer a 
review on the literature on EU Council Presidencies and how they can affect policy-making. The 
following section of the chapter looks at the role of national executives in the Council before 
turning to a discussion on the influence of policy capacity and agenda-setting on policy-making. 
Then, I look more specifically into policy uploading in the European Union. I finish the chapter 
with a presentation of the research design for this study. 
The following chapters (3, 4, 5, and 6) constitute the empirical part of this book. Each of 
these chapters is devoted to the presentation and analysis of case studies. In Chapter 3, I look at 
the French Council Presidency in 2008 and the cases of the European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum, and the Energy and Climate Package. In Chapter 4, I examine the EU Presidency of the 
Czech Republic in 2008, focusing on Energy Security and Immigration Policy. In Chapter 5, I 
look at the Swedish Council Presidency in 2009 and focus on the cases of Europe 2020 and the 
Carbon tax. These are the three main Council Presidency cases for this study. Chapter 6 is 
different than the other ones and offers a presentation of two cases: the Council Presidencies of 
the United Kingdom in 2005, and of Belgium in 2010. Both of these are shadow cases. For the 
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UK, I look at the case of the Working Time Directive, and in the case of Belgium, at institutional 
reforms brought by the adoption of Lisbon Treaty. For each chapter, I first provide a general 
overview of the Council Presidency. I then look at the national context, and European policy 
coordination at the national level, before examining the policy uploading cases. For each policy 
case, I trace the developments that took place both at the national and European levels. After 
each policy case, I provide a preliminary assessment on variables that are important in explaining 
successful policy uploading (or not). Finally, I conclude the chapters (3, 4, and 5 only) with a 
comparative analysis of the two policies reviewed.  
The aim of chapter 7 is to provide a comparative analysis of the cases and to assess the 
findings with regards to the study’s hypotheses. Following these findings, I conclude in chapter 8 
with a discussion on the implications of this research’s findings and on the theoretical debates to 
which it contributes. 
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2.0  CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This research project has two objectives, one empirical, the other theoretical. The 
empirical goal is to explain the conditions needed for the successful uploading of national 
policies at the European level by countries holding the Council Presidency. In order to achieve 
this, I will look at three main case studies, the Council Presidency semesters of France (2008), 
the Czech Republic (2008) and Sweden (2009). In addition, I rely on the two shadow cases of the 
United Kingdom (2005) and Belgium (2010). To uncover the variables necessary for national 
policy uploading to occur, I look at the evolution of two policy proposals for each main case 
study. Through these cases I seek empirical evidence on the variables that contributed to the 
successful uploading of national policy. 
The theoretical goal is to use the results of the empirical analysis and to draw conclusions 
on the uploading of national policies in the European Union (EU). In order to do that, I use a 
theoretical framework combining the “governance approach” (Stoker 1998, Hooghe and Marks 
2001, Peters and Pierre 2005a) with “new institutionalism” (Hall and Taylor 1996). The 
governance approach enables me to introduce national-level variables into the analysis of policy-
making and the Council Presidency, and to take in consideration variables that have been 
overlooked in the literature on the Council Presidency which have mostly been limited to the use 
of rational choice institutionalism. Specifically, I focus on the capacity the country holding the 
Council Presidency has to upload. The concept of policy capacity (Painter and Pierre 2005) is 
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central to my analysis.  The combination of both approaches guide my empirical inquiry and 
serve as the basis for theoretical generalization. 
In this chapter, I first start by presenting how the governance approach and new 
institutionalism help us to understand the policy process in the European Union, and specifically, 
policy uploading. Then, I look at how policy capacity matters in policy-making by putting it in 
the context of the European Union. I also discuss agenda-setting in the EU. Then, I review the 
institutional setting in which policy-making takes place at the European level, focusing on the 
Council. I will subsequently review the literature on EU Presidencies and policy-making. 
Following that section, I discuss the evolution of the role of national executives in the EU.  Then, 
I present what policy uploading is and how it fits the literature on policy transfer. Finally, I 
conclude with the presentation of the research design for this book. 
2.1 (NEW) GOVERNANCE AND NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION CONTEXT 
The governance and new institutionalist approaches to study the European Union provide more 
flexible frameworks than the traditional (neo-) functionalism vs. inter-governmentalism debate 
that has been prevalent in earlier EU studies of its institutions and decision-making (Moravcsik 
1998, Branch and Ohrgaard 1999, Moravcsik 1999, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1999, Wallace, 
et al. 1999, Rosamond 2000). The usage governance and new institutionalist theories in EU 
studies increases the comparative value of the EU, its institutions and its policy process. 
The governance approach was first concerned with “the steering action of political 
authorities as they deliberately attempt to shape socio-economic structures and processes” 
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(Mayntz 2003: 27).  As such, it was concerned with what governments were doing. On the other 
hand, new governance is not about what the governments do anymore, but rather how they do it 
(Pierre 2009). As such, “governance is a relational concept which includes at least two actors. It 
may involve hierarchical relationships of authority and control or reciprocal interaction based 
upon negotiation and mutuality. Governance may have a legalistic ring or be expressed in the 
arrival at a mutual understanding of common objectives, procedures and policies” (Lane 1997). 
In the context of the European Union, governance not only refers to the relationships between the 
member states’ governments, the European institutions, and non-state actors, understood as 
“multi-level governance” (Hooghe and Marks 2001); it also refers to the format governing 
decisions take – ‘modes of governance’. I look at these two aspects of European Union 
governance within this book, but the first one takes a prevalent place in this study. 
Multi-level governance suggests that authority and policy-making are not only shared at 
different levels, but also that supranational institutions have independent influence on the 
outcomes, that all political arenas are inter-connected, and that national governments have lost 
control in collective decision-making (Hooghe and Marks 2001). In sum, the literature suggests 
that because of the complexity of the multi-level structure in the EU, member states have lost 
their capacity to directly influence the European policy process, or to govern effectively.  
Primarily concerned with the uploading of national policies to the European level by 
member states’ government, I use the concept of policy capacity, originating from the 
governance approach, because it encompasses structural and resource dimensions. This concept 
takes its root in the governance approach. Its origins, definition and how I use it in this book will 
be discussed in the next section. But I want to assess its strengths and weaknesses here. As 
mentioned before the advantage of using this concept in my analytical framework is to bring 
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national-level variables into my analysis of policy uploading and the Council Presidency. In 
addition, it directly speaks to claims that states are losing their capacity to influence and exercise 
authority on decisions. However, this concept is not without flaws. The major flaw facing this 
concept has to do with its measurement. Many scholars are using this concept broadly and 
without providing information about how to measure it. Hence, no common definition or 
common elements constituting the basis for its measurement exists in the literature. To remediate 
to this general weakness, I try to be as precise as possible with its definition and measurement. 
The multi-level structure of the EU can be viewed not only with governance lenses, but 
also with an institutionalist one. Under this perspective, the institutional design of the EU shapes 
social and political life by providing restrictions on the behavior of social and political actors. 
The new institutionalism school of thought (March and Olsen 1984, Hall and Taylor 1996) 
emerged as a way to bring back institutions into the analysis of political phenomenon. It is 
composed of three streams, namely sociological institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, 
and historical institutionalism. All three view institutions as important variables shaping the 
social and political life. They consider that institutions are providing boundaries to social and 
political actors. What distinguishes one stream from the other is with regards to their perception 
on the nature and functions of institutions. Consequently, each stream provides different 
conclusions as to the role institutions play in influencing actors’ behavior and shaping political 
outcomes. 
Most of the new institutionalist approach and concepts used in this book falls under the 
rational choice stream. According to Hall and Taylor (1996), four features characterize this 
approach. First, actors are considered to have a determined set of preferences, and they act in 
order to maximize these preferences. Second, scholars using this approach perceive political 
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processes as a sequence of coordination problems. Third, the actions of actors are explained 
according to their calculus (cost-benefit analysis) and the perception they have about the interests 
of the other players involved in the game. Fourth, this approach has difficulties explaining how 
institutions emerge in the first place.  
The first tenet of rational choice is of importance for this book. As such, I take as a given 
the preferences of the member states holding the Council Presidency, according to the policy 
proposed or implemented already at the national level. The EU Presidency is considered to be a 
window of opportunity for member states to maximize their preferences through policy 
uploading. However, on the one hand, even if I consider preferences as a given and contrary to 
most studies using this approach, I do not consider the member state to be a unitary actor as I 
look into the core executive of each member state holding the Council Presidency, as well as into 
the role of high public officials. On the other hand, when looking into the interactions between 
the Council Presidency and the other member states and European institutions, I adopt this 
unitary perspective as it provides a good way to simplify the analysis. 
Although rational choice is especially valued for its simplification of complex political 
outcomes, it is not without its own limitations. As such, the over-simplification of political 
realities is precisely one of the most common critiques this approach faces.  
Within this research, I have adopted some concepts or literature coming from the rational 
choice stream. For example, I use the concept of veto player (Tsebelis 1995, 2002). Veto players 
are “individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is 
required for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 1995). According to the theory of veto players 
theory, the potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of 
congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of 
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policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. Using the 
concept of veto player allows me to capture the complexity of the EU institutional structure for 
looking into policy uploading, which can be perceived as a policy change in this framework. One 
of the weakness of this framework is the possibility for scholars to disagree on the number of 
veto players within the same institutional system.  
In addition, I have used literature on venue shopping, which also takes root in the rational 
choice perspective (Guiraudon 2000, Pralle 2003). Based on a cost-benefit analytical framework, 
this literature looks into the motivations member states have for choosing to bring issues at 
different levels. Using this approach to study why the country holding the EU Presidency wants 
to upload its national policies enabled me to assess the motivations behind the choice for 
pursuing policy uploading. 
2.2 POLICY-MAKING AND THE ISSUE OF POLICY CAPACITY AND AGENDA-
SETTING 
The concept of capacity is based on the consideration of two dimensions: structural 
characteristics and resource stocks a governing system (in this study it is represented by a 
country) possesses (Painter and Pierre 2005). Painter and Pierre (2005) distinguish between three 
types of capacities a governing system can possess: policy capacity, administrative capacity and 
state capacity. They constitute separate aspects of governing and they are interdependent. 
Administrative capacity refers to the management of human and material resources required to 
deliver output, whereas state capacity is based on the “ability the state has to mobilize social and 
economic support to achieve public-regarding goals” (basically, illustrating the relation between 
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the state and society) (Painter and Pierre 2005: 2). Policy capacity is defined in the literature as 
the “ability to marshal the necessary resources to make intelligent collective choices about and 
set strategic directions for the allocation of scarce resources to public ends” (Painter and Pierre 
2005: 2). Policy capacity is key to the other types of capacity as it offers the objects (policy) 
necessary for a state to act in the administrative and state capacity realms. Consequently, steering 
and strategies for effective governance are central to policy capacity (Painter and Pierre 2005). 
In the context of the European Union, the policy capacity of EU member states appears to 
have eroded as a consequence of both external factors (i.e. globalization, cross-cutting issues, 
etc.) and institutional ones (Scharpf 1994, Hooghe and Marks 2001, Painter and Pierre 2005). 
Generally, it is possible for states to choose between two paths of action within the European 
multi-level structure: member states can transfer their policy capacity to EU institutions, or they 
can engage in multi-level governance processes to regain some of their lost policy capacity 
(Peters and Pierre 2005b). In the former, member states are influenced by the EU institutions and 
their governments can try to “piggy-back” on the EU’s policy capacity for domestic purpose 
reasons. The latter is of particular interest for this research project. ‘Playing the multilevel 
governance game’ entails that member states will chose to explore or not different avenues 
(horizontal and vertical) to re-build their policy capacity (Peters and Pierre 2005b). 
The policy capacity model in this research is based on the premise that some 
governments will better be able to promote and push for their national policies at the European 
level than others. As such, the ability of a country to influence EU policy-making is closely 
related to its policy capacity. In this book, policy capacity is understood in organizational terms 
and constitutes a quality of government. The capacity of a government will vary in function of 
the effectiveness of the administrative and political structures (Painter and Pierre 2005). “Policy 
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capacity can be gathered both from the analysis of the quality and quantity of institutional 
resources and from the success of specific outputs and outcomes” (Painter and Pierre 2005: 3).  
Policy capacity is not set in stone: it fluctuates. It may be different from one episode to 
another, from issue area to issue area, and it may also change over time (Painter and Pierre 
2005). Moreover, the institutional configurations at the country as well as at the European level 
will affect the policy capacity one country possesses. In the case of the EU Presidency, not only 
is the country holding the chairmanship dependent on its national policy capacity, but also 
potentially on EU institutions' policy capacity (Peters and Pierre 2005b). 
A certain number of barriers to the efforts of the policy-makers to change, initiate, and 
implement policies exist at the European level due to the number of actors involved and its 
institutional design (Scharpf 1994, Tsebelis and Garrett 1997, Hooghe and Marks 2001). 
Moreover, as in the case of the national policy process, the outcome is highly dependent on the 
skills and resources available to the policy-maker. Resistance to a change in the status quo may 
exist simply because people have become used to behaving inside specific institutional settings. 
The barriers related to policy capacity that a policy-maker may face depend on many 
factors. It may depend on the command of sufficient expertise and experience one has in a 
specific policy subfield. In fact, the less expertise and experience in the policy field the policy-
maker has, the more likely the policy-maker will be dependent on its public servants. Therefore, 
it means that more people will be involved in the policy process and that the policy-maker is 
increasingly dependent on the information provided by others in making the decision. Other 
important variables identified in the literature point to the ability of the policy-maker to 
effectively manage the department he controls (Rose 1974). Although these elements have been 
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considered at the domestic level, they are extremely relevant at the European level as well when 
a country holds the presidency. 
Policy capacity is not the only important variable to consider in the policy process. How 
an actor can manipulate the policy process is just as important (steering and strategies). The 
agenda-setting literature informs us about institutional setting and policy characteristics that may 
hinder (or not) the adoption of a given policy. 
First, as mentioned before, the multi-level nature of the EU allows decision-makers to 
play with the different venues. Venue shopping (playing with multiple levels in the case of the 
EU) rests on the ability a decision-maker has to choose to deal with issues  at the level that 
would enable him to reach its policy goal (Pralle 2003) or/and reduce his political costs 
(Guiraudon 2000). Three explanations exist in the literature to justify the shifting of issues from 
the domestic to the European level: first, a political explanation focusing on the circumvention of 
domestic constraints; second, a more practical and cost-benefit based explanation centered on the 
Europeanization of regulatory standards; and finally, a normative approach which explains the 
shift out of idealist or missionary considerations (Princen 2009).  
Second, institutional characteristics differ from one venue to the other and from one 
policy area to another. For example, each venue does not have the same number of veto players 
and the voting rules depend on the policy area. Veto players are important elements to consider 
in the policy process. They are individuals or collective players whose approval is required for a 
policy proposal to go further (Tsebelis 2002). Consequently, the policy outcome is influenced 
both by the interests and the number of veto players. It is possible that a veto player may be able 
to put an issue high on the agenda but due to the characteristics of the venue the status quo might 
 21 
be more likely to prevail. It is also possible that an issue will be kept off the agenda if the 
interests of other veto players are evaluated to be too far away from the proposed policy.   
Third, many characteristics of the policy itself may influence the ability one has to upload 
it. How the issue is framed and how the proposed solution responds to the other members’ 
concerns and interests are unequivocally important. By framing, Princen refers to the definition 
of the “nature of problems and solution as well as the appropriateness of the EU as a level of 
government.” (2009: 39) The framing of a policy may make it more attractive to a larger number 
of decision-makers and foster the building of consensus around a particular policy proposal. 
Moreover, it has been argued in the literature that certain frames may have more weight than 
others in the context of the EU. This is the case for frames focusing on an economic logic and on 
European integration (Princen 2009).  
2.3 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
The European Union is a complex institutional structure in which many actors interact in the 
policy-making process, both at the domestic and European levels. The EU has a unique policy-
making structure combining supranational and intergovernmental elements. Understanding 
policy making and power games within the EU is important because the EU’s power to legislate 
has expanded over the years to areas usually reserved to nation-states. This is due in part to the 
increasing need for countries to find shared solutions for common problems. This has led many 
scholars to argue that member countries’ power relative to the EU is eroding and that given the 
nature of the organization it has become more complex to influence it (Marks, et al. 1996, 
Richardson 2006). 
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Consequently, the study of the Council, becomes particularly relevant for understanding 
how countries can influence the policy process in the EU. The Council represents the direct 
interests of the member countries in EU policy-making process. The intergovernmental nature of 
the institution dominates, but informal integration in the Council has proven to promote 
supranational values (Lewis 2003) that affect the day-to-day business. In order to reach 
decisions, bargaining between states takes place. To supervise these bargains, a country holds the 
Presidency and chairs the meetings. The powers of the Presidency have grown since its creation 
in 1958, and it is now possible for the Presidency to influence the agenda and to promote its own 
interests (Bengtsson, et al. 2004, Tallberg 2006, Schalk, et al. 2007).  
The Presidency rotates every six months between EU member states according to a pre-
determined schedule (from January to June, and from July to December). The schedule considers 
the formation of ‘trio presidencies’ that include since 2007 one large member, a medium-sized 
state and a small country.3   
In the Council of the European Union, the work is done in committees that are composed 
of the ministers from the member countries according to the subject at hand (i.e. foreign affairs, 
transport, social affairs, justice and home affairs, etc.). In each committee, the minister of the 
country holding the Presidency chairs the meetings. The countries’ voting weight and the voting 
procedure to be followed are determined by Treaties. Depending on the policy area, decisions 
may require unanimity, simple or qualified majority, and may or may not follow a co-decisional 
procedure with the European Parliament.  
                                                 
3 Between 1995 and 2007, a trio was composed of at least one large member state and small ones. 
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In the case of the European Council and prior to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 
December 20094, the Presidency is held by the Head of government or state of the country of 
which it is the rotation term. The European Council usually makes decisions by consensus, but it 
also depends on the existing Treaty provisions for the issue been under discussion.  
The Presidency is a perfect example of an institution combining both supranational and 
intergovernmental elements, as the country holding it must promote the collective interests of the 
EU members and European integration, while at the same time many use the chairmanship to 
promote their national interests. The Council Presidency has been qualified by some scholars as 
a “quasi-supranational” institution (Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008), reflecting the duality of 
interests that exists within it.  
Through its use of informal institutional mechanisms, such as the principle of presidential 
impartiality, the Presidency is considered to have supranational characteristics. Presidential 
impartiality entails that the country holding the Presidency is considered very powerful “and 
[should be] very much committed to a higher European goal and not to its national 
interests.”(Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008: 13) This principle is well-guarded by the Council 
Secretariat, which emphasizes it when informing the holders of the Presidency of their 
responsibilities. However, the norm of neutrality is often challenged by states holding the 
Presidency (Tallberg 2006). If this principle was fully respected, the Presidency would represent 
only an additional burden for its holder as the president would not be able to use the powers 
associated to the position to its advantage. As a result, the country would be cut-off from 
negotiations that might involve its national interests.   
                                                 
4 With the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a ‘semi-permanent’ presidency was created. The treaty stipulates that the 
president is elected by qualified majority and for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. 
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The interaction between the supranational and intergovernmental realities of the 
Presidency, combined with the existence of the principle of impartiality and its push by 
Eurocrats within the Council, created an invisible line countries should not cross in the pursuit of 
their national interests while holding it. Essentially, states ‘may’ pursue their interests, but it 
should not be obvious. The members who have openly challenged this norm through their 
actions as president received many criticisms and have ensued some reputational costs (Lempp 
and Altenschmidt 2008). Moreover, if such behaviour occurs at the beginning of the Presidency 
period, it may also result in difficulties reaching compromises in other areas. France faced these 
types of criticisms and difficulties during its 2000 and 2008 presidencies. 
This duality of interests (supranational vs. intergovernmental) reflects what exists also 
more generally inside the Council as well (Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008). The Council is an 
institution created to provide the member countries with a forum for discussions, negotiations, 
and the ability to reach compromises while safeguarding their national interests at the EU level. 
The Council is constituted of many sub-institutions that support its work and the Presidency, 
namely the different Council’s working groups, COREPER and the Council Secretariat. These 
are the institutions providing continuity to the Council’s work.  
The Secretariat is mostly composed of independent civil servants coming from member 
countries5 (Peterson and Shackleton 2002). The secretariat is often considered to only have a 
supporting role in the work of the Council and the European Council, but some scholars argue 
that its role may be more important than originally presumed (Beach 2004, Christiansen 2006, 
Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008). Scholars have argued that the Secretariat has the 
opportunity to push for pro-integration ideals that it supports, despite the intergovernmental 
                                                 
5 In the case of the DG E dealing with CFSP, the policy unit is also staffed with national officials and military members.  
 25 
nature of its work. Moreover, Beach (2004) argues that with its informational advantage and the 
legitimacy it enjoys, the Secretariat has even been able to exercise leadership in instances when 
the country holding the Presidency lacked it. 
In the case of COREPER and the working groups, a similar development has occurred 
despite the appointments being made through national channels. As such, many have argued that 
individuals within the EU structures have socialized and developed as well as shifted their 
loyalty from the national to the supranational level (Beyers and Dierickx 1998, Egeberg 1999, 
Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008). 
2.4 LITERATURE ON EU PRESIDENCIES, POLICY-MAKING AND AGENDA-
SETTING 
Because of the role of the Commission in policy-making, the limited time a country holds the 
Presidency, and the administrative burden it represents, the ability of a country to really use the 
position has long been questioned by scholars (De Bassompierre 1988, Nugent 1994). However, 
in recent years, scholars have devoted more attention to the role of the chairmanship (Tallberg 
2003, 2004, 2006, Bunse 2009), how the Presidency can influence decision outcomes (Kollman 
2003, Thomson 2008), and how it may not exactly be neutral in conducting its role (Elgström 
2003). 
The studies on the chairmanship produced by scholars mainly use the rational choice 
approach and focus primarily on the ability a country holding the Presidency has to manipulate 
the agenda. Three types of behaviour of the chairmanship have been developed: the EU 
Presidency as an agenda shaper, as a broker, and as a representative (Tallberg 2006). As the 
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agenda manager, the Presidency is expected to delimit and structure the agenda. The role of 
facilitating brokerage emanates directly from the idea of the neutrality of the chair for managing 
discussion and negotiations among the members in order to facilitate the emergence of a 
compromise. Finally, the chairmanship is also delegated by the members of the Council the role 
of representation vis-à-vis third parties. These functions of the chairmanship are argued to have 
originated from functional needs (Tallberg 2006). 
Agenda-setting is an important aspect of policy-making and the Presidency, having the 
possibility to play with the agenda, is given a powerful role. An element often omitted from 
studying agenda-setting with the rational choice approach is related to the “who”. Agenda-setting 
means that not only “what is being talked about [is important, but it also] depends on who is 
doing the talking” (Princen 2009).  
Many resources associated to the Presidency give it an advantage over the other 
members. By holding this position, the Presidency has access to a set of power resources:  
privileged information and procedural control (Tallberg 2006). In terms of privileged 
information, it is possible to think that the country holding the chair will have a better knowledge 
of the preferences the other countries have in regard to different issues, that they can acquire 
technical knowledge over specific ubject matter, and that they can develop their ability to play 
with the formal rules as they know them better (Tallberg 2006: 30) .  
According to formal leadership theory, the institutional design of the chairmanship also 
shapes how the Presidency will be able to push for its national interests within the system 
(Tallberg 2006). When a rotation system is adopted, it creates a reciprocity system between the 
states that enables them to give the chair some flexibility when it holds it.  
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Because most of the studies looking at the EU Presidencies have relied mostly on rational 
choice institutionalism to look at its effect on policy-making, and focus only on the European 
level, some of the lacunae the work of these scholars show are the exclusion of domestic politics 
and the reliance on the approach that the member state is a single actor. Moreover, as Bunse 
(2009) points out, most of these studies have relied also on the study of formal powers. 
Discussions on the EU Presidency only look at the negotiations taking place between countries at 
the European level, only as a one-level game. By dismissing the dynamics taking place between 
the supranational and the national levels, and the complexity of actors involved in the 
achievement of national interests at the European level, scholars have set aside variables that can 
be very useful in understanding how countries use the Presidency differently and why. These are 
some of the questions this research project seek to answer with the use of the governance 
approach. 
2.5 NATIONAL EXECUTIVES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
As the pace of the European integration process increased and as its nature changed by steeping 
on high politics areas, member countries’ executives have faced an increasing burden on their 
offices (James 2010). This is reflected by the increasing role of the European Council, in which 
the national executives play a key function. 
The European Council can be considered as the highest political body of the EU. It has 
evolved as an integral part of the decision-making machinery (Westlake and Galloway 2004, 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, Werts 2008). The European Council meets to make 
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decisions, create, and adopt guidelines, review and call for policy changes, etc. Essentially, the 
work of the European Council shapes the direction in which the EU institutions will go.   
The number of meetings has drastically increased over the years, going from one per 
Presidency, to at least two each one, plus the informal meetings. In addition, with the increasing 
use of ‘informal intergovernmentalism’, and the pre-negotiation of agreements prior to the 
Council meetings, cabinets of national executives have empowered themselves even more, with 
the heads of state or government becoming the ultimate negotiators (Tallberg 2008, James 2010, 
Johansson and Tallberg 2010). “The European Council serves as the ultimate decision-maker on 
issues too complex or contentious for the Council of Ministers to handle, shapes the EU’s 
collective foreign policy, coordinates member state policy on socioeconomic issues, appoints 
senior officials of the EU institutions, initiates and concludes constitutional conferences that 
amend the treaties, and effectively decides if, when, and how the EU should welcome new 
members.”(Johansson and Tallberg 2010) 
Despite the existence of formal guidelines defining the limits of the European Council’s 
powers (i.e. through the treaties), informal practices give it a central role in all policy areas. 
“Operating (...) in the absence of a clearly defined role or explicitly delimited functions, the 
European Council has felt free to deal with whatever issue it likes in whatever way it likes. As a 
result, the heads of state or government have been, and continue to be, involved directly in all the 
important issues on the EU’s agenda” (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 170). Moreover, 
because of the complexities of the issues dealt with in the specialized Councils, the European 
Council is often called upon because the issues are politically sensitive, or because issues cut 
across various Council configurations and may need a package agreement. 
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The increasing demands on the European Council are paralleling a phenomena discussed 
more and more by scholars of parliamentary democracies in Europe: the ‘presidentialization’ 
process of their regime (Bäck, et al. 2009). The ‘presidentialization’ process is understood as the 
result of Europeanization taking place among the core executive of a country, and it is argued in 
some cases to be the result of European integration (Bäck, et al. 2009). At the domestic level, 
“the reforms involved shifts in authority, discretion and resources in favour of the chief 
executive, and [are] explicitly motivated by the perceived institutional prerequisites for influence 
in the European Council.” (Johansson and Tallberg 2010: 210) 
2.6 UPLOADING POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
One trend in the study of European integration has been to look at how the European Union 
policies affect the member countries. This constitutes the conventional conception of 
Europeanization as a top-down process of policy transfer (Radaelli 2003, Lenschow 2006). On 
the other hand, less attention has been devoted to the study of the upward process, that is, how 
domestic policies influence the EU policy-making, what I call “uploading”. 
I conceptualize uploading as a policy transfer taking place from the national to the 
European level. In the literature, policy transfer is defined as “a process in which knowledge 
about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in 
the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or 
place” (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344). Based on this definition, and applied to the European 
Union, I define policy uploading as the transfer of elements surrounding national policies in one 
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country, such as knowledge, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc., to the European 
level.  
The literature on policy transfer identifies the objects of possible transfer and the degree 
of replication it can take. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identify seven possible objects of transfer: 
policy goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; 
ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons. In this book, these elements of 
transfer guide the identification of the objects one country has been able to upload or not.  
Beyond the objects of transfer, the literature on policy transfer suggests many degrees it 
can take. Rose (1974, 1993) identifies five different degrees of transfer: copying; emulation; 
hybridization; synthesis; and inspiration. Copying or emulation can be pictured to be at the upper 
end of the scale, with hybridization or synthesis being in the middle, and mere influence (or 
inspiration) been the weaker type of policy transfer. In the context of the EU, these 
conceptualizations suggest that the uploading of national policies to the European level can take 
many forms and dynamics. 
Given the context of the EU and the aim of this study, three types of policy transfer 
interest me. First, copying or emulation refers to the transfer of a given policy in a national 
setting, replicating the exact same policy in another. Second, hybridization is constituted of 
elements from different national settings. Third, influence refers to the transfer of particular 
national ideas to another political setting. I am using these types of transfers in order to build my 
measure of policy uploading in the EU. 
 Many institutional variables will influence policy uploading in the EU. First, the 
institutional design of the EU and the absence of a government or “vertical axis of hierarchy” 
(Padgett 2003) allows for more or less fluid form of policy-making that incorporates a plurality 
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of actors. Consequently, the “institutional opportunity structure” (multiple access points, 
decision-making processes, and veto points) exists to influence the policy process (Padgett 
2003). Depending at which stage influence occurs, the result will not be the same. Applied to the 
project of this book, it suggests that the possibilities for the occurrence of policy uploading will 
be different depending at which stage of the policy process it happens. 
 The European Commission is usually identified as having a stronger impact on the policy 
process as it is given the role of the agenda-setter (Pollack 2003) and of policy manager (Pierson 
1996). This argument rests on the initiative prerogative the Commission possesses. This is 
especially true in the areas of community competency, based on the assumption that the 
Commission can draft its proposals without any outside influence and that the changes that can 
be made to them are limited.  However, in practice, the Council Presidency has some power over 
the agenda, and given its role, the European Council sets long-term orientations to which the 
Commission is submitted. 
The second institutional variable affecting policy transfer concerns the negotiating 
environment. It has the potential to shape national preferences (Padgett 2003), but it can also 
shape the result as the later depends on the ability of an institution or a country to reconcile the 
heterogeneity of national preferences (Héritier 1999). In the literature, some scholars distinguish 
between bargaining and problem solving negotiation environments (Bulmer and Padgett 2004, 
Bulmer, et al. 2007b). In a bargaining environment, a situation in which an actor is in the pursuit 
of self-interests and promotes adversarial exchange, the policy transfer outcome is argued to lead 
to deadlock or to the lowest common denominator solution. However, Héritier (1999) has argued 
that mechanisms such as issue-linkages, loser compensation, the alteration of preferences, or the 
creation of frameworks can take place during bargaining negotiations which in turn may result in 
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escaping deadlock in particular policy area. Thus, it may be possible to have more than lower 
common denominator solutions within a bargaining environment. 
 The second negotiating environment identified in the literature is one that focuses on 
problem solving (Bulmer and Padgett 2004, Bulmer, et al. 2007b). In this type of negotiating 
environment, negotiations are oriented towards common interests and policy transfer is argued to 
result in solutions that meet all members’ interests. The problem solving environment 
concentrates on the exchange of information among the actors. Bulmer and Padgett (2004) argue 
that in a problem solving negotiating environment, emulation is more likely to succeed. 
Considering the practices of decision-making and the norm of consensus existing within the 
Council and the European Council, both negotiating environments seem to exist simultaneously.  
Finally, the mode of decision employed affects policy transfer. Scholars have argued that 
as the number of veto points increases, it reinforces the use of compromise for policy-making 
(Tsebelis 1995, Tsebelis and Garrett 1997, Padgett 2003, Bulmer and Padgett 2004, Bulmer, et 
al. 2007b). Moreover, Padgett (2003) shows that copying or emulation is more likely to be found 
under less demanding majority rules. 
The literature using the governance approach is also informative about the influence the 
legal format policies take can have on the prospect of agreement between actors. The distinction 
between different modes of governance, such as soft law and hard law instruments, has received 
considerable attention by scholars. It is generally considered that more authoritative legislative 
instruments (i.e. more based on hard law) are harder to adopt than less authoritative ones (based 
on soft law instruments), but they provide a more credible commitment as the costs associated 
with deviation from them are higher (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Many authors have demonstrated 
that European integration is influenced by both hard and soft law modes of governance (De la 
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Porte, et al. 2001, Héritier 2001, Trubek and Trubek 2005, Bruno, et al. 2006). The dichotomy 
between hard law and soft law is often represented in the literature on the EU by the Community 
Method opposing the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Héritier 2001, Scott and Trubek 
2002, Trubek and Trubek 2005).  
Based on these discussions, I argue in this book that the Presidency evolved into an 
influential institution providing the office holder with a comparative advantage to shape the EU’s 
agenda and policy outcomes in line with its national interests, exemplified through policy 
uploading. Accordingly, I expect to find that there is an intentional push for the uploading of 
national policies to the European level from the country holding the Presidency (Hypothesis 1). 
Specifically, I hypothesize that uploading is more likely to occur in instances where the country 
wants to legitimize decisions on controversial domestic issues or avoid domestic pressure and 
political costs (Hypothesis 1.1). Because domestic situations are different from one Member state 
to another, not all the countries holding the Presidency will have the same success in uploading 
their policies. As such, I expect that the policy capacity of the country holding the Presidency, 
the concentration of executive power in a country, the policy proposed, and the individual 
holding the chair will affect the ability a country has to upload its national policies. More 
precisely, I expect to find that the stronger the policy capacity of a country, the more 
concentrated the executive power is and the more liked the leader holding the chair is by the 
other decision-makers, combined with a policy reflecting the convergence of interests of the 
members, the more likely the country will be able to upload its national policy (Hypothesis 2). In 
addition, I also expect to find that each of these variables may not weigh equally in each type of 
uploading (subtle or direct) (Hypothesis 2.1). Lastly, I evaluate the changes brought by the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. I hypothesize that the creation of the ‘permanent’ Presidency will 
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reduce the likelihood of domestic policy uploading because negotiations are managed in a more 
neutral manner, and desires for policy uploading are more apparent (Hypothesis 3). 
2.7 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to seek evidence for the evaluation of the hypotheses in this research project, I rely on 
the case study method. I follow a most-similar systems design, and rely on a small number of in-
depth case studies. Using this method allows me to control for “concomitant variation” (Peters 
1998). It strengthens my ability to make inferences based in part on the variables originally 
differentiating the countries selected for their Council Presidency. In total, 114 cases of Council 
Presidencies were available at the time of writing this book. The Council presidencies have 
existed since 1958, but the powers given to the institution, whether formal or informal were 
different then. Each of the Treaty changes of the European Union has modified the powers the 
European Council may exercise. For this reason, most of the cases have been selected after the 
implementation of the Nice Treaty. The main three cases are France (2008), the Czech Republic 
(2008) and Sweden (2009). The United Kingdom (2005) will serve as a shadow case. So, too 
will Belgium (2010), which is the only case selected after the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty, with the objective of suggesting how the new system has changed the uploading of 
national policies. Using shadow cases allows for some kind of external validity, as it can support 
the findings uncovered with the main cases on the effect of independent variables on the 
outcome (policy uploading). 
The second element affecting the case selection on the variation in the countries’ policy 
capacity. This is essential in order to test my central hypothesis that policy capacity matters in 
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explaining national policy uploading. This categorization of countries goes beyond the traditional 
‘big versus small’ states distinction, although I also took this into consideration. Policy capacity 
brings additional nuances to the study of the Presidency because it relies more on qualities like 
efficiency and ability to use the relevant resources rather than quantity. The selection of the cases 
was first based on the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell, et al. 2011), which incorporates 
the World Bank’s measure on government effectiveness6. Although the index measuring 
government effectiveness does not measure policy capacity, I used it as a proxy to guide the 
choice of cases. The results of the index show that the Czech Republic ranks the lowest (.93), 
then followed by France (1.60), The United Kingdom (1.93), Belgium (1.98) and Sweden (2.06). 
In parallel, I have I constructed my own general index of policy capacity of Council 
Presidencies, for which I considered two sets of variables: economic and administrative 
resources, and political variables7. I consider a country to have a strong policy capacity when it 
shows good quality use of the indicators. Consequently, the ranking of the cases on policy 
capacity changes. The Czech Republic remains with a low policy capacity. Sweden and Belgium 
are considered to have moderate policy capacity, and France and the UK have strong policy 
capacity. It is important to note that these apply only at the national level: policy capacity in a 
given issue area can be different. 
The third variable taken into consideration is the level of centralization of executive 
power. As discussed in the theoretical section, the literature points to the centralization of power 
in the heads of state and governments. Consequently, it is quite possible that this concentration 
of power affects the ability of a country to upload its national policies. With its semi-presidential 
                                                 
6 The measure of government effectiveness combines indicators on the quality of public service provision, quality of 
bureaucracy, competence of public servants, independence of civil servants from political pressure, and the credibility of 
government’s commitment to policy. 
7 Economic and administrative resources: budget allocated to the presidency (and how it is spend), organizational structure, 
expertise and experience of staff, use of Council Secretariat; political variables: experience of leaders, expertise of leaders. 
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system, France is considered to be a centralized country. On the other hand, despite its 
institutional design (semi-presidential), analysis on the Czech Republic has considered it to 
reflect a system where power is more diffuse than in similar systems (Brusis 2004, Zubek 2008). 
The United Kingdom and Sweden are both unitary parliamentary systems. And finally, Belgium 
is a federal system. 
Other elements are different from case to case but have not driven the case selection 
process: variance in the degree of commitment to European integration, experience in holding 
the office of the Presidency, whether they faced governmental instability or not, differences in 
administrative traditions, and their interests in different policy areas. 
For each main country-case, I look at two policy cases. The attempt was to have a success 
and failure case of each Council Presidency to better be able to identify the variables leading to 
policy uploading. Looking at how two instances of an event/non-event (of policy uploading) per 
country developed increases the number of cases and allows me to identify patterns and causes. 
They were selected according to priorities announced through interviews leaders offered in 
newspapers explaining their EU Presidency’s work programme. For each case, I start by looking 
at the national policy in a given issue-area and then trace and analyze the developments leading 
to policy uploading during the Council Presidency, reflected by the adoption of elements of the 
national policy at the European level. Specifically, I employ process tracing for my within case 
analysis in order to map the causal processes at play. This tool permits to assess which 
explanation should be rejected or not in relation to the dependent variable (George and Bennett 
2005, Bennett 2010).  
I used a non-random, purposive sample made up of officials involved in their country’s 
Council Presidency with whom I conducted semi-structured interviews. In total, I conducted 38 
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interviews. These interviewees were mostly high public officials and politicians involved in their 
country’s Council Presidency, and sometimes directly involved in the policy area under 
investigation. Validity and reliability are important issues to be concerned about for a researcher 
interviewing élites as the individuals questioned may express their bias view, or exaggerate (or 
downplay) their role. Hence, in order to maximize validity and reliability, I have used multiple 
sources for each of the Presidencies and policy areas under study in this book. It helped me to 
corroborate (by triangulating) the information obtained and to help reconstruct the events that 
took place (Tansey 2007). The interview consisted of semi-structured questionnaire protocol 
designed for each Presidency and policy area, but highly similar. The objective for having 
similar fundamentals between the cases is to facilitate comparison within and between cases, but 
also allowing for probing of informants (Tansey 2007). In addition, written primary and 
secondary sources consisting of newspaper reports, official documents, and archival materials.  
Regarding the policy cases, I look at the European level at the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum and the Energy and Climate Package for the French Council 
Presidency (chapter 3); the Common Energy Policy and Immigration Policy for the Czech 
Presidency (chapter 4); and Europe 2020 and EU Carbon Tax for the Swedish Council 
Presidency (chapter 5). Each of these European Policies are first matched to their issue-area at 
the national level. Then I turn to the UK and Belgium shadow cases (chapter 6). I look at the 
Working Time Directive for the UK Council Presidency. I review the changes brought by the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in the case of Belgium.  
Finally in chapter 7, I compare the cases in order to identify the necessary conditions for 
policy uploading to occur (George and Bennett 2005). I assess the necessity of each independent 
variable -- intention (H1); domestic pressures (H1.1); policy capacity, concentration of executive 
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power, leadership, policy content (H2 and H2.1) -- by two standards. First, I examine which of 
these variables are observed in each case. Second, I expect to find that there is a causal link 
between the presence of an independent variable and the observed outcome, namely the 
successful uploading of national policy. 
For its operationalization, I distinguish between two types of policy uploading. These 
categories are based on the literature on policy transfer and can be imagined as constituting a 
range of uploading. The first type is what I identify as subtle uploading. Subtle uploading can be 
defined as the transfer of ideas, goals and norms from the national to the European level. It is 
considered to occur when ideas, goals or norms entrenched at the national level in a given policy 
and expressed through official documents and/or speeches, and interviews with élites, find their 
place in official documents at the European level.  
The second category is direct uploading. It is characterized by the replication of the 
majority of the elements (ideas in addition to, for example, policy instruments, etc.) of the 
national policy at the European level. The result is a copy, with or without changes, of the policy 
in use or projected at a certain time in the country. The easiest way to prove direct uploading has 
occurred is to look at the wording of the adopted policies at the European level. 
2.7.1 Summary on the Selection of Cases 
2.7.1.1 United Kingdom (July-December 2005) 
The United Kingdom (UK) represents a case of centralized executive power, with most 
political decisions taken by the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Tony Blair, from the Labour 
Party, was the Prime Minister during the UK Presidency, and he is usually recognized to have 
exercised good leadership. In theory, the Prime Minister relies on his cabinet and is dependent on 
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the parliament. However, some scholars have argued that the country is experiencing the 
‘presidentialization’ of its system and that the Prime Minister has acquired more power and 
autonomy vis-à-vis the parliament (Foley 1993, 2000). 
 Evaluations on the UK Presidency usually consider it to be a rather successful one, but 
not quite of its own making as it was heavily dependent on the other EU institutions (Whitman 
2006a). Since the entrance of the UK in the European Union, the country held the EU Presidency 
six times. Most importantly, Tony Blair experienced the EU Presidency twice: in 1998 and in 
2005. The 2005 UK Presidency program focused on three main policy areas:  economic reforms 
and social justice, security and stability, and Europe’s role in the world. 
2.7.1.2 France (July—December 2008) 
France also represents a case of centralized executive power, however in the hands of the 
President. France is a semi-presidential system in which the president of the nation is quite 
powerful when not faced with a co-habitation situation. This was the case of Nicolas Sarkozy, 
who was president during the French EU Presidency. He is recognized to have leadership, be 
proactive, and he is usually also characterized as hyper-active (Autret 2008, Barber 2009) .   
France experienced a controversial EU Presidency, but it is usually accepted that it was a 
dynamic and somewhat successful Presidency despite some considerable drawbacks (Barber 
2009, Dehousse and Menon 2009). The French Presidency’s key priorities were on making 
Europe a model for sustainable social, ecological and economic development; making Europe 
more attentive to the rights, security and aspiration of citizens; and finally, reinforcing Europe’s 
role on the international stage. 
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2.7.1.3 The Czech Republic (January – June 2009) 
The Czech case is particular because of the division of powers that exist at the domestic 
level and how this is articulated: the power is quite diffused despite its semi-presidential 
structure. Vaclav Klaus who is the Czech President was not very involved during the country’s 
EU Presidency, except during summits with third countries. Given the role of the President in the 
Czech Republic constitution, Vaclav Klaus has limited powers. However, he still has an 
influential role in his country and on European matters. His only legislative power is the right of 
veto on his country’s legislation. He is also well-known to be a Eurosceptic.  
In the Czech Republic, executive power is centralized in the hands of the government, but 
can be shared by many parties. The government is composed of the Prime Minister, the deputy 
Prime Ministers and of the ministers. Initially, the Czech EU Presidency started with Mirek 
Topolánek as the Prime Minister, who was from a center-right and Eurosceptic political party 
and who head also a center-right coalition government. However, in March 2009 he lost a vote of 
no-confidence, became a caretaker government and was eventually replaced in May by another 
independent caretaker government. At the head of this new government was Jan Fischer. The 
government of Jan Fisher was constituted of members of all political parties, and he was not 
associated with any of them.  
Evaluations on the Czech Presidency generally claim that it was unsuccessful, or that the 
small successes it achieved were quite rare (Barber 2009, Benes and Karlas 2010). No particular 
leadership seems to have been exercised during the country’s term. The EU Presidency of the 
spring 2009 was the first experience for the Czech Republic, and the second time a member from 
East Central Europe held the chair. The Czech Presidency focused on economics, energy, and 
Europe in the world. 
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2.7.1.4 Sweden (July – December 2009) 
Sweden is another case of unitary centralized state. However, in the case of Sweden, 
bureaucrats and specialized agencies are highly involved in policy drafting and implementation 
(Pierre 1995). Besides, executive power remains centralized in the hand of the Prime Minister 
and his cabinet. Similarly to the United Kingdom, Sweden is also undergoing a process of 
‘presidentialization’ which increases the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime 
Minister and his ministers (Bäck, et al. 2009). During the Swedish Presidency, Frederik 
Reinfeldt was Prime Minister and he was from the Moderate Party, a center-right party. He was 
at the head of a governmental coalition of center-right parties. 
The evaluation of the Swedish Presidency is mixed. When it is argued that it was 
successful, the focus is on the efficiency of the Presidency in concluding final agreements on the 
constitution and on policy packages; whereas it is considered to be unsuccessful when the 
attention is put on policy initiation and implementation (Miles 2010). The Swedish Presidency’s 
key priorities were economy and employment, climate, justice and home affairs, and Europe in 
the world. 
2.7.1.5 Belgium (July – December 2010) 
Again, the case of Belgium is the only EU Presidency that took place after the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force in December 2009. 
During the EU Presidency, Belgium was faced with domestic turbulence at the federal 
level. The country started and ended its EU Presidency with a caretaker government, as the 
differences between the Walloon and Flemish communities seemed irreconcilable and no 
compromise was found in order to form a new government. At the head of the caretaker 
government was Yves Leterme, from the center-right Christian Democrat and Flemish (CDV) 
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political party. He is the head of a coalition government with other Flemish parties. Executive 
power is thus dispersed among many political parties.   
In general, the evaluations of the Belgian presidency consider it quite efficient and 
successful (Le Bussy 2010, Leblanc 2010, Taylor 2011). According to the accounts of politicians 
and public officials in the newspaper, Belgium is recognized to be a great negotiator and to have 
great abilities in fostering the emergence of compromise. The Belgian Presidency program 
focused on three main areas: socio-economic priorities, climate and environmental concerns, and 
the European Area of Freedom, security and Justice. 
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3.0  FRANCE 2008 COUNCIL PRESIDENCY 
This chapter examines the case of the 2008 French EU Council Presidency. It points to 
which variables are important in facilitating uploading for a country such as France, chosen for 
its strong policy capacity and centralization of power.  In this chapter I focus on the issues of the 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and on the Climate and Energy package. Both were 
high on the French Council Presidency’s priorities (French Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union 2008).  
This chapter demonstrates that, despite its strong overall national policy capacity, France 
lacks capacity in the areas of energy and environmental policies.  This relative weakness results 
from relying more on external experts than in the case of migration related policies. This resulted 
in more difficulty for promoting its own policies in that area, especially because the proposals 
were also well advanced in the EU policy process. More importantly, I suggest  that the 
leadership exercised (or not) by a country within a specific policy area (whether it is a policy 
entrepreneur, a pusher,  a laggard, or a fence sitter) and the role taken as the Council Presidency 
holder will impact the ability of a country to upload its national policies. France is a laggard in 
the areas of energy and climate change policies and took more the role of the broker during the 
negotiations, which diminished radically its ability to upload. On the other hand, in the area of 
migration policy France is a pusher and an agenda manager, which enabled it to upload its 
national policies at the European level by focusing on general goals in the proposed Pact. 
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The chapter is divided into five sections. The first presents a global analysis of the French 
Council Presidency and its priorities. The second section looks at the national coordination of 
European policies in France, which is heavily linked to policy capacity. The third and fourth 
sections examine the cases of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the 
Energy/Climate Package. These two sections provide a survey of the national policy in France in 
the relevant policy area and discuss the pre-Presidency and actual Presidency period before 
providing an analysis of the case. The conclusion provides a comparative analysis of the two 
cases. 
3.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The French EU Presidency was controversial. On the one hand, analysts point positively at the 
dynamism of the Presidency period and the abilities France showed to accomplish many of its 
programme priorities and efforts to solve international crisis. On the other hand, France’s actions 
undermined community institutions and actors, as well as other member states (Barber 2009, 
Dehousse and Menon 2009). France controlled its agenda, and took initiatives quickly when 
required, for example with the financial crisis and the Russia-Georgia conflict, without waiting 
for European institutional actors. Moreover, it often neglected its usual allies in the Council in 
favor of its own interests. 
The French Presidency focused on three key priorities. The first was environment, energy 
security and sustainable development. The particular focus in that area was on the Energy-
Climate Package, energy security, and financial regulation. The second priority was on “making 
Europe more attentive to the rights, security and aspirations of its citizens” which included 
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immigration. And finally, its last priority was on Europe’s international presence, with special 
emphasis on the CSDP, enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Union for the 
Mediterranean (French Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2008). However, as 
mentioned before, the French Presidency also faced many unplanned issues such as the Russia-
Georgia crisis and the beginning of the financial crisis in Europe which had to be put on the 
agenda at the last minute because they required quick action. The financial crisis was of 
particular importance for the negotiations on the Energy/Climate package because economic 
concerns weighted more heavily in the balance than they would of otherwise. 
3.2 NATIONAL CONTEXT AND COORDINATION OF EUROPEAN POLICY 
France has a unique and complex configuration for the national coordination of European 
policies. The coordination system involves individuals from different departments and 
organizations, both at the national and European levels, but everything must go through the 
Secrétariat Général des Affaires Européennes (SGAE). The SGAE is under the direct 
supervision of the Prime Minister and the State secretary for European Affairs. Whether it 
concerns diffusion of European-level decisions downwards, transposition, or providing the 
French position to national actors at the European level, the SGAE is always in the middle- an 
unavoidable institution. The SGAE’s main missions are to make sure French interests are 
promoted coherently in Europe and to coordinate the different actors in constructing French 
positions. 
The SGAE can be considered to provide France with strong policy capacity, and this is 
reflected through its administrative organization. The director of the SGAE is a special advisor to 
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the Prime Minister. The SGAE is composed of civil servants originating from different 
departments for a term of three years. They provide specific knowledge on the issues of their 
department relevant at the European level. In addition, they develop and provide a general 
approach for European policy through their cooperation with other officers (Lanceron 2007). 
Work in the SGAE is divided according to the configuration of the European Council, and each 
group is in contact with many departments in order to define where France stands on particular 
issues and proposals. In theory, official French stands in European institutions are not allowed if 
they did not go through the SGAE in the first place. If something needs to be introduced by 
France or that a French position is needed at the European level, it always goes through the 
SGAE. In 2006, 186 individuals worked in the SGAE and 93 were top officials. However, the 
workings of the SGAE are usually considered to be more reactive to European proposals rather 
than proactive early in the European policy process (Auber and Desmaison 2009). 
Despite these resources and the sharp coordination mechanism, its effectiveness is 
sometimes questioned for many reasons. A major barrier to effectiveness is the division of the 
executive in France. Even if the Prime Minister is directly responsible for the SGAE, Presidential 
involvement may occur in SGAE affairs, especially during a Council Presidency period. Also, 
officials of the SGAE critique the end result of their work because they are mostly making 
summaries, rather than finding compromises when divergences between actors occur at the 
national level. Hence, the political executive is solicited in those situations and is the only one 
taking the decisions (EurActiv.fr 2008a).  
The role of the SGAE mostly remains the same during an EU Presidency, although its 
activities are significantly increased (Toute l'Europe 2008). During the 2008 EU Presidency, a 
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special committee for the French EU Presidency was created within the SGAE in order to 
support the work of the Elysée EU Presidency team.  
It is worth mentioning that presidential and legislative elections took place in France 
during the spring of 2007. Although the President and the government remained from the same 
political party, the differences between Chirac and Sarkozy are significant. As a result of the 
elections, little was actually planned more than one year before France took the Council 
Presidency. Starting a few months before and continuing during the holding of the Presidency, 
inter-ministerial meetings of the ministers also took place every Tuesday (Challenges 2008c). 
3.3 THE EUROPEAN PACT ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM 
3.3.1 Domestic Bases: French Immigration Policy 
France is probably one of the countries in Europe that has made the highest number of changes 
to its immigration policy, especially since 2003 when a new impulse was given to its policy. In 
total, six amendments were made to the 2003 law. The most significant ones took place in 2006 
and 2007. These three laws constitute the essence of France approach to immigration. 
The first major change to French immigration policy was the regulation of the 26 of 
November 2003 on immigration and asylum (also called the “Sarkozy Law”) aiming at creating 
stricter rules for immigration and asylum in France. The 2003 amendments were responding to 
adopted European directives that needed to be transposed at the national level or forthcoming 
ones, and to French political interests. The 2003 changes were inspired by security concerns and 
concentrated on the fight against illegal immigrants. It focused on stricter rules for the admission 
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of a foreign spouse and family members in France, the creation of an electronic database to 
collect information on visa applicants, the strengthening of discretionary power to the prefectures 
for decisions on immigration status renewals, and gave more precisions on the measures for 
removal and detention of illegal immigrants (Marthaler 2008).  
The second significant change occurred on the 17th of May 2006, with the adoption of 
new amendments, commonly called “Sarkozy Law II”. After the riots in the suburbs of Paris in 
2005, the attention of politicians was put on the lack of ‘Republican identity’ and integration in 
French society that existed among the young immigrants or children of immigrants living in the 
suburbs. Riots were interpreted as an illustration of immigrant youth’s unwillingness to integrate 
into French society and adopt its values. Consequently, the focus of the amendment was on 
immigrants’ integration and in general, on a better selection of immigrants (Marthaler 2008). 
The ‘new’ immigration policy focused on three main concepts: selective immigration 
(immigration choisie), circular immigration (immigration circulaire) and co-development, the 
integration into French society. Entrenched within these concepts, the policy had an overall aim 
to restrict illegal and family immigration. This second amendment reinforces the new strategy 
adopted by France towards the management of migration flux.  
Selective immigration is seen as a change to France’s immigration approach in 2006 
because it was argued by politicians that the country had previously submitted to unwanted 
immigration (immigration subie), with particular reference to family reunification and illegal 
immigrants. Moving towards selective immigration meant that France aimed at a more active and 
utilitarian immigration, now desired, and in accordance with its labour market needs. It 
specifically targeted qualified workers, whether highly skilled or not. To implement this 
approach, the law creates a ‘competence and talents card’ (carte de séjour compétences et 
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talents), which authorizes the immigrant to practice any occupation of his choice. It is meant to 
facilitate the reception of immigrants whose talent is conceived as being an asset for the national 
development and international outreach (rayonnement) of France. However, its application was 
not to cover occupations highly needed (such as doctors, nurses, etc.) from immigrant candidate 
coming from sub-Saharan Africa. In line with the theme of selective immigration, third country 
nationals (TCN) have seen the length of their stay in France stretched out to now reach an 18 
month period before being able to ask for their family to join them, instead of one year as it was 
previously. 
Circular immigration and co-development are other innovations included in the 2006 
amendments. The idea behind these changes is that France may need migrants with certain skills 
to fulfill market needs only for a short period of time. Immigrants would come to France, gain 
experience and make money, in order to ultimately go back to their home country. In doing so, 
by agreeing to go back to their home country, they will make their home country benefit from 
their experience and money gained in France. This idea is also intended to be fulfilled through 
the education of élites from third countries in France, who would go back to their home country 
after their training. In order to make these notions concrete and implement them, bilateral 
agreements with the emigrant countries are signed and quotas are set. Development aid is also 
attached with these bilateral agreements to create an incentive to respect the agreements. 
With regard to integration the focus was put on the need for migrants to integrate 
themselves in French society. According to the policy, integration includes a number of 
mandatory components. It starts with the signature of a contract of reception and integration 
(contrat d’accueil et d’intégration). In order to reside permanently in France, the migrant must 
also demonstrate his willingness to integrate into French society by upholding French laws and 
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values as well as demonstrate his competency in the French language. In addition, integration is 
in part measured according to the number of years one had lived in France. In reality, most 
‘integration’ measures are countered by the aim of restricting family reunification by setting new 
conditions to which an immigrant must submit, before being able to have his family join him (i.e. 
time in France, salary, living conditions, etc.). These measures were again modified in 2007. In 
addition to the previous mandatory integration requirements, it became compulsory to attend a 
class on French History, institutions and culture, and a meeting with a career counselor to 
facilitate professional integration in France. Each of these components are formalized with 
certificates which needed to be shown each time one requested for his status renewal. 
Overall, Sarkozy’s amendments were mostly driven by security concerns (fighting 
irregular immigration), which were also the cornerstone of Sarkozy’s presidential campaign in 
2007. With Sarkozy’s election as President, subsequent changes were made to immigration 
policy, mostly of a logistical nature with the creation of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, 
National Identity and Co-Development (MIIIC).8 The creation of the ministry accelerated the 
application of the 2003, 2006 and 2007 immigration policy amendments, which became very 
important because of Sarkozy’s promises during his electoral campaign. The policy was a way to 
respond to public pressure for a stricter control on immigration in France (Bertossi 2008). The 20 
November 2007 amendments targeted family immigration. The reception and integration 
contract became compulsory for families, and parents were now responsible for their children’s 
integration into French society. If the contract was not respected by the children, then the child 
support allowance would be suspended. Also, in suspicious cases, DNA testing became possible 
for finding a child’s affiliation for immigration purposes, although it is used on a voluntary 
                                                 
8 Before the creation of the ministry, several aspects of the immigration policy were divided among different departments and 
coordination was difficult. 
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basis.9 In addition, the demonstration of sufficient material and financial resources had to be 
verified in order for an immigrant to have his family reunified. Moreover, through a circular in 
July 2007, quotas to be reached for expulsion were set: 25,000. Generally, the policy was 
confirming the approach taken previously by focusing on security and utility for France. To 
some extent, it also answered to human rights organizations’ critics through minor provisions, 
such as the possibility to regularize immigrants on a case by case basis (Marthaler 2008). 
3.3.2 Pre-EU Presidency Preparation Period 
3.3.2.1 Elaborating the European Pact 
The first reference to a European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was made in a press 
conference by Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior, after the December Council of 
Ministers in 2006. He declared that:  
“Because we are in a free movement area, every decision taken by 
a member state has consequences on its neighbor. This is the reason I proposed 
to my colleagues, also ministers of the interior, from the big six European Union 
country, who welcome by themselves about 80% of migrant in the European 
space, the adoption of a European Pact on Immigration. A first draft of this 
proposal has been presented and adopted by the G610. The member states of the 
EU have to walk in the same direction. It is essential to establish a European 
policy of immigration on a voluntary involvement of states and on common 
principles: refusing mass regularization; introduce efficient and stable border 
control; a common measure for familial reunion and asylum; on the principle 
for expulsion of illegal migrants and delinquent foreigners except when 
particular protection is needed11” (Setton 2008). 
                                                 
9 Although DNA testing is possible according to the law as an experimental procedure for 18 months, it was in fact never 
implemented and finally abrogated in 2009 with the refusal of the new immigration minister to implement the experimental 
period. 
10 G6 is composed of France, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland. Together, they represent about 49% of votes in 
the Council. Although Sarkozy made this declaration, no copy of the proposal dating from 2006 is available. 
11 "Dans un espace de libre circulation, toute décision prise par un État membre a des répercussions chez ses voisins. C'est 
pourquoi j'ai proposé à mes collègues ministres de l'intérieur des six grands pays de l'Union européenne, qui accueillent à eux 
seuls 80% des migrants dans l'espace européen, l'adoption d'un pacte européen sur l'immigration. Une première esquisse de ce 
Pacte européen pour l'immigration a été adoptée par le G6. Les États membres de l'UE doivent marcher dans la même direction. 
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Hence, the ideas of the Pact were already well developed a long time before France took the 
Council Presidency. However, the Pact was not formalized at the national or European level until 
the 2008 EU Presidency. 
France was in standby for the preparation of its EU Presidency for most of the Spring of 
2007 as presidential elections were held. One major electoral campaign proposition of Sarkozy 
had to do with immigration. He promised to introduce annual immigrant quotas, take measures to 
reinforce the learning of French before the arrival of immigrants in the country, and the creation 
of a ministry of immigration. During the entire campaign he adopted a hardline towards 
immigration as he was also trying to appeal to the far-right electorate (Marthaler 2008). These 
promises are reflected in the 2007 French law, but national legislation was considered not 
enough due to the interdependence existing between European Union members in the area. 
As soon as Sarkozy became president, the new French government was formed, and the 
work on persuading the other EU members of the necessity of the European Pact on Immigration 
and asylum started. Generally, only broad principles transpired from the bilateral meetings 
between France and other EU countries. The discussions focused mainly on the ban of mass 
regularization, the integration of immigrants in the host countries, the signature of agreements 
with third countries regarding circular immigration, co-development and the removal of their 
nationals from European territory if in irregular situation, and the coordination of removals in the 
EU.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Il est essentiel de fonder une politique européenne de l'immigration sur une démarche volontaire des États et sur quelques grands 
principes communs: le refus des régularisations massive; la mise en place d'une frontière extérieure efficace et stable; une règle 
commune d'asile et de regroupement familial; le principe d'éloignement des migrants clandestins et d'expulsion des étrangers 
délinquants sauf protection particulière." 
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On May 31st 2007, Sarkozy met with the President of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero, in Madrid. Among other things, they discussed the idea of the European Pact. Without 
going into many details, Zapatero declared that he felt that an agreement on the Pact was not 
going to be difficult to adopt in the EU because the general objectives of the Pact on legal 
immigration mattered to every member, especially for the countries receiving the highest number 
of immigrants. He confirmed that Spain adhered to the majority of the principles discussed, 
sustaining that common action in the field of immigration was required, despite divergences 
between countries (Sarkozy and Zapatero 2007, Le Monde June 1, 2007). Spain also declared 
that it would not to pursue a mass regularization strategy in the future and that it would 
concentrate on processing demands on a case by case basis. France is strongly against mass 
regularization and planned to ban it by including the ban in the Pact. Spain’s 2005 mass 
regularization had attracted vivid critics from the other EU governments. Mass regularization is 
criticized essentially because it is not a measure that effectively solves the issue of irregular 
immigration. 
The project of the European Pact was officially confirmed to be on the agenda of the 
French EU Presidency with a letter from the newly elected President Sarkozy addressed to his 
Minister of immigration, Brice Hortefeux, on July 9, 2007 (Sarkozy 2007a). In this letter 
Sarkozy formally invites his minister to work hard to convince the other leaders of the EU to 
engage into the definition of a common policy for the management of immigration, to be 
concretized through the Pact. 
Following this announcement, a tour of the European capitals led by the President and his 
minister began. The pre-presidential preparations for the adoption of this Pact were extensive. 
The most important countries involved in this tour were the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and 
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Germany because they represent, together with France, the countries receiving almost 80% of 
immigrants in Europe (Rea and Tripier 2008). Most of the 20% leftover are shared between 
Poland, Portugal and Austria. However, the burden of immigration control is heavier on 
countries such as Malta, Greece, Spain, Italy and Cyprus because of their geographical location. 
This is also the case with countries on the Eastern border of the EU, but they do not receive as 
many demands as the Mediterranean countries. As the free movement of people is applied and 
customs lifted within the Schengen area signatory countries, migrants are able to benefit from it 
too. Consequently, once one enters an EU country it is easy for countries to lose track of 
individuals, whether they are legally entered in one country or not. This reality causes concern 
for France and other members; France wants to find ways to better implement border controls 
and admission through the Pact. Focusing on the big immigration countries has another 
advantage for France because they also represent a significant number of votes in the Council. If 
they agree on the principles and the specificities of the Pact, it is more likely that the other 
members might too.  
In August 2007, Hortefeux went to Italy to meet with the Italian Minister of the Interior, 
Giuliano Amato. The two countries have been cooperating on the policing of their common 
border to fight illegal immigration for some time. French and Italian security officials work 
together in the same office to prevent illegal immigrants to cross borders by developing common 
action, sharing information, cooperate with judiciary procedures, etc. (Nice-Matin 2007). The 
Pact was discussed broadly during this meeting and in an official declaration, Hortefeux stated 
that both he and Amato were in broad agreement on immigration matters. Italy agreed not to 
pursue mass regularization anymore, and it supported the signature of agreements with countries 
such as Morocco, Tunisia and Libya to facilitate the return of nationals from these countries 
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(Nice-Matin 2007, Rodier 2007). This position was reinforced again in November, when 
Sarkozy went to Italy and met with Romano Prodi and made similar declarations (Sarkozy and 
Prodi 2007). 
In November, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel received Sarkozy. Cooperation 
between the two countries has been strong in the past decades, and is maintained by the holding 
of ministerial meetings biannually since 2003.12 At that particular meeting, it was announced that 
France and Germany were launching discussions on a common immigration policy, to better be 
able to fight illegal immigration and to focus on integration (Calla 2007). It was sustained that by 
holding such discussions and finding common alignment, Germany and France would improve 
their joint strength on immigration discussions within the EU. Sarkozy and Merkel expressed 
different but complementary visions on immigrant integration while they attended field activities 
on the subject. Sarkozy focused more on the need for immigrants to integrate the host countries 
laws, values and culture, while Merkel, reflecting the country’s recently adopted ‘National Plan 
for Integration’, concentrated her attention on the need to learn the host country language (Calla 
2007). These approaches echo the leaders’ countries respective immigration realities. Following 
this meeting, cooperation between France and Germany seemed to be going smoothly for the 
upcoming French EU Presidency. 
3.3.2.2 The First Draft of the Pact: The First Test for French Propositions 
As the EU Presidency came closer, 2008 began with the launching of the “official tour” 
of European capital. Hortefeux met with ministers responsible for immigration from all EU 
countries. A first draft of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum dated January 28, 2008 
                                                 
12 Biannual meetings had been held between Germany and France since 1963, but until 2003, they only concerned the heads of 
State of the two countries.  
 56 
started to circulate to prepare ministers and heads of state for discussions during bilateral 
meetings or larger gatherings. This first version of the Pact was only six pages long and differed 
from subsequent versions. It had a preamble and five sections also referred to as commitments: 
“protecting Europe better by controlling external borders within a spirit of solidarity; organizing 
legal migration on the basis of each EU member state’s ability to receive, with a spirit of 
responsibility; organizing effective removal from the EU for foreigners staying there illegally; 
constructing a Europe of asylum; and promoting co-development and development aid” 
(Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). The document contained many deadlines and instrument 
proposals. 
The preamble provides information about the situation in Europe and what has been done 
up to this point in the area of immigration. However, it leaves out developments made at the 
Community level. It points to the need to adapt the migration flow to “Europe’s capacity to 
receive it, insofar as the employment market, accommodation, and the health, education and 
social services are concerned” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b).  From this introduction is 
also seems that the Pact sets the broad principles and instruments for a “veritable common 
immigration policy” and put clear boundaries between all actors involved in the policy with “a 
clear division of tasks and missions between the community and the national or 
intergovernmental levels, and on dialogue with countries of origins” (Ministère de l'Immigration 
2008b). The rest of the document goes into detail regarding each of the specific ‘commitments’ it 
covers. 
Under the first title, “protecting Europe better by controlling external borders within a 
spirit of solidarity”, the Pact gives voice to security concerns and renders compulsory the 
issuance of biometric visas from January 2011, “and to progressively create joint centers for the 
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issuing of visas, or joint European consulates.” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b) It also 
proposes to give to the Frontex agency new resources such as a senior staff body, two 
headquarter agencies (one in the South of Europe and the other in the East) “with the capability 
to mobilize the means the member States commits to provide to Frontex on demand, and to equip 
it with a unit of trainers-inspectors by January 2009” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). 
Another paragraph opens the door to coordinated watch of internal borders through the 
organization of bilateral agreements. 
The second commitment regarding the organization of legal migration is at the core of 
this Pact. Regarding legal immigration measures, the Pact allows member states to implement 
their own policies if they are respecting the general principles of the Pact, while at the same time, 
includes specific instruments which states must adopt. The main idea is based on the shared 
“knowledge that migration must proceed from a double willingness, that of the member State 
and that of the migrant” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). One of the measures confirmed in 
the Pact is the ban of mass regularization: “large-scale and collective regularization produce an 
important pull factor and it is hence agreed to do without them in the future. Regularizations will 
have to depend on a case-by-case examination, in exceptional circumstances, notably 
humanitarian ones, in response to some precise objectives. It cannot be a mean of managing 
migration flows” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). This section also establishes the principles 
for ‘chosen immigration’: “the European Council notes the weak qualifications of immigrants 
towards Europe, [in comparison to those immigrating to the United States or Canada]. (…) Thus, 
member States will favour an immigration that is chosen and concerted, of a professional kind, 
within respect for their national specificities and while taking into account the situation of the 
employment market and of the talents and competencies they require” (Ministère de 
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l'Immigration 2008b). Regarding integration of migrants in host societies, the Pact says that 
“language courses and the assessment of professional competencies will be implemented in a 
systematic manner, including before entry into Europe” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). 
Finally, it makes compulsory certain instruments: “the European Council recognizes the interest 
of the integration contract for third-country nationals who are admitted for long-term residence 
on their territory and encourages member States to propose it at a national level. This integration 
contract must be compulsory” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). 
The third commitment, concerning the removals of illegal immigrants, is also important 
because the implementation of these promises is usually not respected. “Only one removal 
decision out of three is executed in Europe. It is essential to respect the rule according to which a 
migrant in an irregular situation must either leaver voluntarily or be taken back to their country, 
throughout the European area. Moreover, member States must apply the principle, adopted in 
2001, whereby removal measure taken by one of them is applicable in any location in the EU 
territory” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). Measures included in the Pact are that “whenever 
necessary, member States must resort to joint return flight between several member states.” It is 
proposed that Frontex supervise and coordinate these group returns. Also, it is emphasized that 
the agreements on readmission reached to this point at the European level are inadequate. “A 
truly global approach must be developed in order to reach tangible results in this domain. The 
European Council invites the member States and the Commission to support and enable the 
negotiation of readmission agreements by means of any diplomatic and commercial instruments. 
(…) the objective is to have the required legal instruments for the return of irregular foreigners to 
their country (…) whether this is through an agreement reached at the European level, or in the 
form of a bilateral agreement, or also through the use by member State of a bilateral agreement 
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reached by another member State (mutualisation) (…) within a delay of five years” (Ministère de 
l'Immigration 2008b). Finally, some attention is put on employers and landlords of illegals and 
the trafficking in human beings by punishing them more severely by harmonizing the repression 
methods in Europe. 
Constructing a Europe of asylum is the fourth commitment included in the Pact. It aims at 
harmonizing rules existing in Europe, and to also find ways for asylum seekers to not be 
penalized with the intensification of border control “if they have the basis for obtaining a refugee 
status”. The Pact goes further in sustaining the creation of a European support office in 2009, 
“and to establish some common guarantees in the field of asylum ad a uniform refugee status in 
2010” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). Another measure included in the Pact is the setting up 
by member states of “joint teams for the assessment of asylum claims, capable of intervening in 
border regions when there are mass arrivals of people, in 2009.” It argues for the reinforcement 
of the external dimension of asylum policy, referring to the selection of the asylum seekers and 
the study of their files prior to their arrival on the European territory. Moreover, a delay of five 
years is given in order to achieve the creation of “the institution, procedure and common criteria 
for the assessment of asylum applications and the recognition of refugee status in Europe” 
(Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). 
Regarding the fifth and final commitment, on co-development and development aid, the 
focus is put on “the fight of the plunder of brains by avoiding to favour the definitive 
immigration of qualified people when their departure would have the effect of depriving the 
countries of origin of an indispensable resource for their development or for the populations’ 
daily lives” (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008b). Only one example of individuals who would fit 
this category is given in the text, that of doctors from Africa. The Commission is mandated to 
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produce statistical data and a survey of best practices on what kind of compensatory instruments 
exist to this time, within a two year period. It also argues for the implementation of a clear 
circular immigration policy and the elaboration of instruments (i.e. tax incentive or banking 
products) that would enable migrants to participate in the development of their countries of 
origin and to facilitate money transfers. The Pact also more concretely pushes for the holding of 
consultation.  
The six months prior to the French Council Presidency proved to be quite active for the 
Minister of Immigration with the continuation of the tour of European capitals. With the first 
draft of the Pact in hand, it was time to discuss the more specific issues included in it with the 
other EU members. The objective was to make sure it would get adopted in the Council. Most 
discussions concerned the need to stop mass regularization or more specific instruments included 
in the Pact (Avril 2008b, a, Barluet 2008). The meetings usually took a few hours, allowing for 
meetings with other countries on the same day. The first few months more often involved the 
Minister of Immigration, but the last months were characterized by the high involvement of the 
executive (both the President and the Prime Minister) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The 
French President was particularly active in the discussions on the Pact, and it was often referred 
to as “his” project. Most countries received a visit of one of the French executive or ministers, or 
were able to participate in discussions with them in a small group of countries, as it was the case 
for the Visegrad group13. However some exceptions exist such as Ireland, who did not receive or 
discuss the Pact with the French.  The working document was presented only to high public 
officials and to politicians. Two large meetings were held to discuss it, one at the end of March 
                                                 
13 The Visegrad group is composed of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
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and the other at the beginning of April, and each involving half of the EU members (EurActiv.fr 
2008b, Le Nouvel Observateur 2008a).  
The meetings that took place before July 1st were instructive as to what the positions of 
the other countries were on the different aspects of the Pact, what needed to be changed for its 
adoption, and what was actually intended by the French propositions. For example, in a meeting 
with Angela Merkel in January, Sarkozy gave more specificity on the proposition on the ban on 
mass regularization by declaring that it would involve that “each country agrees not to use mass 
regularization without having the authorization from the other members.14” (Pineau 2008b) This 
particular point on mass amnesties ended up been contentious with Spain. This was also the case 
with the Pact’s migrant integration scheme, which revolved around compulsory measures to be 
implemented by the member countries, especially the integration contract. Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Italy were the first to react to the draft (Challenges 2008a, b).  
Spain’s position on the Pact was the most difficult for France as it criticized the measures 
included in the Pact. A report for the Assemblée Nationale (La Délégation de l'Assemblée 
Nationale pour l'Union Européenne 2008) confirms Spain’s adherence to the long-term 
objectives of the Pact. However, conflicts exist over the use of mass regularization because of 
the historical reliance on this method by the country. In addition, the contract of integration was 
a sensitive topic in Spain because it had already caused controversies in the country during the 
last electoral campaign. Negotiations with Spain went on until the last day of June.  The timing 
was important as the Pact was to be discussed on the first Council of Ministers meeting on the 6 
and 7 of July (Le Nouvel Observateur 2008b). Italy’s objections were similar to Spain. On the 
other hand, the Netherlands supported the Pact’s direction (Pineau 2008a).  
                                                 
14 « (…) que chaque pays s'interdit des régularisations massives sans avoir l'autorisation des autres » 
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In the report to the Assemblée Nationale, it is observed that many countries found the 
first draft too oriented on the repression of illegal immigration (La Délégation de l'Assemblée 
Nationale pour l'Union Européenne 2008: 29). The compulsory nature of integration instruments 
were also causing heated discussions amongst the EU members, and reservations were expressed 
regarding the harmonization of asylum policy as proposed in the Pact. In sum, even after many 
months of promotion and discussion, many controversial elements of the Pact were still 
unresolved. Agreement on border surveillance and enforcement was less controversial. 
Sarkozy went to the UK in order to promote this Pact and promote common action in the 
field of border control, immigration and asylum, for much of which the UK has opted-out from 
agreements at the European level. Sarkozy argued that involvement and commitment at the 
European level would help in solving long-term immigration issues (BBC News 2008). In the 
Assemblée Nationale’s report it is mentioned that the UK favorably welcomed the Pact because 
of its focus on the fight on illegal immigration. However, the UK desires bilateral agreements 
over European ones as it prefers to conserve its sovereignty in the field of immigration. The UK 
particularly supported the proposals for the constitution of group flights for the removal of illegal 
immigrants, the ban of mass regularization, and the prospect of implementation of co-
development and circular immigration. It has more nuanced opinions on the other sections of the 
Pact, although it approved the strengthening of Frontex, and supported biometric visas, it was 
more reluctant to create European consulates to address demands, and believed that every 
country should maintain its ability to decide how many and who is allowed to enter the country. 
The UK’s strongest position is against the elaboration of a common European asylum policy 
because it wants to keep control over their national asylum policy (La Délégation de l'Assemblée 
Nationale pour l'Union Européenne 2008). 
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The same Assemblée Nationale document reports on Poland and maintains that it 
generally supports the Pact. However, many concerns were expressed on the precision of 
concepts included in the Pact and the deadlines included in it. Poland is also the only country that 
openly voiced its opposition to a permanent Frontex unit and the evolution of its structure and 
argued in favor of mass regularization for countries who wished to use it. Moreover, it wondered 
about the costs and financing involved for the implementation of the technologies mentioned in 
the Pact (La Délégation de l'Assemblée Nationale pour l'Union Européenne 2008).  
In sum, these meetings show that all members agreed on the long-term objectives of the 
Pact, but not necessarily on the specifics. Members also vary in their willingness to delegate 
some of their immigration-related prerogatives at the European level, and on their vision for 
immigrants’ integration. 
 On the 12th of June, Ireland’s population rejected the Lisbon Treaty. It has been 
suggested that it radically modified the French intentions for the Pact as they wanted it to be 
formalized and not just been a political agreement (Lequesne and Rozenberg 2008). Moreover, 
the Pact’s implementation would have been facilitated by the quick adoption of the Lisbon treaty 
and by the voting rules changes (Collett 2008). 
In parallel to these developments, in early June, the Commission published  a 
communication ‘A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools' 
(COM (2008) 359 final). It is important to mention because France faced many criticisms for not 
taking into consideration and try to integrate more from the Commission into its proposal 
(Ludlow 2009a). It shows that France really acted on its own. 
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3.3.3 EU Presidency Term 
Much of the negotiations, and agreements on compromises were done prior to the actual 
Presidency, during bilateral meetings. As it was decided that discussions on the Pact would take 
place during the July Council of Ministers, it is no surprise to see that much of the action was 
done prior to the holding of that council. However, not all members had voiced their concerns at 
this stage of the proposal. After all, discussions between the 27 ministers had not taken place 
either. 
A few days before the first council meeting of July 7, the second version of the Pact 
circulated. Many changes were made. Many contextual justifications for specific measures 
proposed have been left aside or watered down to please the other EU members. The general 
vision for European immigration and asylum policies is more developed in the preamble than it 
was in the first version, and it also integrates a little more the developments that took place at the 
EU level (i.e. the Commission’s communication and previous developments in the field). In this 
second version, immigration is specifically mentioned as a positive contribution to Europe and to 
their home countries (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008a), and it acknowledged the need for 
countries to still limit it for maintaining good integration conditions in host countries. The 
preamble makes specific reference to both co-development and circular immigration. The 
structure of the document was also changed in an effort to try not to put systematic attention on 
the security-driven measures. 
The points causing friction between the countries were slightly modified. Regarding  
mass regularization, instead of a simple ban for its use, it was now written that general and 
unconditional mass regularization should now be avoided and be limited to regularization on a 
case by case basis in the future, used in exceptional cases to be established within national 
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legislations, and for humanitarian and economic reasons. The previous version only referred to 
humanitarian case regularizations. The contract of integration was also left out of this new 
version and it was now only making reference to the need for “ambitious policies to promote 
integration” that would specify the rights and duties of immigrants, also focusing on language, 
employment, and European values (Ministère de l'Immigration 2008a). This document was 
considered to be a middle ground between the positions of Rome and Madrid on regularizations 
(Syfuss-Arnaud 2008). 
On other points, the Pact was stronger, notably with temporary and circular immigration, 
which were now put placed as a priority. The use of quotas to implement this scheme was put 
forward in the Pact. It also reiterated the basic principles included in the previous draft: Europe 
cannot integrate all immigrants because it has limited capacities and these need to be taken into 
consideration. 
On the 7th of July, an informal meeting of Minister of Interior took place in Cannes. The 
Pact was officially presented and discussed during this meeting. Before this meeting, Spain was 
seen as one of the major countries having issues with the proposal. Specifically, Spain’s major 
issue seemed to be with having compulsory integration contracts for immigrants. Once France 
dropped the idea, Spain was satisfied and supported the Pact completely (Goldirova 2008a, Van 
Eeckhout 2008b). As the Pact was ‘adopted’ in this meeting, the spokesman for the UMP 
(political party of the French president) declared that the adoption of the Pact validated French 
immigration policy, which had been under attack around that time for its reliance on the idea of 
quotas (Ferenczi and Van Eeckhout 2008). The main differences between the version of the Pact 
before and after the Council meeting are not only Spain’s demand but also the integration of the 
Pact into a more communitarian European process, which was not referred to in previous 
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versions (it lacked references to the Commission and/or process already in place) (Carrera and 
Guild 2008). 
Five commitments are expressly stipulated in the ‘final’ version of the Pact. First, 
organizing legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception capacities 
determined by each member state, and to encourage integration. Second, control irregular 
immigration by ensuring the return of irregular aliens to their country of origin or a country of 
transit. Third, make border controls more effective. Fourth, construct a Europe of asylum. Fifth, 
create a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and transit to encourage the 
synergy between migration and development. It calls upon the European Council to adopt the 
concrete actions outlined in these five sections, in order to give shape to these objectives. The 
Pact is important for the EU insofar as it gives tools to be able to attract qualified immigrants, 
invite members to make their asylum procedures more coherent and reinforce the idea of a 
utilitarian selected immigration while fighting illegal immigration (Council of the European 
Union [1344/08]). 
Another aspect of the July meeting was the creation of a ‘European Asylum Support 
Office’ in the area of asylum. France originally wanted to have an agency able to deliver visas 
(centralized agency) but other countries, especially Germany, were against the idea (Van 
Eeckhout 2008a). This idea was also present in the Pact and had been discussed during the pre-
presidential period.  
On September 25th, the Council of Ministers officially adopted the Pact in conformity 
with the version agreed on in July. Since the approval of the European Council was required, it 
was scheduled to take place at the October meeting, and was adopted without any problems.  
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On November 25th, at the Euro-African summit, the EU-27, with France at its head, 
already started to push for the conclusion of agreements implementing certain aspects of the 
Pact. Precisely, they wanted to sign agreements with the emigration countries in order for them 
to secure their development aid. This was heavily based on France’s experience, in signing 
previously similar agreements with many African countries, with the exception of Senegal and 
Mali (Bernard and Van Eeckhout 2008). 
3.3.4 Analysis 
The periods before and during the Council Presidency show that France was very independent 
during the process for the adoption of the Pact. The French Presidency acted on its own, outside 
of the Community’s institutions, and without their support or reliance on their resources for the 
elaboration, promotion and negotiations of the Pact. The Commission did not initiate the 
proposal and it was left aside by France. France’s first draft completely omitted to take into 
consideration the developments that took place at the European level in the fields related to the 
Pact or the role of the Commission in it. In parallel, the Commission published a communication 
on “A Common Immigration Policy for Europe” (COM (2008) 359 final) with the objective of 
providing a new vision for a common policy for the EU. The Pact was shortcutting the 
Commission and intended to shape the Stockholm programme in 2009. 
Nevertheless, the communication and the Pact do share some things in common. For 
example, they both insist on the solidarity of EU members in the area of immigration. Yet, their 
global visions are drastically opposed. The Pact promotes strong inter-governmentalism, whereas 
the Commission’s communication focuses on the harmonization and creation of a common 
European policy vision which would require supranational supervision. Moreover, the Pact 
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resembles more of an action plan promoting a general policy vision, not a ‘common policy’. On 
the other hand, the Commission’s communication does not contain any concrete propositions but 
tries to provide a common policy for Member states. Whereas the Pact strengthens the position 
of national legislations in the area of immigration in the EU, with the objective of setting 
standards but not necessarily aiming for harmonization; the communication suggests to work 
towards the harmonization of national policies, which had been under discussions for many years 
and previously agreed upon by the members.  
The Pact reflects the attitudinal changes taking place in European societies. Indeed, the 
Pact is conservative and inspired by the political right that has become more and more popular in 
many EU countries (Collett 2008). Moreover, the general attitude among governments in Europe 
has been to try to retain power over immigration policy as it is a highly politicized area at the 
national level. In part because of this, France’s push for the Pact with the other EU members was 
made easier.  
Other factors helped the French to succeed in their endeavor. All EU members are 
concerned with immigration flows, even if their experiences were not the same. Many countries 
that used to be emigration countries became immigration countries with enlargements and 
European integration (Spain, Italy, Cyprus, and many East Central European countries). The EU 
members have different ways of handling migration and they are ineffective for dealing with it. 
In addition, policies aimed at attracting high-skilled workers in Europe are not well developed or 
implemented (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010). Hence, countries are always unsatisfied with 
the status quo, creating a need for action in the area, especially for political purposes. 
Therefore, even if The Hague programme adopted in 2005 and its forthcoming update, 
the 2009 Stockholm programme, set goals and the action plan, France decided to put on its 
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Council Presidency’s agenda the theme of immigration through the adoption of the Pact. The 
Hague programme provided an action plan for 2005-2009, but was very general and not 
particularly ambitious (COM(2005) 184 final). Discussions on cooperation in immigration had 
been taking place at the European level for many years without providing concrete results as to 
what global approach to immigration the EU would adopt. Agreements were concluded only on 
specific directives without a common vision. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 
filled this gap at that time. 
France initiated the Pact mainly out of national political motivations. Part of Sarkozy’s 
electoral campaign in 2007 focused on the restriction of immigration. Many of the measures 
adopted at the national level had been controversial and France was seeking to legitimize its 
policy and approach to immigration. This is illustrated within the Pact by the high number of 
references to French immigration concepts such as “immigration choisie”, “immigration subie”, 
“co-developpement”, and “immigration circulaire” contained in the Pact, especially in its first 
version, aimed at its domestic audience. Some of these specific expressions were sometimes 
diluted in subsequent and the final versions, but the ideas behind the concepts remained in the 
document. Moreover, many measures included in the first version were applied in France (i.e. 
contract of integration). Despite the dilution of French-specific vocabulary in the Pact in its 
subsequent versions, the project maintained its French color. This shows that the French Council 
Presidency was effectively able to upload its national immigration policy at the European level, 
through the use of agenda-setter and shaping strategies. 
This is exemplified in the final version by the emphasis put on the limitation for 
immigration in European countries, the focus on security, and integration. The pact is the first 
document acknowledging that “the European Union (…) does not have the resources to decently 
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receive all the migrants hoping to find a better life here” ([1344/08]). In addition, it is also the 
only text giving importance to the concrete implication that changes in migration policies in one 
country can have implications on others, making “imperative that each member state take 
account of its partners’ interests when designing and implementing its immigration, integration, 
and asylum policies” ([1344/08]). Furthermore, the EU documents referring to border controls or 
fighting migration usually use the expression of “irregular immigration”. The Pact is the only 
document making references to “illegal immigration”, the same as the national French 
immigration policy. 
Circular immigration was discussed superficially in European documents (i.e. the Global 
approach to Migration from the Commission) preceding the adoption of the Pact, but France had 
been implementing this principle many years before the discussions took place at the European 
level. The Pact clearly makes reference to circular immigration and how it should be 
implemented, the same way the French immigration policy had intended. It stipulates that the 
principle is to “(…) enable those nationals to acquire training or professional experience and 
accumulate savings that they can use for the benefit of their home countries. (…) [with the aim 
of encouraging] temporary or circular migration, in order to prevent brain drain” ([1344/08]). 
Moreover, based on the model of the French agreements signed with third countries, it explicitly 
suggests that future partnerships with third countries from which many TNCs are originating 
should include provisions on circular immigration linked it to their development aid. 
On integration, the Pact is more specific about criteria that should be taken into 
consideration when evaluating the integration of immigrants in the host country. These criteria 
undeniably originate from French concerns. The Pact adds an additional criteria for family 
reunification which was not included in the Family reunification directive of 2003 (2003/86/EC 
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), which is the knowledge of the host country’s language. Overall, the Pact focuses much more 
on the responsibilities and duties of the migrants rather than that of the host country, reflecting 
what is in the French immigration policy.  
The conclusion of the Pact also insures that actions will ensue from its adoption by 
mandating all actors involved in the formulation, adoption and implementation of the policy with 
specific goals. For example, the Commission was mandated to provide an annual progress report 
on the developments related to the Pact.  Hence, even if the document itself is only a political 
commitment, it is a strong one. 
Throughout the negotiations and the ‘selling’ of the Pact to the other members, the main 
ideas behind the Pact were not the object of conflict with the other members, rather it was mostly 
the specific measures proposed that caused disagreement. For example, this was the case with the 
integration contract, the ban on mass regularization and the creation of a European Asylum 
support agency. Given the inter-governmental nature of the document, and the flexibility it 
sometimes gives to EU members to implement policy instruments their own ways, the 
compromises were easier to make. In essence, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum is 
an agreement on policy goals. With its adoption, the influence of the community’s institutions in 
the area of immigration was weakened because it promotes actions directly between members 
and a form of cooperation outside of the community method (Carrera and Guild 2008, Ludlow 
2009a). Consequently, the adoption of the Pact illustrates that including broad goals and 
measures, putting only minimal standards and leaving the possibility for member states to 
implement them according to their own national priorities, was a way to guarantee its adoption. 
Another factor that facilitated the adoption of the Pact is related to its legal nature. The 
document does not actually have much formal power or a binding nature. Indeed, it is qualified 
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to be only a ‘political commitment’, which means that any deviances from it would not have 
consequences for a member. The document was not even attached to the October Council’s 
Conclusions, despite making many references to it. A political commitment is more normative in 
nature. Thus, disrespect of the Pact still has consequences for the signatories, remains significant 
for the Council and the EU in general, even if its legal nature is weak. It is also an important 
document because it touches a highly politicized area of public policy, which was highly 
mediatized. Any drift from it would probably be called out by others, involving mainly 
reputational costs, but could also create others.15  Moreover, if the document was not important 
for the EU members, not as much time and resources would have been devoted to it, nor would 
the procedures by which it was adopted be so formal. The actions took by the Council and the 
Commission following its adoption underline the importance of the Pact. 
Many directives and agreements directly related to the Pact were adopted following its 
approval. For example, the ministers of the interior or immigration adopted a common 
declaration in the conclusion of their meeting on integration in Vichy at the beginning of 
November, declaring that they “placed particular emphasis on the promotion of European values, 
the introduction of an integration programme with, for the migrant, a balance between rights and 
duties, priority for integration through employment, and special consideration given to the 
integration of women” (Présidence française du Conseil de l'Union européenne 2008). Moreover, 
many directives adopted in 2009 and the following years were pursuing the goals of the Pact. For 
example, in June 2009, the Council and the European Parliament adopted a directive relating to 
sanctions against illegal employers from TCN (2009/52/EC).  
                                                 
15 The mass migration of Tunisians to Italy following the revolution of 2011 shows that the non-respect of the ban on mass 
regularization by Italy has ultimately brought about a re-negotiation of the Schengen agreements, allowing for its suspension, 
which also has consequences for their own nationals. 
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France showed real policy leadership at the European level when proposing the Pact. It 
was actually more a pusher than an innovative policy entrepreneur. The French immigration 
policy was the inspiration for all of the ideas included in the European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum, even with regards to the instruments proposed in it. The French leaders, especially 
President Sarkozy and the Minister of Immigration Hortefeux, were extremely knowledgeable in 
the policy area, which enabled them to better sell their Pact. Generally, in the field of 
immigration, France is known to be quite proactive, having its own vision on the matter. An 
additional element worth mentioning is that the policy frame used by France for the Pact was 
also coherent with the approach to the issue used by many of the other member states.  
 In conclusion, the Pact pushed by the French Presidency and adopted by the Member 
states can be explained by many variables. France was highly motivated for its adoption, out of 
national political concerns but also as a way to make sure its own interests would be secured in 
the upcoming renegotiation of the Stockholm program. France deployed many resources for its 
adoption and retained its independence from all European institutions throughout the 
negotiations, even undermining them with the adoption of the Pact through the strong promotion 
of inter-governmentalism within it. Moreover, the Pact itself revealed to be coherent with the 
positions of governments in power in the other member states. 
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3.4 THE ENERGY AND CLIMATE PACKAGE 
3.4.1 Domestic Bases: The French Environmental Policy 
France has a national reputation that puts it behind other EU members in the environmental area, 
because the country is usually many years behind in the transposition and implementation of 
environmental decisions taken at the European level. It is also one of the few countries defending 
and promoting nuclear energy as a ‘clean’ energy source. This was a big divergence and caused a 
blockage during the March 2007 negotiations on energy and climate change under the German 
Council Presidency (but it was ultimately resolved).16 Consequently, it has been difficult for 
France to take a leading role under the environment, energy, or climate policies in Europe. 
Two legal steps are worth noticing in France’s environmental action in the area of 
fighting climate change and using renewable and sustainable energy. The first was taken in 2004, 
when France adopted a “Plan Climat” (Climate Plan), and its plan of action for 2004-2012. This 
policy essentially plans the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol at the national level. It is 
updated every two years. One of its aims is to bring back the greenhouse emissions to their 1990 
level. Overall, the plan combines various regulatory, fiscal and incentives measures (Mission 
Interministérielle de l'Effet de Serre 2006).  
The second step was launched in 2007, with the consultation of many actors involved in 
the fight against climate change. The Grenelle de l’environnement was to be the basis for France 
major catch up in the area of environmental policy and to demonstrate its ability to be more 
progressive in the area (Lacroix and Zaccaï 2010). This consultation focused on six themes: 
                                                 
16(Euractiv.com 2007) 
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biodiversity and natural resources, fight climate change and control energy demand, relations 
between the environment and public health, modes of production and consumption, issues of 
environmental governance and ecological democracy, the promotion of sustainable patterns of 
development favorable to competition and employment, genetically modifies organisms, and the 
management of waste. 
Regarding the fight on climate change and the control of energy demand, many 
propositions were made by the group and later transformed into policies (but due to the speed of 
the French legislative system, they were not translated into policies and laws before 2009 and 
2010). Generally, the measures focused on the reduction of consumption of energy, particularly 
in regard to transport and buildings (especially in the area of greenhouse emissions, energy 
consumption, and the production/use of renewable energy); the reduction of transport emissions 
to their 1990 level by 2020; making generally sustainable cities and territory; the introduction of 
clear economic signals to promote environmental friendly practices; and finally, to cease relying 
on carbon and reduce energy production (Ministère de l'Écologie 2007). Appendix A 
summarizes more precisely the main measures suggested under each of these themes. 
As mentioned earlier, the Grenelle de l’Environnement’s consultation involved many 
actors: not only were politicians involved, but every group was composed of leaders from the 
environmental sector, economical actors, as well as representatives from the European 
Commission. From the beginning France can only do so much on its own in this area. But this 
consultation was clearly a political project. With the development of this environmental policy, 
Sarkozy’s ambitions were to “place France at the head of the European environmental policy” 
(Sarkozy 2007b). Other French government representatives went further in stating that: “France 
needs Europe to approve its national initiatives, take them over and bring them into international 
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negotiations. The support of community authorities are also essential if we want to implement a 
value added tax (VAT) at a reduced rate on ecological products respecting climate and 
biodiversity”17 (Assemblée Nationale 24 janvier 2008). 
This was probably the most innovative proposition of the new upcoming French national 
environmental policy. It intended to increase the environmental contribution for all fret trucks 
according to the number of kilometers driven in France, and to reduce or increase the VAT on 
products depending on their greenhouse emission for their production and transport. This 
measure however, cannot be implemented without the approval of the rest of Europe. 
3.4.2 Pre-EU Presidency Preparations 
The Climate/Energy package is not an idea that came from the French government directly. 
Indeed, it is the continuation of commitments taken during the 2007 March European Council 
under the German Presidency. The EU committed to reduce 20% of greenhouse emissions, 20% 
of energy consumption, and increasing to 20% the use of renewable energy for 2020 (this is 
known as the “20-20-20” targets) ([7224/1/07]).  As the Kyoto protocol was coming to an end 
and international negotiations for a new agreement were on the international agenda, the issue 
was picked up for the next trio-Presidency which included Slovenia, France and Czech Republic. 
Following the 2007 March European Council, the next step was to translate the objectives 
agreed on into actions. The Commission published its first proposal of the Energy/Climate 
                                                 
17 Translation from the author : « La France a besoin que l’Europe approuve ses initiatives nationales, les fasse siennes et les 
porte dans les négociations internationales. L’appui des autorités communautaires sera également indispensable si l’on veut 
mettre en place une TVA à taux réduit sur les produits écologiques respectant le climat et la biodiversité. »  
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Package in January 200818 which needed to be discussed and adopted by the Council and the 
European Parliament. However, progress was not made during the Slovenian Presidency, but a 
strong engagement was taken to reach an agreement between Member States before the end of 
2008. “It is of utmost importance to adopt a legislative package before 2009, if the EU wants to 
play the leading role in achieving an agreement on a new international climate accord in 
Copenhagen in December 2009” ([7652/1/08]). Therefore, the French actions and proposals 
really take root into the European legislative process itself, and France faced a lot of pressure for 
making sure it would reach an agreement. Negotiations were going to be difficult, as France 
would have to determine how the work of meeting these targets will be divided between member 
states. Interestingly enough, France hired the head of the DG Environment, Peter Carl, to help 
with the negotiations as the French felt that this was going to be one of their “big battles” (Le 
Monde 2008). 
Almost all member countries had some difficulties with some aspect of the targets 
contained in the Commission’s proposals (Mahony 2008, Dehousse and Menon 2009). For 
example, even if Germany was leading negotiations in 2007, by the following year, it was one of 
the countries that had some issue with measures included in the proposal because it claimed the 
cost for the industry would be too high (Calla and de Vergès 2008). For their part, the Central 
and East European States had concerns on the implication of the greenhouse reduction on their 
economies and for their reliance on Russian energy exports (Dehousse and Menon 2009). 
                                                 
18 It actually involved four propositions, but they were grouped: COM (2008) 16; COM (2008) 17; COM (2008) 18; COM (2008) 
19.  
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3.4.3 EU Presidency Term 
The outlook for an agreement on the Climate/Energy Package was not convincing at the 
beginning of the French EU Presidency. In early August, a senior Polish government aide 
confirmed that the Polish government was "trying to find allies for [its] position [to stop the 
launch of a full auctioning of greenhouse emission for 2013], especially among new member 
states. It's possible to form a blocking minority and we are working on this" (Runner 2008). 
Around the time of the October European Council the financial crisis was hitting hard and 
France also wanted to  give priority to its European Pact on Immigration and Asylum during that 
meeting, so the French EU Presidency announced that talks on the Climate/Energy Package 
would be “short and concise” (Goldirova 2008b).  Even if the package was on the agenda for 
December, the French Presidency decided to also put it the agenda for the October summit. The 
French Presidency wanted to include a strong political confirmation of the EU's climate change 
commitments and a list of issues on which member states had already reached a compromise in 
the summit conclusions (Kubosova 2008, Ludlow 2008). However, even on this common text no 
agreement was reached, so Paris decided to present the document only as a legally non-binding 
paper, called "Presidency guidelines for further work on the energy/climate change package" 
(2008 [14240/08]). Still, there was no consensus on these guidelines, which caused more conflict 
than anything else.  
One group of countries had issues over the draft’s language and questioned how fair and 
balanced the package was. “The Baltic states, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania 
are not so convinced about its "balance", and are among those pushing for "some recognition" 
when it comes to CO2 emission cuts achieved by their economies between 1990 and 2005 - a 
period when eastern economies saw sharp economic - and thus also carbon emission - declines 
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following the end of Communism. The commission instead bases its burden-sharing calculations 
on 2005 figures” (Goldirova 2008b). Moreover, four delegations - from Italy, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, and the Czech Republic - agreed with Poland for allowing their industry to buy their 
right to emit carbon dioxide by auction only from 2020, instead of from 2013 as envisaged by the 
Commission. Moreover, Italy was hesitant to adopt anything as it found it difficult to evaluate  
which industrial sectors would suffer the most because of international competition if the 
package was going to be adopted as it was (Ludlow 2008). Consequently, the prospects for 
consensus on the package in October were very slim. Moreover, Italy and Poland threatened to 
veto the whole package if it was going to be adopted as it was then (Dehousse and Menon 2009).  
As a result, the Council mandated “the Presidency and the Commission to organize 
intensive work over the next few weeks in order to enable the European Council in December 
2008 to decide on appropriate responses to the challenge of applying that package in a rigorously 
established cost-effective manner to all sectors of the European economy and all Member States, 
having regard to each Member State's specific situation” (Council October 2008). Getting to that 
commitment ended up been quite a challenge for the Presidency, as the Central and Eastern 
European countries proposed an amendment that specified no deadline, rather just a decision in a 
“timely manner”, and more vagueness about what would be applied as conflicts prevailed 
(Ludlow 2008). Hence, Sarkozy and Donald Tusk, the Polish Prime Minister, met bilaterally in 
order to find a compromise for the mandate. Substantial concessions were given in order to reach 
that compromise: the need to take into consideration the specific situations of member states was 
made more explicit in the mandate and the European Council, which decides by unanimity, 
would be the ultimate decision-maker on the issue, rather than the sectoral Councils (Ludlow 
2008). Nonetheless, the Presidency and the other governments that supported the original 
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proposal pointed out that the sectoral councils would still maintain the use of QMV where 
appropriate, so the European Council would be a “court of final political appeal” (Ludlow 2008). 
On the other hand, the supporters of Poland felt that they had secured a veto right with these 
compromises. 
The period between the October and December European Council meetings was crucial 
in order to bring about a compromise, especially one that would also suit the European 
Parliament’s interests. During this period, the French Presidency and the Commission showed 
openness for possible derogation that would have been limited in time and scope (Goldirova 
2008d). In the Energy Council, Germany reinforced the critiques made by others because it 
found that the targets would be unfair to its automotive industry (Ludlow 2008). To get Poland 
and its coalition on board, the French EU Presidency offered a three-year long exemption from 
the regime to those countries that produce at least 60 percent of their electricity from coal and are 
poorly connected to the grids of other EU states. However, the idea was not supported by Poland 
who made the counter-offer to use a “benchmarking-auctioning approach" that suggests granting 
free allocations on the basis of actual production” (Goldirova 2008c). It was a dead end. 
In November, Poland and its coalition met to organize their strategy for the upcoming 
European summit (Phillips 2008). Even when Sarkozy met with them to negotiate, the countries 
did not move from their position. At the end, the deal was concluded 48 hours before the 
December European Council. These last days proved how much independence France was able 
to get in order to draft compromises, as the Conclusions are usually prepared by both the 
Presidency in collaboration with the Commission and the Council Secretariat, then send to 
COREPER a few weeks before the European Council meeting. “Even though the Presidency’s 
draft Conclusions contained a number of paragraphs about energy and climate change from 2 
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December onwards, however, the early drafts gave nothing away about the specifics of the 
package. It was not in fact until the afternoon of the 10th of December, 24 hours before the heads 
of state and government were due to convene, that the Presidency finally revealed its hand. The 
document, entitled ‘elements of the final compromise’ was made entirely in Paris. The normal 
channels were bypassed in other words” (Ludlow 2009a). Moreover, as the issue where highly 
technical, most negotiations had been done by national experts. Indeed, “the former Secretary of 
State Jean-Pierre Jouyet underlines how Heads of State and Government, unable to master the 
technicalities of the dossier, gave free rein to their experts to thrash out a deal” (Dehousse and 
Menon 2009). 
The final agreement reached was the object of much criticism as the sectors identified as 
having the most significant risk of carbon leakage (that is, those in which the costs of the 
emissions trading scheme might lead firms to relocate outside the EU) would receive emissions 
permits free of charge, which would account to around 90 per cent of European manufacturing 
(Dehousse and Menon 2009). Germany, Poland and its coalition won as “the auctioning rate to 
be reached in 2020 for the industrial sectors not exposed to carbon leakage is set at 70%, with a 
view to reaching 100% in 2027, bearing in mind that the initial level in 2013 is set at 20%” (2008 
[17215/08]). This is less than intended. Regarding industries exposed to carbon leakage, the 
definition was modified from the previous drafts to include more industries, which were given 
100% allowances for free under the new emission trading scheme (Council of the European 
Union 2008 [17215/08]). In addition, instead of measuring the emission reduction in comparison 
to 1990, it was decided to measure it according to 2005 because data on emissions at this time 
point was more trustworthy for East Central Europe. As a result, it meant that the actual 
reduction of greenhouse emissions for the EU was 14% for 2020 and that the increase of the part 
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of renewable energy for consumption was 11.5% for 2020. Finally, Central and Eastern 
European countries were reassured by the creation of a fund to help them finance the transition to 
clean energy. As their energy production is primarily based on carbon, it signified substantial 
investment for them and this was one of the issues. 
As the Climate/Energy package followed the co-decisional procedure with the European 
Parliament, the agreement had to be approved. The EP was supposed to have a vote on the 
proposal on a first reading before the Energy Council, but had agreed to postpone the vote until 
after the European Council met. Consequently, it meant that the EP had a very short period of 
time if it wanted to keep Europe’s leadership in the area. Luckily enough and due to the 
efficiency of informal trilogues, the compromise was adopted on the first reading. 
3.4.4 Analysis 
Although France showed some ambition to pursue some of its ‘new’ national environmental 
policy measures at the European level before taking the EU Presidency, by the time Paris held it, 
the Climate/Energy package was already well advanced in the European policy process. As a 
result, France’s ability to promote its national policies was quite limited. The negotiations on the 
Package during the French Presidency were about specific measures, which suggest that specific 
measures and an increase in complexity for negotiations may result in more difficulties to 
influence and upload policies, than with broader policy goals and vision. 
In this case, Paris’ ambitions are also questionable as it did not even manage to sustain its 
own national objectives in the final agreement. In reality, France’s emissions reduction is 
equivalent to 14% in the Package, rather than the 20% promised at the national level (as a 
consequence of the change in the year of reference). However, regarding the use of renewable 
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energy, the objective was set at 23% which seems to be in tune with its national objectives. The 
Presidency played more the role of the supranational conciliator, rather than the interested 
national state. Environmental and energy policies were important at the national level for the 
population, as shown in the holding of the Grenelle de l’environnement, but the binding policy 
was in the making. Moreover, France’s laggard status in the environmental and energy area made 
it even more difficult to really inspire and push for innovative amendments coming from the 
national orientations within the Package. 
The French Presidency in the context of the Package involved many different actors. 
Because the negotiations had to be done in parallel with the European Parliament, the second 
counselor of the Permanent Representative was involved in the negotiations with the EP’s 
rapporteur, while Jean-Louis Borloo (French Minister of Environment) and Nathalie Kosciusko-
Morizet (State secretary of the Ministry of Environment) led the discussions in the sectoral 
councils. Moreover, the French presidency was supported by an external specialist in the 
negotiations, such as the ex-Commissioner for environment. The Presidency clearly lacked 
external resource expertise in this policy area. Hence, its policy capacity in this case cannot be 
considered to be strong. 
The European institutions were quite involved in the negotiations. The Commission 
clearly had the initiative for the four proposals presented under the Energy/Climate Package, 
which set the baseline for future negotiations. However, the Package was significantly modified 
during the Council negotiations and the Presidency played a leading role in enabling this. 
Overall, the negotiations were characterized by high conflict, even to the point of EU 
members threatening to use their veto. However, the French Presidency was able to reach an 
agreement with all members, and this constituted already a ‘success’ given the divergent 
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positions. In this context, opportunities for the uploading of the French environmental policy 
were almost nonexistent in this case. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The cases of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, and of the Climate/Energy 
Package, show how some variables can promote successful uploading of national policies at the 
European level and how some do not. 
Unsurprisingly, the policy process and the decision rules followed are of great 
importance, but this does not necessarily constitute a barrier. In the case of the Immigration and 
Asylum Pact, Paris had the leadership all the way from the beginning to the final output of the 
Pact, which was not the case with the Package as the Commission initiated the proposals. Both 
cases involved the co-decisional procedure with the European Parliament, and in both cases the 
Parliament did not modify the decisions that were taken in the Council. Moreover, the unanimity 
voting rule was used in both cases in the European Council and it shows that when conflicts 
arise, as in the case of the Package, it can be used by opponents of the proposal, which would 
block even more the possibility of uploading. In terms of the policy process, these two cases 
confirm that trying to have influence on policies that are already at a later stage is more difficult, 
especially trying to upload, even when a country is holding the EU Presidency.  
The role the Presidency took was also different in one case than in the other. In the case 
of the Pact, France played the role of the agenda-setter and shaper. In the second case, France 
acted more as an honest broker.  
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France’s ambitions for uploading were not the same in both areas. France devoted much 
more time, money and resources on the preparation and selling of the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum to the other EU members than it did for the Package. The adoption of 
the Pact had an important political significance at the national level because it showed to the 
French population that France was able to influence European policy in line with its national 
interests. France’s ambitions regarding the Climate/Energy Package were limited from the 
beginning for the reasons mentioned before, but also because it was likely more difficult to take 
leadership and try to upload policy since the country was lagging in this area in the first place. 
Moreover, its own national policies were in the making.  
With regards to the holding of the Council Presidency, generally, France did not need to 
rely on the EU institutions as much as a small country would in order to conduct all the activities 
managed by the Presidency. Indeed, critics on the Presidency often pointed out how France put 
aside the leaders of European institutions (Barroso, Solana and Junker), and consequently the 
institutions they were representing as well (Ludlow 2009a) .  
In both cases France aimed at legitimizing its policies by bringing ideas and measures 
from its national policies to the European level. Also, both issues were highly politicized and of 
great importance to all EU members. However, the degree of conflict was not the same, and 
neither were the specifics under discussion. From the beginning, the Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum reflected a certain convergence of opinion from the European political leaders in regard 
to the utility and control of immigration, and the need to harmonize asylum practices, even if it 
was consistently reflecting French policy. Interviews conducted with German officials involved 
in the area of immigration confirmed that they were all aware that France was pushing for its 
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own policy.19 Divergences were noticeable only when specific instruments were discussed. Then, 
not surprisingly enough, the specificities of policy instruments were exactly what caused conflict 
in the Climate/Energy Package. In both cases, goals were agreed upon. Consequently, normative 
uploading seems easier than the uploading of concrete measures. 
The nature of the proposal is also an important variable. The European Immigration and 
Asylum Pact represents a plan of action that was not integrated into the Conclusions of the 
Council Presidency properly speaking nor was it published in the Official Journal. However, all 
European institutions recognized the importance of the document and its centrality for upcoming 
legislative proposals. But because of this focus on more general policy goals, and despite 
sometimes having specific policy proposal objectives, most of the document promotes an 
orientation for future policies that suggests to the other members that they will also be able to 
influence those more precise policies. Hence, given this nature, it seems that uploading was 
easier in this case than with the Energy/Climate Package. The latter was composed of four 
directives, binding on the members after their adoption. Moreover, some members had more to 
lose than the others due to important industries in their country or given the nature of their 
energy production. Consequently, it was more difficult to influence the Energy/Climate Package 
with the aim of uploading.  
Other noticeable differences between the two policy fields were the reliance on experts 
and how the coordination mechanism with the SGAE was used. Producing policies in the area of 
immigration and asylum does not require extensive knowledge. Moreover, in the case of France, 
the President had been Minister of the Interior for a long time before his accession to the 
Republic’s Presidency. His minister of immigration also had the chance to know well his policy 
                                                 
19 Interviews were conducted in 2008 with 15 German high officials working for ministries involved with immigration and at the 
European Commission Delegation. 
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field and the other European actors as he met them often and was able to sell the pact to them 
without many troubles. However, in the case of the Climate/Energy field, experts took over the 
negotiations. Consequently, it might be more difficult to defend national interests and policies 
when the political élite is less present or when this knowledge is lacking. Moreover, France is 
more like a policy entrepreneur in the field of immigration, whereas it is a laggard in the 
environmental and energy fields.  
The SGAE’s role was more important in the case of the Energy/Climate Package than in 
the case of the Pact because more institutions were involved at all levels, requiring coordination 
and coherence. Because of the financial implications the Package has, interests between the 
Ministries had to be coordinated. The SGAE was also the link between the activities going on at 
the European level and the Assemblée Nationale.  Moreover, as the vote in the European 
Parliament was important, the SGAE had to provide information to all French representatives on 
the French position in the hope that they would support it when the vote would come. On the 
other hand, the Pact on Immigration did not require as much coordination because it is based on 
the French national policy that was already implemented and fewer Ministries have interests on 
it. It seems the Pact was almost only played out at the highest spheres of the Council. 
In sum, the two French cases suggest that conditions needed to facilitate policy uploading 
would have to be present from the beginning of the policy process, in order to have more 
influence and opportunities for uploading; to devote resources in preparing and selling the 
proposal prior to the policy process becoming entrenched; having expert politicians in the policy 
areas discussions harmonized; be an ambitious leader with the intention of uploading in the 
policy area; and finally, focusing on the uploading of policy goals in order to reach agreement 
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early on to therefore secure future policy instruments and measures that are aimed in the same 
direction. 
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4.0  THE CZECH REPUBLIC 2009 COUNCIL PRESIDENCY 
This chapter examines the 2009 Czech EU Council Presidency. It illustrates possible obstacles to 
national policy uploading in the EU, and how it is still possible for a country to promote its 
interests despite the absence of uploading and in the face of domestic political instability. The 
Czech Republic was chosen for its low policy-capacity and its centralization of power. In this 
chapter I focus on the issues of energy and immigration policies. Both of the issues were on the 
work programme of the Presidency, but energy policy was definitely more important politically, 
especially in face of the gas crisis that occurred during the first days of the Czech EU Presidency. 
The chapter offers an analysis of two failed cases as the Czech Republic was unable to 
upload its national policies. In the case of energy policy, this results primarily from an already 
advanced policy process in which the major elements promoted by the EU Presidency were 
already broadly included, or it is the result of the absence of formal decision or orientation 
documents regarding long-term policy orientation. However, the Czech government was still 
able to promote its interests in the energy policy area through decisions on the funding of 
pipelines. In the case of migration policy, the lack of political interest at the national level in this 
area as well as the well-advanced legislative process proved to be a significant barrier for 
uploading. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first presents a general analysis of the 
Czech Council Presidency and of its priorities. The second section looks at the national 
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coordination of European policies in Czech Republic. The third and fourth sections examine the 
cases of energy and immigration policies. These two sections provide a review of the national 
policies in Czech Republic in the relevant policy area and discuss the pre-Presidency and actual 
Presidency period before providing an analysis of the case. Finally, the conclusion provides a 
comparative analysis of the two cases. 
4.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The Czech Republic did not have experience holding the EU Presidency. Moreover, it was only 
the second ‘new’ Member State of the 2004-2007 enlargement round to hold the position, after 
Slovenia in the first half of 2008. Overall, it proved to be a difficult exercise for the country as it 
faced many challenges coming both from the domestic front as well as the international stage. 
Despite these obstacles, many analysts have concluded that the Czech Council Presidency had 
been moderately efficient in conducting daily business, considering the obstacles it faced (Benes 
and Karlas 2010). 
One of the biggest challenges that the Czech government faced before and during the 
Council Presidency was national political instability. This situation affected the preparations for 
the EU Council Presidency many times, as they were delayed and/or changed orientation with 
the different actors involved in the government (Pehe 2008, Marek and Baun 2011). After the 
June 2006 national parliamentary elections, it took Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek a little more 
than seven months to form a government and win a vote of confidence. And only a few months 
later, the first Topolánek government collapsed and a new government coalition was formed. 
This second coalition government conducted the EU Council Presidency. However, the 
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formation of this new government did not diminish the tensions between parties, it was 
constantly under threat of confidence votes (it faced four votes during the period of January 2007 
and before the holding of the EU Presidency), and despite many attempts to negotiate a truce 
between parties during the period of the Council Presidency, no agreement was reached (Benes 
and Karlas 2010, Marek and Baun 2011). Unfortunately, on March 24th 2009, this coalition 
government was dissolved following a no-confidence vote in the middle of its EU mandate. A 
technocratic caretaker government, headed by Jan Fischer, a non-partisan who was the head of 
the Czech Statistical Office, finally took over the rest of the mandate. However, the inability to 
put in place a caretaker government during the one and a half months following the no-
confidence vote had the effect of finishing the EU Presidency politically (Kaczynski 2009). 
The work programme for the EU Presidency was very ambitious at first, involving six-
themed priorities in 2007 (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs 2007), but 
ultimately was reduced to three themes two weeks after the beginning of the Council Presidency. 
The priorities finally included in the programme were (1) the economy, with a focus on the 
single market and the global financial crisis, (2) energy, with particular interest on energy 
security, and (3) the EU in the world, with external relations focusing on EU enlargement, the 
Eastern Partnership and transatlantic relations (Czech Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union 2009b).  
Due to the advancement of issues under the French Council Presidency, the tensions 
created by the harmonization of the 18-month work program for the trio Presidency, as well as 
conflicts within the European Commission, the program was substantially reduced.  The French 
Council Presidency was able to push further than expected the issues on the agenda, for example 
by reaching an agreement on the energy-climate package, which consequently reduced the 
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activities the Czech Council Presidency would have to do during its term (Král, et al. 2009, 
Marek and Baun 2011). The relations with France were difficult during the preparation of the 18-
months work programme, due to the two countries expressing diverging views on where the EU 
should be going with regard to the economic crisis. France had a more protectionist stand than 
the Czech Republic, who wanted to adopt a more liberal stand on dossiers such as the single 
market (Král 2008, Kaczynski 2009, Marek and Baun 2011). The issues over the 18 month 
programme had to be resolved with the intervention of the Council General Secretariat (Král, et 
al. 2009). Finally, the Czech Republic had inadvertently offended the European Commission by 
negotiating unilaterally with the United States on the extension of the visa waiver program for its 
nationals, instead of leaving the leadership to the Commission, which would have negotiated for 
all of the new members (Pehe 2008). Moreover, the Commission was unhappy with the delay in 
drafting of the work program of the Presidency (Marek and Baun 2011). As a result, the 
Commission decided to move ahead with the post-Hague program and budget reforms, but under 
the Swedish Council Presidency instead of the Czech Council Presidency, thus also depriving the 
Czech Presidency from another of its original priorities (Král 2008, Král, et al. 2009). 
The European Parliament elections impacted the work-programme, but without 
necessarily reducing it. Starting at the beginning of April, the campaign for the early June 
elections of 2009 would have the effect of suspending most of the EU legislative process. 
Therefore, the first part of the EU Presidency was considered more important for the Czech 
Republic if it wanted to achieve its legislative agenda. Moreover, these upcoming elections 
meant that European issues would be even more important at the national level, in a country 
where the mix between national and European politics were already blurred (Kaczynski 2009). 
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The Czech Republic is perceived as a Eurosceptic country. Its President, Vaclav Klaus, 
was considered to be one of the most Eurosceptic head of state among the 27 members in 2009 
(Král 2009). Because the Czech Constitution is not clear on the division of powers between the 
President and the Prime Minister with regard to dealing with the EU, an agreement had to be 
made prior to the EU Presidency. It was decided that the Prime Minister will hold the 
chairmanship of the European Council. Nevertheless, the influence of Klaus over the Council 
Presidency was still important as he would lead many bilateral summits and he was active vis-à-
vis the domestic population. Politically, this could have many consequences as the elections for 
the European Parliament were coming up, and also for the government who faced constant 
threats of confidence vote. 
An element that needs to be mentioned that might have impacted the credibility and 
legitimacy of the Czech Republic to lead Europe was that, by the time the country held the 
Council Presidency, it still had not ratified the Lisbon Treaty.  
Taking all these elements into consideration, the Czech Council Presidency was starting 
its Council Presidency with many challenges, and faced many others during the chairmanship. 
Overall, Czech Republic spent almost as much as a big country on its EU Presidency, with a total 
of about €130 million (Marek and Baun 2011). 
4.2 NATIONAL COORDINATION OF EUROPEAN POLICY 
Since the Czech Republic’s transition to democracy, the administrative design of its government 
has changed many times. Moreover, corruption is high in the civil service, and since 1997, all 
attempts to legislate in order to create an independent and professional civil service to address  
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the problem have failed or been delayed due to the absence of political support for it (Marek and 
Baun 2011). In general, the administration in the Czech Republic is considered to have a high 
degree of uncertainty, high politicization, and an overall low quality of staff (O'Dwyer 2002, 
Kaniok and Gergelova Steigrova 2014). These elements contribute to the characterization of the 
country as having a low policy capacity. 
The system of coordination adopted for the conduct of its EU Presidency only modified 
slightly the semi-centralized system that it uses for regular EU business. The overall coordination 
of the Presidency issues was vested, at first, in the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) for European 
Affairs Alexandr Vondra and his office, while the ultimate decision-making power was reserved 
for the governmental EU Committee consisting of all the government ministers (Benes and 
Karlas 2010, Marek and Baun 2011). Vondra was later replaced by Štefan Füle, as Minister for 
European Affairs, during the caretaker government.  
The EU Committee plays a central role in determining the Czech positions in the EU. It is 
divided into two levels: the government level, chaired by the Prime Minister, where the Czech 
interests are formulated; and the working level, chaired by the DPM, at which these interests get 
promoted in the Council and COREPER (Marek and Baun 2011). This level exercises overall 
coordination and monitoring functions in decision making on EU matters, and it approves 
mandates for Czech ministers at the EU Council. The team DPM Vondra put together for the 
Czech Council Presidency was considered to be fairly familiar with the conduct of a Council 
Presidency. Its staff had participated in Council Presidencies of other countries in order to get 
accustomed with the administrative machinery of the Council Presidency (Marek and Baun 
2011). 
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The EU Committee also supervises the work of the Ministerial Coordination Groups 
(MCG), which are the most basic level for the formulation of the Czech EU position. These 
groups are composed of experts and representatives from different ministries who are involved 
on a given issue, and chaired by the ministry of the main policy area. The MCG are responsible 
for identifying and formulating the Czech position on specific policy issues, monitoring 
developments in their area at the EU level, and represent the Czech Republic in the EU Council 
working committees (Marek and Baun 2011). In case of cross-sectional issues, two or more 
ministries share responsibility. In these cases, coordination suffers the most because each 
ministry has their own approach depending on the objectives, but mostly on who are their 
“clients” (Kaniok and Gergelova Steigrova 2014). The problem has been that no transparent and 
functional mechanism was created to resolve these conflicts. Moreover, most ministries lack 
expertise in EU affairs due to the short length of membership as well as the previous outflows of 
competent officials to EU institutions (Karlas 2010). 
The Czech Permanent Representation, which is usually solely under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), was put jointly under the supervision of the authority of 
the DPM and MFA for the duration of the EU Presidency, this also played an important role in 
preparing and conducting the EU Presidency. This situation created some confusion at times 
(Král, et al. 2009). In addition, a new Ambassador was appointed only one year before the EU 
Presidency and had limited contacts and experience in Brussels (Pehe 2008). The number of 
employees of the Permanent representation doubled in size during the Presidency (an additional 
110 posts were created) (Marek and Baun 2011). 
Importantly, officials from the Czech government had no experience in holding the 
Council Presidency. The government invested in training for its Presidency by consulting with 
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previous Presidencies and modelling itself on the Austrian, Slovenian, Germany and Irish models 
(Kaniok and Gergelova Steigrova 2014). A central register of employees who received training 
relating to the EU was created. 
The Prime Minister and the President of Czech Republic are not part of the general 
coordination system of EU Policy. However, they are sometimes still involved. The Prime 
Minister will usually intervene when the issues at hand are very political and significant for the 
country, if a conflict over an issue arises and cannot be resolved without the intervention of the 
PM, or when he has a particular interest in the issue been discussed (Karlas 2010). In the case of 
the Czech President, due to mainly his symbolic role, his influence rests on his ability to 
participate in discussions relating to the foreign policies of the country in which he is involved 
(Karlas 2010). 
4.3 ENERGY SECURITY POLICY 
Energy policy in the Czech Republic cannot be regarded as totally independent from the 
influence of the European Union. Many aspects of the Czech Energy Policy have been 
influenced through conditions that needed to be met before EU accession and the integration of 
the acquis communautaires at the domestic level (Černoch 2013, Vlček, et al. 2013). Moreover, 
it is still influenced by it through EU requirements and targets that must be met (International 
Energy Agency 2010). Despite this strong EU influence on energy domestic policy, the Czech 
government was able to shape its own energy policy, which is different from other Member 
States, and integrate strong national concerns, such as energy security, which will be the focus 
here. 
 97 
4.3.1 Czech State Energy Policy 
The energy policy framework of the Czech Republic is set by the State Energy Policy, adopted in 
2004. The main objectives of the policy are to strive for independence from foreign energy 
sources, maximize the safety of energy sources, and to promote sustainable development 
(Ministry of Industry and Trade of Czech Republic 2004). The State Energy Policy is 
characterized by a high concern for energy security, which is expressed through an economic 
lens for the promotion of liberalization and the development of domestic sources of energy. In 
2006, an Expert Group on Energy Security was set up by the government to monitor the situation 
in the country and to make recommendations to further insure all measures were taken to 
promote energy security (International Energy Agency 2010). 
From the beginning of the transition to democracy in the 1990’s, the Czech Republic 
made policy choices differing from the other Central East European (CEE) countries. For 
example, the Czech Republic was the only one to invest and inaugurate a new oil pipeline 
connecting its own oil to Western Europe as early as 1996 – the IKL Pipeline with Germany 
(Nosko and Lang 2010, Neuman 2011). Moreover, the Czech Republic contracted supplies of 
Norwegian gas and completed the building of nuclear power plants to insure its supply diversity. 
The strategy adopted by the government was to diversify not only its suppliers, but also the 
transit routes. On the other hand, only limited investment was made into renewable energies. 
Although all EU candidate countries had to privatize and liberalize their energy market as 
part of the acquis, the Czech Republic’s legislative measures and initiatives proved to be more 
efficient and beneficial to its population and companies. “Czech government through the energy 
policy choice and their foreign dimension assured that Czech consumers and companies paid 
lowest prices for their energy as compared to their neighbor to the east” (Nosko 2013: 111). The 
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Czech Republic is regarded as been the only CEE country that established an effectively 
functioning energy market (Nosko and Lang 2010).  
Moreover, the Czech Republic is the third-largest net electricity exporter in the European 
Union, after France and Germany (International Energy Agency 2010). Electricity production is 
largely composed of domestic coal and nuclear. Natural gas only represents a complementary 
source of energy on the market. However, the Czech Republic imports almost all of its oil and 
gas requirements. According to Eurostat, the overall import dependence of the country is 
relatively low in comparison to the EU27 average. In 2009, it is estimated to be at the level of 
28%, whereas the average for the EU is of 54% (Eurostat 2009). 
For these reasons, it is interesting that energy security is still an important concern for the 
Czech government because its energy sources are relatively well diversified, and the country is 
not as dependent on energy imports as are many other EU Member States (Nosko 2013).  
The focus on energy security in the Czech national energy policy can be explained 
through the influence of domestic politics and foreign concerns. The Minister holding the office 
is very important in shaping the direction that the energy policy will take. Martin Riman was the 
Minister of Industry and Trade in the Topolánek government, and he was criticized for not 
focusing enough on the environment and sustainability. Moreover, he was in favor of breaching 
territorial limits on brown coal mining, as well as building additional nuclear facilities (Vlček, et 
al. 2013).20 This approach caused political conflicts amongst the coalition parties in the 
government, and a special independent commission to assess long-term energy requirements in 
the Czech Republic was set up in order to make propositions that could be more aligned with the 
Green Party’s interests (less nuclear and coal energy) (Vlček, et al. 2013). However, the report 
                                                 
20 The Minister that replaced Riman in the Fisher government, Vladimir Tosovsky, pursued a similar trend but focused even more 
on the development of domestic sources of energy (Vlček, et al. 2013). 
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was never officially published because criticisms over the independence of its experts were 
raised, and the conclusions of the report, supporting diversification of energy sources and 
legitimizing nuclear energy, could have led to an early fall of the government with the removal 
of the Green Party support in the coalition (Vlček, et al. 2013).   
The opinion from citizens is also quite important in the field of energy in the Czech 
Republic. Even if the country does not face an immediate energy threat, opinion polls have 
suggested that the public is quite worried and sensitive to these issues (Nosko and Lang 2010). 
According to results of PEW surveys, Russia is perceived as an energy threat by the population 
in the Czech Republic, much more so than in the other CEE countries, even during the years 
when no energy crisis occurred (Nosko and Lang 2010). Hence, the government was able to 
invest public money more easily into projects of energy diversification. 
At the implementation level, the Energy Regulatory Office (ERO) sets the rules for 
business activities in the energy sectors as well as the rules for trading. Its creation was mainly 
due to EU stimulation during the candidacy period: all candidate countries had to create a 
regulatory office (International Energy Agency 2010). Another institution is also involved in the 
implementation of the energy policy, the State Energy Inspection (SEI), which performs only a 
monitoring function, based on the demands coming from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the 
ERO or of its own initiative. It monitors conformity with the Energy Act. 
Beginning in 2009, the country started a review of its policy to further achieve a balanced 
energy mix, with preferential use of all domestic energy sources and maintain excess production 
of electricity, in order to make sure it remains relatively independent of foreign energy sources. 
Moreover, plans to prepare a specific energy security strategy were under discussion. 
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What is important to retain from the Czech Republic’s experience is that the evidence 
suggests that “prioritization of security in energy policy, on the long-run, does not come at a cost 
to other policy aims and priorities, as it did not have negative effects on either the GDP or 
employment” (Nosko 2013: 112). 
4.3.2 Promoting Energy Security at the European Level 
4.3.2.1 EU Presidency Preparations 
Czech politics show that the orientation policies take can be very much influenced by the 
actors’ opinions in the issue. In the case of the Czech EU Presidency, a dominant actor in the 
formulation of the energy security policy at the national level was involved in the preparations of 
the Czech work program establishing the priorities for the EU chairmanship. Alexandr Vondra, 
who was the DPM for European Affairs and responsible for the preparation of the EU 
Presidency, was a strong ‘Atlanticist’, meaning that he takes the view that the “EU needs to play 
a more important role in providing security guarantees in Europe and in stabilizing its 
neighbourhood” (Stritecky 2010: 165). Many speeches given by Vondra during the years prior to 
the Czech EU Presidency demonstrate this position. For example, he depicted Russia as an 
energy security threat during a conference in 2007 by declaring that the “unjust manipulation or 
interruption of energy supplies is as much a security threat as is military action. Post-soviet 
countries have been experiencing that on a daily basis, as Russia’s appetite for using energy as a 
political tool is growing” (Vondra 2007b). In addition, he later emphasized the importance of the 
EU by stating that “a genuine external energy policy is not thinkable without a strong single 
energy market. The two complement each other and cannot be separated” (Vondra 2007a). These 
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declarations also illustrate that for the Czech Republic, energy security cannot be dissociated 
from its economic element. 
Of course, not only is the personalization of political issues such as energy security  
important for setting it as a priority on the EU Presidency agenda, it was also made possible by 
the support of this view by a majority of political actors at the national level, notwithstanding 
their political party affiliation (Stritecky 2010).  
On a practical side, no particular actions were taken during the preparation period to 
promote the energy security priority beforehand. As mentioned in an earlier section, most of the 
efforts during the months prior to the EU Presidency were devoted to the training of officials and 
civil servants, and the decisions over the work program. 
4.3.2.2 Council Presidency Term 
The Presidency term started with momentum for the Czech government regarding its 
agenda on the promotion of energy security at the European level, as opposed to a focus only on 
the environmental aspects of energy policy. In early January, a gas conflict over payments 
between Russia and Ukraine arose and created an energy supply problem for eighteen (18) EU 
members (Euractiv.com 2009c). The CEE countries were the most affected by this crisis 
(Euractiv.com 2009h). It even led to the involvement of the EU in resolving the conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia. The gas crisis prompted discussions on energy security within EU 
institutions, and it openly revealed the interests of some member countries in the energy sector as 
preferring to promote security, more or less at the expense of the environmental targets, in order 
to secure a diversity of energy sources (Euractiv.com 2009c). Thus, the gas crisis had the effect 
of confirming the need of energy security discussions at the European level and legitimizing it on 
the agenda of the Czech EU Presidency. 
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Another result of this crisis was that it revealed the discrepancies existing between the 
EU Members States with regard to energy dependence on imports, routes and suppliers. Western 
Europe was far less affected by the Russian Gazprom cut than the CEE countries. Table 4.1 
compares energy dependence on imports according to countries.  
 
Table 1. Energy Dependence (%), Decreasing Order 
Geographic location Year 2009 (%) 
























Czech Republic 27,2 




This table shows the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to meet its energy needs. The 
indicator is calculated as net imports divided by the sum of gross inland energy consumption plus bunkers. It is for 
all energy products. (Source: Eurostat) 
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The table shows which countries are the most vulnerable: most EU countries have a high 
dependence on imports. The gas crisis also raised the question of solidarity between member 
states in face of future crisis, and the necessity for a common European energy policy, whose 
development had stagnated since 2007 due to divergence between the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council on what form it should take.21 The Czech Presidency understood the 
strategic opportunity before them in this area. Topolánek stated that “in the future, Europe must 
speak with one voice and maintain a clear vision of its energy policy. My primary objective as 
President of the European Council is to lay the foundations of such a common policy and such 
common vision” (2009). And Vondra added that “the Presidency must not lose the political 
momentum generated by the crisis and must harness it to bring about a rapid adoption of short-, 
medium- as well as long-term measures that will strengthen the EU energy security. This is how 
we intend to use the spring European Council” (2009). 
Part of the legislative agenda on energy policy was inherited during the Czech EU 
Presidency. This was the case with the Second Energy Review, which was set to be adopted 
during the Czech EU Presidency. The Review is a comprehensive blueprint for the EU’s future 
energy policy that includes orientation and targets. The Commission’s Communication for the 
Review was published in November 2008, and reached the European Parliament and the 
European Council during the first months of 2009. As exemplified by the following section of 
the Review, the energy security orientation was already substantial in it before it reached the EP 
and the Council: 
“While each Member State is responsible for its own security, 
solidarity between Member States is a basic feature of EU membership. 
With the internal market for energy, specific national solutions are often 
                                                 
21 For a review on the discussions that took place between 2006 and 2007 on energy security and the various proposals made by 
the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council, see Natorski & Herranz Surralles (2008). 
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insufficient. Strategies to share and spread risk, and to make the best use of 
the combined weight of the EU in world affairs can be more effective than 
dispersed national actions. For these reasons, energy security is an issue of 
common EU concern.  
Given these global developments, the EU needs to take action to 
secure its energy future and to protect its essential energy interests. The EU 
needs to intensify its efforts in developing an effective external energy 
policy; speaking with one voice, identifying infrastructure of major 
importance to its energy security and then ensuring its construction, and 
acting coherently to deepen its partnerships with key energy suppliers, 
transit countries and consumers” (COM (2008) 781 final: 3). 
 
Moreover, the review specifically addressed issues such as the infrastructure needs and 
the diversification of energy supplies, external energy relations, oil and gas stocks and crisis 
response mechanisms, and energy efficiency. The Commission identified the projects for which 
priority should be given. These included the Baltic interconnection plan, the Southern gas 
corridor, Liquefied natural gas, the Mediterranean energy ring, the North-South gas and 
electricity interconnections, and the North Sea offshore grid.  
In early February, the European Parliament (co-decisional with the Council on energy 
issues) adopted a report on the Review which contained specific demands to be included in the 
review or future actions to be considered. In its report, the EP calls for a more ambitious 
diversification plan and the further extension of supply routes and sources to the Caspian region, 
with the mention of the Nabucco pipeline, which was not in the Commission’s Review. 
Moreover, the EP report encourages the Commission to revisit the 2004 Security of Gas Supply 
directive to include an emergency action plan, both at the EU and national level, and to 
incorporate some kind of energy security clause in the cooperation agreements with transit and 
producer countries to ensure that commercial dispute would not lead to supply disruption in the 
future (European Parliament 2009). 
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Finally, the European Council took place on March 19 and 20th. Czech Republic chaired 
and concluded the discussions on the Review, with its approval. Similarly to the EP, the 
European Council also called for the Commission to propose a regulation concerning measures 
to safeguard security of gas supply. The Presidency pushed in more detail “for a review of the 
strategic energy infrastructure and of the networks of major producing and transit countries, 
advocating the review of the rules for oil contingency stocks and raised the issue of  energy 
solidarity” (Král, et al. 2009). Furthermore, the European Council Conclusions calls on the 
Commission for the drafting of measures to achieve priorities of the review and to propose a new 
EU tool for energy security and infrastructure for the beginning of 2010 (Council of the 
European Union 2009 [7880/09]). It also promotes diversity at the domestic level by encouraging 
investment in every country’s own energy resources, and supports the use of nuclear energy as 
well. In sum, the European Council Conclusions really focused on energy security, at the 
expense of the Copenhagen Conference preparations and sometimes with lesser consideration on 
climate change goals, such as the reduction in the use of nuclear power in the EU. 
Most importantly during the meeting, the Czech EU Presidency launched a general 
discussion of positions on the 2010-2014 Energy Action Plan, focusing mainly on the external 
dimension of energy security, but for which no formal document has emerged (Král, et al. 2009, 
Ludlow 2009c). Another important issue raised during the European Council for which a 
compromise had to be reached was on the founding of pipeline projects. Foreign Ministers had 
previously been unable to find a compromise in their meeting because they were divided on 
which project they would fund with the €5 billion reserve there could use (Pop 2009). 
Ultimately, the Czech EU Presidency, with the support of the CEE countries and of the European 
Commission, was able to secure funding for the Nabucco pipeline during the March European 
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Council, despite the opposition of countries such as Germany (Benes and Karlas 2010). From the 
beginning Topolánek stated that “this (Nabucco) was an absolute priority [during the EU 
Presidency]. Our partners see it in the same way, and we have agreed on this at the Visegrad-four 
meeting” (Euractiv.com 2008). Hence, bringing the project back on the table was contentious, as 
other projects for the ‘Southern corridor’ were also considered and supported by bigger EU 
countries (Euractiv.com 2009a). In order to make concrete advancements on the ‘Southern 
Corridor’, a summit was organized in Prague on May 8, 2009 (which was also an informal 
Energy Council meeting). One major concretization of the EU Presidency during that meeting 
was to secure the final negotiations on the Nabucco project under the umbrella of the EU (Czech 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2009a). 
4.3.3 Analysis 
At first glance, it may seem that the Czech Republic somewhat succeeded in uploading its energy 
security policy focus at the European level. The Czech Presidency often spoke of the subject as if 
energy security was not a concern present at the European level. The discourse adopted by the 
political leaders of the EU Presidency gives the impression that Czech actors, with the help of its 
CEE supporters, was able to impose their vision. But it would be misleading to adopt this view. 
Awareness over the diversification of energy sources and suppliers was already a major concern 
at the European level and for individual Member States despite a lack of common EU action (as 
shown in the Second Energy Review).  Coupling this with the on-going securitization of EU 
energy policy indicates that the Czech Presidency was capitalizing on a vision already shared by 
others. 
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What the Czech Presidency has been successful with is the concretization of these 
principles and in bringing them further than first intended, establishing the pressing need for EU 
solidarity and independence in the energy area as well as succeeding in the promotion of its 
interests regarding the diversification of route and supply projects that would receive funding 
with the Nabucco pipeline. In sum, it was able to lay the foundation of a future common EU 
energy policy and legitimize the continued investment into nuclear energy, which became 
questionable over the previous years. The European Council endorsed the initiatives already set 
out in the Second Strategic Energy review and mandated the Commission for a new EU Energy 
Security and Infrastructure Instrument by 2010 and took actions on the development of a 
Southern Corridor. With these in mind, the Czech EU Presidency seem to have taken the role of 
the agenda setter, but not quite of a shaper. The impact of the gas crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine cannot be excluded from these achievements. The gas crisis created a momentum which 
enabled the conclusion of discussions that had been back and forth on the EU’s agenda. 
The case also show that strong cooperation between the Commission and the Czech EU 
Presidency existed. This factor contributed to the swift advancement of dossiers in the area of 
energy policy, which did not stop with the new caretaker government, as revealed by the 
discussions on the funding of the Nabucco pipeline. Hence, it appears that during the second part 
of its Presidency the Czech Republic took on more of the role of honest broker in the 
negotiations over the funding of energy projects. 
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4.4 IMMIGRATION POLICY 
4.4.1 Czech Immigration Policy  
Immigration policy in the Czech Republic is headed by the Ministry of the Interior. The main 
principles of the policy are vague and general. They focus on the elimination of all forms of 
illegal immigration and other illicit activities by means of measures taken on the basis of 
international cooperation as well as measures adopted at the national level; they aim to insure 
that measures taken in the area does not hinder legal migration and support those forms of 
immigration that are beneficial to the country and society in the long term; and seek to cope with 
migration-related consequences of humanitarian crises and eliminating the reasons for such 
phenomena the with the cooperation of Czech Republic in global and European communities 
(Ministry of the Interior Czech Republic 2015b). The legislative proposals are supposed to take 
these principles into consideration. However, at the legislative level, most of the Czech 
Republic’s immigration policy is based on European regulations and directives that had to be 
transposed into national legislation at the time of integration in 2004 and thereafter (European 
Migration Network 2008). The Czech government has not been as innovative in this policy area 
as other countries, because immigration (legal and illegal) does not represent a strong public 
policy challenge and it does not engage its population in divisive opinion that could have 
electoral ramifications. 
Nevertheless, two initiatives meant to increase and encourage the arrival of foreign 
workers in the country are worth noting as they illustrate the relative independence Czech 
Republic developed in the area. The first one was created in 2003 and was aimed at the 
recruitment of skilled workers from outside the EU, as a response to a noticeable flow of skilled 
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workers to the EU-15 from Czech Republic (Macáková 2011). The Selection of Qualified 
Foreign Workers encourages foreign workers to apply for a residence permit after a period of 2.5 
years instead of 5 years, and they had to already have a work permit. The selection is based on a 
point system, that includes criteria such as age, education, language skills, work experience, but 
no specific occupation or professional requirements are set (Drbohlav, et al. 2009). At first, only 
immigrants from specific source countries could apply for it, but it was later expended.  
The other initiative of the Czech government was the creation of a Green Card, which 
started to be implemented in January 2009. Its aim is to support short-term immigration of high 
skilled-workers with specific free labour vacancies, as a way to supplement the Selection of 
Qualified Foreign Workers. The Green card holders are able to bring their family with them. 
Employers must prove that the job they offer has been vacant for a long time and does not 
impede on the preferential treatment that Czech and EU nationals are entitled to (Drbohlav, et al. 
2009). 
The Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers and the Green Card measures show the 
liberal approach the Czech Republic has developed towards immigration policy. It points to the 
different reality the country faces with regard to immigration in comparison to Western Europe. 
Immigration is perceived as a tool for the economic development of the country as the entrance 
in the EU created a demand for more workers (European Migration Network 2008, Ministry of 
the Interior Czech Republic 2015a).  
Regarding the fight against illegal immigration, the positioning is based on the Action 
Plan of Combat against Illegal Migration, which was adopted in 2004. The Plan focuses on the 
prevention and control of illegal immigration, includes penalties, and outlines inter-ministerial as 
well as international cooperation in the area (Ministry of the Interior Czech Republic 2015a). 
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Again, most of the measures included in this Plan are legislative measures transposed at the 
national level from the EU. Due to the location of the country, the Czech Republic did not have 
to face the same challenges as the other CEE countries that entered the EU in 2004 and 2007. 
4.4.2 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – EU Level 
Most of the agenda of the Czech EU Presidency in the area of Justice and Home Affairs is 
inherited, limiting the scope for the Presidency to influence its content and process. From the 
beginning, the government did not show strong commitment in the preparation of the Presidency 
in this area. As mentioned earlier, despite the willingness of the Presidency to first start working 
on the new Stockholm Programme, its attempt to include it on its work programme proved to be 
unsuccessful. Moreover, most of the actions taken in the JHA field during the six months of the 
Czech EU Presidency were not contentious issues between the Member States (Monar 2010). 
Hence, work in the JHA area proved to be taking place much more at the administrative level 
than at the political one: the Council mostly confirmed what had already be negotiated before. 
The developments that took place in the area of Justice and Home affairs during the 
leadership of the Czech Presidency show how, in this case, the national and the European levels 
can sometimes work in parallel or complementary manner. Two directives relating to legal and 
illegal immigration that were adopted during the Presidency semester are worth considering here. 
The first one is the ‘Blue Card Directive’ (Council Directive 2009/50/EC) on the 
condition of entry of third-country nationals for highly qualified employment. The directive was 
adopted during the Czech Presidency after been under discussion for almost one year. The 
creation of this card, which combined a residence and work permit for its holders, was first 
supposed to compete internationally with similar instruments, such as the US ‘Green Card’ 
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(Monar 2010). However, the end result is not what was intended because Member States still 
have the choice to maintain or introduce similar skill selective national immigration 
arrangements that could be more attractive than the EU Blue Card. Moreover, at the adoption of 
the directive, the UK, Denmark and Ireland had already signified that they would opt-out from it, 
as they have similar immigration schemes that go further (Monar 2010).  
The second directive adopted during the Czech Presidency in the area of immigration 
concerns its illegal aspect, with the sanctions of employers hiring illegal migrants. The Directive 
1009/52/EC aims at providing for minimum standards and sanctions against illegal employment 
of third-country nationals. According to this directive, employers (both companies and 
individuals) are obliged to require the holding of a work permit from the third-country nationals 
as a condition for their employment. Financial sanctions are applicable for non-compliance and 
can increase according to the number of illegal workers employed. Moreover, employers might 
even have to support the cost of return to the country of origin if such a procedure gets to be 
carried out.  
As most of the developments in the area of JHA took place at the administrative level, no 
political statements appear in the European Council Conclusions during the Czech Presidency, 
and the directives were only joined to them. In addition, JHA were only discussed during the 
June 2009 European Council, but not with the leadership of the Presidency. Cyprus, Greece, Italy 
and Malta, who faced a recent flow of illegal immigrants, drafted the paragraphs in the 
Presidency conclusions calling for the solidarity of other EU members in dealing with this 
phenomenon (Ludlow 2009b). 
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4.4.3 Analysis 
The case of immigration policy and JHA under the Czech EU Presidency clearly reflects the 
failure and lack of intention for the uploading of national policies by a country holding the 
chairmanship. As most of its agenda was inherited, the Czech Presidency was more reactive in 
character with efforts aimed at managing only what was unavoidable (Drulakova 2010). This 
situation can be partially explained by the lack of interest at the national level in the immigration 
issues as the country is more a transit country than a target one, and that JHA was dealt at the 
administrative level rather than the political one during the Presidency. 
This case also exemplifies how a country can remain impartial when an issue comes up, 
such as large illegal immigration flows, because of their lack of interests in the area, which could 
be conducive to taking the role of the honest broker when contentious issues arise. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The cases of energy and immigration policies during the Czech EU Presidency illustrate how a 
country can fail at uploading its national policies at the European Union level. Interestingly 
enough, these failures are not due to the domestic political instability present in the country 
during the EU Presidency period, which provoked a change in government for the last part of the 
mandate. Nor are they due to the active involvement of other European institutions, which has, in 
the case of the European Commission, been a strong ally for the EU Presidency in the activation 
of its short-term agenda. 
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In the energy area, the Czech EU Presidency failed to upload its national policy but 
succeeded in promoting its interests. This case specifically show how policy uploading is not the 
same thing as defending its interest. Energy security was a recurring theme at the European level 
since 2006, despite no concrete European action in the area due to the willingness of the Member 
States to keep their own prerogatives. Hence, the Czech EU Presidency put it back on the 
agenda, but did not upload its national policy or drastically shape the EU policy outcome, 
especially with regard to the Second Energy Review, which was already far advanced in its 
proceeding. Moreover, with the gas crisis, it is evident that the issue of energy security would 
have been on the European Council’s agenda, but it is not clear that without it, the prioritized 
Czech elements might have led to detailed discussions or decisions in the energy policy realm as 
it did. The crisis created the opportunity for other discussions to take place on the future of a 
common European energy policy, but not formal adoption of any kind was published. The 
influence of the Czech Presidency was most important with regard to the settling of funding on 
pipeline projects. 
In the immigration area, the Czech EU Presidency failed to upload national policies in 
part because political will and intention did not exist from the beginning. This lacunae can be 
explained by the fact that the issue of immigration does not raise high stakes at the national level 
in the Czech Republic. Moreover, the Czech Republic is not an innovative country in the area of 
immigration policy. Most of its legislative framework on migration is based on European and 
international legislation. It is more difficult to promote different avenues to policy when they do 
not exist in the first place. Finally, the work programme of the Czech EU Presidency in the area 
of Justice and Home Affairs was mostly inherited and did not leave space for EU Presidency 
initiative. 
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To summarize, this chapter showed that domestic political instability might not impede 
the general performance of an EU Presidency, and that in the case of Czech Republic, it was not 
a factor contributing to the failure of policy uploading. In addition, this section confirmed how 
important political will and intent for uploading of the actors involved in the EU Presidency is, 
and how being too far along in the EU legislative process is an obstacle to influence. 
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5.0  SWEDEN 2009 COUNCIL PRESIDENCY 
This chapter examines the 2009 Swedish EU Council Presidency. It demonstrates which 
variables are important in facilitating uploading for a country such as Sweden, chosen for its 
strong-moderate policy capacity and centralization of power.  In this chapter I focus on the issues 
of Europe 2020 Strategy and on eco-efficiency, specifically the EU carbon tax. The first case 
was officially on the Presidency’s work program, and was considered quite an important priority 
for the Presidency, On the other hand, only discussions on an eco-efficient economy in the realm 
of environmental policy were on the agenda, despite an announcement from the Presidency that 
it would push for the adoption of an EU carbon tax. 
This chapter shows that Sweden was able to upload its broad principles of its national 
policy in the area of labour/gender equality at the European level, in part because it is a leader in 
these policy areas and because it devoted enough resources to promote its interests. Moreover, 
ministerial expert politicians were essential in securing this outcome. However, being  a leader in 
a policy area does not guarantee successful full-uploading, as the second case on eco-efficiency 
and the EU carbon tax demonstrate. Policy instruments remain difficult to upload, especially 
when unanimity is required in the Council. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first presents a global analysis of the 
Swedish Council Presidency and its priorities. The second section looks at the national 
coordination of European policies in Sweden. The third and fourth sections examine the cases of 
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Europe 2020 and the EU carbon tax. These two sections provide a review of the national policy 
in Sweden in the relevant policy area and discuss the pre-presidency and actual Presidency 
period before providing an analysis of the case. Finally, the conclusion provides a comparative 
analysis of the two cases. 
5.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
To prepare for their Council Presidency, Sweden had to plan it under two different sets of rules 
(Miles 2010). Whether or not the Lisbon Treaty was going to be adopted and when it would take 
effect was still undecided and this shaped the preparations for the Presidency. In addition, the 
Swedes were faced with many external international factors they had consider: the recession 
started earlier but was then hitting Europe hard, the financial system was destabilized, 
unemployment was rising, etc. The impacts and responses to the economic crisis by EU members 
were different from one to another, and created some domestic political disruptions among some 
of them (Langdal and von Sydow 2009a, Miles 2010). Consequently, this situation created 
barriers in some policy areas, but also created a window of opportunity in others. Therefore, the 
original intended EU Presidency programme was quite different from the one implemented. 
General assessments made by analysts on the Swedish Council Presidency are usually 
evaluating the Presidency as quite ordinary (Center for European Reform 2009, Langdal and von 
Sydow 2009a, b, Miles 2010). The Swedes were able to bring some policies to their final 
agreements, but few were actually initiated and implemented by them. Considering the context in 
which it was taking place, some analysis even presented it with only small possibilities in which 
Sweden was able to exercise a coordinating role (Center for European Reform 2009). 
 117 
The major contribution of the Swedish Presidency was the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, 
to which it devoted a great deal of resources and time as it was a top priority in the programme, 
with the new appointments for the positions of the President of the European Council, of the 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and of the European 
Commission. The other priorities of the work programme focused on the economy and 
employment, climate change, the Stockholm Programme, EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea and 
external relations (particularly on the European Neighbourhood Policy and enlargement) 
(Regeringen 2009, Government of Sweden 2010, Miles 2010). 
5.2 NATIONAL CONTEXT AND COORDINATION OF EUROPEAN POLICY 
The coordination system was modified many times since the accession of Sweden in the EU in 
1995 in order to increase effectiveness, and with the aim to maximize the influence Sweden can 
have at the European level (Mazey 2000, Ruin 2000, Miles 2005, Jacobsson and Sundström 
2007, Persson 2007). The coordination of national EU policy in Sweden can be considered as 
somewhat decentralized. On paper, the Prime Minister’s Office plays a pivotal role ensuring 
overall responsibility, coordination, and management of all activities regarding EU policy 
through the help of the EU Coordination Secretariat (Kansliet för samordning av EU-frågor) 
(Miles 2005, Government Offices of Sweden 2007, Persson 2007, Government Offices of 
Sweden 2009), but the PM Office is in fact only rarely involved except when issues of political 
dignity are raised, or when inter-ministries conflicts arise (Larue 2006). 
The EU Coordination Secretariat directs horizontal coordination in the Government 
offices. “It coordinates Government Offices preparations for meetings of COREPER and for the 
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general affairs section of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, and assists the 
Prime Minister's Secretariat with preparations for meetings of the European Council” 
(Government Offices of Sweden 2009). The Secretariat is divided according to policy areas that 
coincide with the divisions of departments within the Swedish administration and the 
organization of the Permanent representation (Larue 2006, Government Offices of Sweden 
2009).  
Each ministry remains responsible for their respective policy areas and to represent 
Sweden in the Council of Ministers, but with prior discussion and approval of the position to be 
taken. “Before a ministry can present its view on a particular EU matter, it must first consult with 
the Prime Minister’s office, the Ministry of Finance’s Budget Department and the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs’ EU Department, as well as any other ministry affected by the particular matter 
at hand” (Persson 2007: 213).  
Despite the decentralization of its coordination system, Sweden is very effective in 
developing its positions for the beginning of negotiations at the working group level (Panke 
2010a). Resources are devoted in establishing the country’s position early on in the European 
legislative process because the government believe it is the best way to maximize its influence 
on policy outcomes (interview #13, and #14). Moreover, it usually provides for instructions that 
are solution oriented and well supported by technical expertise (Mazey 2000, Panke 2010a). 
Inter-ministerial conflicts are also a rare occurrence (Panke 2010a). 
Prior to the beginning of the Presidency semester, a total of about 200 temporary extra 
staff were hired in order to make sure Sweden would  be able to fulfill its responsibilities 
(Government of Sweden 2010). Training for all civil servants involved in the Presidency works 
was offered starting in early 2008. Moreover, special attention was devoted to training 
 119 
individuals (ministers, state secretaries, and their political staff) who would be involved in 
negotiations and meetings, providing them with techniques to enable them to perform well in 
their functions during the Council Presidency (Government of Sweden 2010).  
During the 2009 Council Presidency, Sweden functioned the same way it usually does 
with regard to coordination of EU policy. Only two temporary offices were created: one to deal 
with the logistics of the Presidency and the other with its communications. An interesting 
political element taking place during the Swedish Council Presidency was that Prime Minister 
Fredrik Reinfeldt requested a ‘period of consensus’ from the other parties involved in the 
coalition and the opposition in order to pursue the Presidency as efficiently as possible 
(Johansson, et al. 2012). This aspect is important because the Swedish parliament has a scrutiny 
power over EU affairs, which could prevent the government from actively pursuing its position if 
conflict arose. 
5.3 THE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES: SHAPING THE RENEWED 
LISBON STRATEGY (EUROPE 2020) 
5.3.1 At the National Level: The Swedish Labour Market Model 
Sweden’s Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) is composed of two main overarching 
objectives: to aim for a well-functioning labour-market, and to achieve full-employment and 
increased prosperity through good, sustained and sustainable economic growth (Anxo and 
Niklasson 2006, Magnusson 2007, Olsson 2007, Cook 2008). The Swedish Model is based on 
the work-first principle, which is articulated through measures increasing employment by 
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making it more worthwhile to work, measures that make it easier and less costly for employers to 
hire and creating better conditions for entrepreneurship and competition. In addition, the ALMP 
is used not only to facilitate the transition of workers from unemployment to employment, but 
also to assist in the integration of marginalized or excluded workers in the labour force (Anxo 
and Niklasson 2006).  
 
“The Swedish Government's overall goal is to restore the 
work-first principle and fight labour market exclusion. This will be 
achieved by measures and initiatives making it worthwhile to work, 
making it easier and less costly to take on new employees and making 
it possible for more enterprises to start up and grow. With this basis, 
more people will be given the chance to get a job and earn a wage. At 
the same time, the conditions for improving welfare will be created” 
(Government Offices of Sweden 2008: 1). 
 
ALMP has known many changes over time, but the overarching objectives have remained the 
same. The major changes made to ALMP started in 2006 with the newly elected Reinfeldt’s 
center-right government, which gave the policy a more neo-liberal color. “The government 
introduced a reduced income taxation for low and medium income earners, introduced in-work 
tax credits and reduced unemployment benefits to make work pay. Moreover, the government 
shifted the insurance funding burden to individuals by increasing the self-funding component of 
unemployment insurance, reducing the income ceiling for sickness insurance and removing the 
co-financing requirement for employers. In addition, the government increased labour market 
flexibility by expanding fixed-term contracts, cutting hiring costs to employers and reformed the 
Swedish Labour Market Administration. Finally, reductions to company and wealth taxation 
combined with the easing of regulation to further transferred resources to business” (Cook 2008: 
5). This measures were not without political consequences: Swedes were unhappy with these 
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reforms, “but it was still acceptable for them if we were able to bring back growth involving jobs 
and not jobless growth” (interview #13). 
In order to achieve the ALMP general goals, the government created many programmes 
aimed at particular segment of the population. The most important ones are: 
 
(1) The ‘Job and Development Guarantee’ is aimed towards long-term unemployed who 
benefit, or not, from unemployment insurance (Government Offices of Sweden 2008). 
Under this program, individuals get help finding a new job and can participate in 
activities such as job training, work experience, subsidized employment and skills 
development. However, a job useful for society will be assigned if the limits of 450 days 
for parents with children under 18, or for over 300 days for singles is reached.  
(2) The ‘New Start Jobs’ program alleviates the social contributions and provide a generous 
tax credit to employers who hire persons receiving unemployment or sickness benefits, 
disability pension or social assistance for more than a year, or for newly arrived refugees 
(Government Offices of Sweden 2008). The employers’ relief lasts for a maximum 
period of five years. Regarding people who have reduced capacity to work as a result of a 
disability, who usually face difficulty finding a job regardless of the economic situation 
and depend more on special initiatives to enter the labour market, the Swedish 
government has created special initiatives in labour market policy such as wage 
subsidies, development employment, security employment, sheltered employment with 
public sector employers and sheltered employment at Samhall AB, etc.  
(3) The ‘Job Guarantee for Youth’ is aimed at individuals aged between 18-24 years old. A 
reduction in the total levy of social security contribution and the payroll tax is available 
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to them. Moreover, funding is available to them for apprenticeship and vocational 
training. 
(4) Measures for workers aged 65 and older were also adopted. Individuals remaining in the 
labour market receive a higher in-work tax credit over 65 years old, and employers get 
relief over a certain contribution. 
(5) The ‘Step-in Jobs’ are intended for the newly arrived immigrants. The program works in 
conjunction with the offering of Swedish language training, and incentives are given to 
employers to hire them and facilitated their integration into Sweden’s labour market. 
One general target exists for these programmes: the aim of the government is to achieve 
80% employment rate and an unemployment rate below 4%.  Specific targets are set for each 
programme with that one in mind and they are reviewed every year. Hence, beyond the 
implementation of the programmes of the ALMP, the most important role of the employment 
agencies helping the unemployed becomes the matching between the potential workers and the 
employers’ need. 
An additional feature specific to Sweden in ALMP is the role social partners play in the 
implementation of the policy and programmes. Collective agreements are made between the 
actors involved in the ALMP. With these collective agreements, the system can be adapted to the 
varying conditions that exist in different parts of the business sector. The social partners can also 
take responsibility for the development of a modern and well-functioning working life through 
their own initiatives. Thus, the Government safeguards the Swedish model where conditions in 
the labour market are to a large extent regulated by collective agreements. The combination of 
contractual arrangements with the social partners, policies aiming at life-long learning, with 
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active labour market policies, and social security availability is sometimes conceptualized as 
‘flexicurity’ – a mixture of flexibility and security in the labour market.  
In June 2009, the government presented specific measures aimed at further promoting 
gender equality in the labour market and the business sector. Sweden is already a leader in the 
area of gender equality, but some challenges still remain. Although the country has the highest 
proportion of women active on the labour market in the EU, a pay gap remains between women 
and men, and with the economic crisis, women are considered more vulnerable than men because 
they have a tendency to already have more precarious positions on the job market. The initiatives 
included in the 2009 strategy aimed at “combat gender divisions in the labour market and 
business sector, promote gender-equal conditions for entrepreneurship, increase gender-equal 
participation in working life and enhance gender equality in working life conditions” 
(Regeringskansliet 2009a). Specifically, gender equality is seen as necessary for economic 
growth to be achieved and sustained. 
Thus, some labour market programmes were specifically designed to encourage women’s 
entrepreneurship and professional development. The general objective of first programme was to 
increase the number of women starting their own business, for example through the use of start-
up grants for unemployed women, and to increase growth among more companies run by 
women. With regards to professional development, the aim was to increase the number of 
women employed as experts and managers by offering them training (Regeringskansliet 2009b). 
These measures were supported in a wider perspective by the articulation of policies such as 
parental leave, policy for the conciliation of work-family life, etc.  
Administratively, the ALMP used to be decentralized in its implementation, with the 
national, regional and local levels having autonomy in their different roles to play and targets to 
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achieve. Early in 2009, the government fused the national and regional levels in an effort to 
make the implementation more effective, uniform and fair for the public (Government Offices of 
Sweden 2008). Moreover, the management is done through objectives, not administrated based 
on regulation and directives. Thus, the system combines conditions for a flexible and efficient 
labour market policy (Anxo and Niklasson 2006). Sweden’s spending on ALMP is one of the 
highest in Europe. 
5.3.2 At the European Level: Influencing Europe 2020 
Active labour market policies touch multiple areas of action at the European level. The same is 
applicable for the Lisbon Strategy/Europe 2020.22 At the time Sweden took over the Council 
Presidency, discussions on the post-Lisbon Strategy had only been limited. However, the 
evaluation of the Lisbon strategy diverged among the actors involved, but the constant point was 
that a delivery gap existed and should be resolved in the next one (Euractiv.com 2009e). Only six 
Member States met the targets of the Lisbon strategy at the beginning of 2009. These countries 
were Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain (Willis 2009). Despite these outcomes, 
the strategy was neither considered to be a success or a failure by most actors involved. 
However, this was not the case of Reinfeldt, who declared that the Strategy had been a failure 
(Euractiv.com 2009i). 
                                                 
22 The Lisbon Strategy was the main EU framework orienting policies for growth and jobs from 2000-2010. Europe 2020 is the 
following ten years strategy. 
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5.3.2.1 Pre-EU Presidency Preparations 
The Lisbon Agenda (or Strategy) was ending in 2010 and a new one needed to be revised 
for the next ten years in order to guide the economic growth strategy of the EU. Spain, which 
would hold the Council Presidency during the first semester of 2010, was designed to be the 
country leading the adoption and discussions of the new agenda. However, Sweden’s intentions 
were also to influence the orientation the new strategy would take during its Presidency, and 
announced an early start to discussions on the renewal of the Agenda, even implying possible 
adoption before Spain would take over the Presidency. “Preparing and setting the framework” 
for the strategy was the objective declared by officials of the Swedish government. Moreover, 
the Swedish’ government writes in its work program that it aims at “adopting conclusions on the 
new EU strategy for growth and employment for the next ten years (i.e. the next Lisbon Strategy) 
ahead of the European Council” (Regeringen 2009: 27). Hence, in this context, the adoption 
during the Spanish Presidency would be only a formality. 
The Presidency programme clearly sets the ALMP on the Council’s agenda and the 
orientation it should take. The government writes that “an active labour market policy for better 
adjustment and mobility in the EU’s labour market, more effective matching, increased skills 
development, and more entrepreneurs are important factors in dealing with the job crisis in the 
short and long-term” (Regeringen 2009: 4). In addition, on June 4th, in an article in the Financial 
Times, Prime Minister Reinfeldt and his Minister of Finance Anders Borg declared that the 
Lisbon strategy had been a failure and that in the future “the successful implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy requires more efficient benchmarking and evaluation and robust institutional 
frameworks underpinning increased productivity and long-term growth” (Reinfeldt and Borg 
2009). It is important to mention the government did not intend to achieve these objectives at the 
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expense of its and other national governments’ prerogatives. The Presidency programme clearly 
states that “the responsibility for labour market policy lies with the Member States. The added 
value of the EU is in the exchange of experience and commitments to take measures at national 
level that increase employment for women and men throughout the EU” (Regeringen 2009: 6).  
Therefore, the Swedish government clearly supports and persists in using the open method of 
coordination in the ALMP area.  
The ALMP became important for the Swedish council Presidency because the economic 
crisis was hitting Europe harder than expected, consequently having effects on employment and 
requiring actions for short and long-term reforms, and the dissatisfaction over the discussions 
that took place during the Czech Council Presidency on the future of the Lisbon Strategy. To be 
sure, the normal schedule of events in the planning of the Europe 2020 strategy did not go as 
anticipated by actors: delays were created by the postponing of the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, 
the Czech government was not able to conduct effective discussions on the future of the Lisbon 
strategy, and the nomination of the President of the European Commission was further delayed. 
These elements affected the drafting of the framework and the timing for public consultations on 
it. 
Gender equality was also an important element of the work programme of the Presidency 
with regards to economic growth and employment. Two draft directives relating to gender 
equality and the labour market were already in the making at the time Sweden took over the 
Presidency. These directives aimed at the reconciliation of “work and family life and provide 
increased health and safety protection: equal treatment of self-employed women and men and 
measures to improve health and safety in the workplace for workers who are pregnant” 
(Regeringen 2009: 28). 
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5.3.2.2 The EU Presidency Term 
Discussions on the post-2010 Lisbon Strategy started early during the Presidency term. 
An informal Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) with 
employment Ministers took place in Jönköping on June 6-9, with the aim of providing short-term 
solutions to safeguard employment during the economic crisis and to bring in a more social 
dimension. “By taking active measures, we can tackle labour market exclusion and increase 
labour participation to better face the challenge of an ageing population” declared the Swedish 
Minister of Employment Sven Otto Littorin (Euractiv.com 2009m). At the outcome of this 
informal meeting, the Presidency saluted the broad consensus reached on “labour market 
inclusion [and on how it] can be increased by using tools such as the common principles of 
flexicurity and active inclusion strategies as well as preparing for the jobs and skills of the future, 
including Life-Long Learning strategies” (Littorin in Euractiv.com 2009m). These elements are 
characteristics of the Swedish approach to labour market policy described earlier. 
In order to make future propositions more concrete, a ministerial working group was set 
up to discuss the issues related to employment that should be included in the post-Lisbon 
Strategy. The group met on October 19-20. In this meeting, agreement existed amongst the 
ministers involved on the continued accuracy of the Lisbon Strategy and that it should be 
maintained. However, they pointed out that demographics, such as population ageing, needed to 
be further integrated in it. Moreover, they identified six topics that should be part of the new 
strategy: (1) skills and education, (2) flexicurity, (3) social cohesion, (4) macroeconomic and 
public finance stability, (5) productivity, competitiveness, small businesses, and (6) energy 
efficiency, energy security and eco-efficient economy (Council of the European Union 2009 
[16551/09]). Special mention was made regarding the social dimension of the Lisbon Strategy. 
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In addition, the report from the ministerial working group to the EPSCO Council proposes that 
“inclusion in the labour market, the creation of jobs and keeping people in employment should 
be considered the main elements of the social dimension of the Lisbon strategy (…) and that 
concrete proposals should be put on the table” (Council of the European Union 2009 [16551/09]: 
2). 
On November 25, 2009, the European Commission officially presented and launched 
consultations on the next post-Lisbon agenda ten-year strategy (COM (2009) 647 final). 
Stakeholders had until January 15, 2010, to comment on it, and the aim was for the Commission 
to present a more detailed plan at the March 2010 Council. The draft proposal included all of the 
six themes identified within the ministerial working group and paid particular attention to the 
problem of demographics in Europe and inclusion on the labour market. However, no particular 
attention was put on gender equality. Moreover, although flexicurity and the fight of exclusion 
from the labour market were both present in this draft, the revision of the Lisbon strategy for 
2008-2010 already mentioned these themes (COM (2007) 803 final). Because the document is 
meant to be a framework for actions, no specific measures are stipulated in it regarding the 
implementation of the themes in the Member States.  
Discussions on the post-2010 Lisbon Strategy were independently following their course 
in the council configurations. An EPSCO Council was held on November 30 and December 1st 
2009. During the Council, policy debates based on previous meetings’ work were held on how to 
recover from the crisis and preparing the post-2010 Lisbon Strategy as well as on gender equality 
for the strengthening of growth and employment (Council of the European Union 2009 
[16611/2/09]). Both of these matters led to the adoption of Council conclusions, without any 
mention of the Commission’s draft proposal. In the conclusions adopted on the first debate, the 
 129 
emphasis was put on inclusion in the labour market (Council of the European Union 2009 
[16214/09]). Concerning the conclusions of the second debate, they specifically address the issue 
of the creation of programmes aimed at women entrepreneurs, and “invites the incoming Spanish 
Presidency, with the support of the Commission, to use its best endeavours to ensure that both 
gender mainstreaming and gender-specific issues are prominently reflected in the post-2010 
Lisbon Strategy and in future employment and social policies (…)” (Council of the European 
Union 2009a). Both Conclusions are in line with Sweden’s Council Presidency agenda. 
Moreover, during the EPSCO Council meeting, a political agreement was reached on a 
draft directive on the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an 
activity in a self-employed capacity. This proposal for a directive had already been discussed in 
the Council during the Czech Presidency as the proposal from the Commission dated back to 
2008. 
If actions of the Presidency on Europe 2020 in the different Council formations are 
considered more generally, conclusions were adopted in all of those that were concerned, 
namely, the ECOFIN Council, the EPSCO Council, the Competitiveness Council, The 
Environment Council, The Transport, Telecommunications and the Energy Council, and the 
Education, Youth and Culture Council. There was also an “initial discussion in the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council” (Government of Sweden 2010: 27). High level 
conferences and informal Council meetings were held “to identify and agree on the areas that the 
future strategy should focus on and lay the groundwork for a good decision during the Spanish 
Presidency” (Government of Sweden 2010: 28). “These included the importance of promoting 
external and internal openness and a well-functioning internal market, ensuring sustainable 
public finances for future investment and welfare, increasing the labour supply and reducing 
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exclusion, showing the link between gender equality and economic growth, creating a greener 
economy and an innovative business climate, and promoting investment in human capital and 
research” (ibid.)  
Despite the efforts and resources devoted by the Swedish government to bring the 
renewed Lisbon strategy in the discussions before the spring 2010 European Council, only 
general advances were made. Limited elements reached the European Council, who is 
responsible for the ultimate adoption of the strategy. Indeed, in the European Council’s 
conclusions of the December meeting, only four paragraphs are devoted to the new EU 2020 
strategy and no documents were annexed to it. The Conclusions reiterate the need for a new 
strategy and stipulates that the general objectives of the strategy should be to “improve 
competitiveness and increase the EU’s sustainable growth potential” (European Council 2009 
[EUCO 6/09]: 7). Moreover, it identifies priorities the framework should take into consideration 
such as “how to ensure sustainable public finances whilst preserving investment and social 
welfare, how to establish inclusive and efficient labour markets, how to further strengthen the 
internal market, and how to fully exploit the reciprocal benefits of external trade and openness 
(…), the benefits offered by a greener economy, the improvement of the business climate, and 
the enhancement of the knowledge base in our economies. In this context, every effort should be 
made to ensure economic, social and territorial cohesion and gender equality” (European Council 
2009 [EUCO 6/09]: 7). In addition, the only mention on the draft proposal of the Commission is 
that the European Council takes note of it. 
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5.3.3 Analysis 
In light of the developments that took place during the Council Presidency term, no controversies 
emerged and it was relatively easy for Sweden to try to upload some concepts and priorities 
present in its national policy in the area of ALMP. The intention to upload general principles was 
also set from the beginning: “because we couldn’t do much on the legislative level on ALMP, 
what we did was to promote these principles and disseminate our best practices, so we don’t 
make the same mistakes as before (…) we tried to influence developments in the long-run” 
(interview #13). 
Many factors can explain why the issue was not controversial. First, many other Member 
States already have similar ALMP in place. Moreover, the updated version of the Lisbon 
Strategy (2008-2010) already used new concepts such as flexicurity, which also combines 
elements present in many countries. Finally, countries with limited means to go forward with 
these measures were still open and interested in ALMP. Because the general ALMP aims which 
existed in many other member countries were similar to those in Sweden, Sweden was able to 
push further for the integration of gender equality in the next strategy.  
What is interesting in this case is that Sweden played the role of the agenda setter and 
shaper. Through its leadership, it put discussions on the future ten-year strategy back on the 
agenda because it was unsatisfied with the no-result of the discussions under the Czech Council 
Presidency (Ludlow 2009c). The Agenda 2020 was perceived by the Swedish government to be 
the best way to influence the trajectory of the EU social and economic dimensions for the years 
to come, especially because the legislative process at the EU level in the social area is limited 
(interviews #13, and #14). Moreover, it pushed for the inclusion of new topics in the strategy, 
such as gender equality. 
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Many variables can explain why Sweden had facility in promoting its approach to the 
ALMP area. First, the object of uploading. As mentioned before, no controversies and opposition 
existed in these matters and why they were important to be included in the next strategy. The 
only potential difficulty faced with regard to the Swedish proposition was the ability of certain 
countries, particularly Central European ones, to implement ALMP despite their openness 
because their financial means was very tight especially due to the economic crisis (interview 
#14). 
Second, the use of conclusions for policy-making makes it easier for other countries to 
accept the decision because conclusions can be considered as soft-laws. They are binding but 
represent a soft commitment from the Member States. They set the direction Member States are 
taking as a whole through the EU, but do not involve punitive consequences if the country does 
not respect it. In essence, they are a political commitment.  
Third, the reliance on the OMC in the area of the Lisbon Strategy/Europe 2020, and 
particularly with regards to employment policy, makes it easier for other Member States to 
accept general orientations in the framework, as they know they can still influence the 
benchmarks that will be used to evaluated their country’s performance, its national directions and 
implementation in the future. Moreover, even if recommendations are made for their country 
regarding the reforms they should make to achieve their national objectives with regard to the 
general framework’s objectives, countries remain powerful in deciding whether or not they want 
to comply with the proposals aimed at them as they are only responsible for the transposition of 
European policy at the national level in this area. The fact that Sweden openly supports the use 
of the OMC in this area, despite criticisms raised on the implementation/transposition of the 
Lisbon Strategy 2000-2010’s objectives in many countries, sends a signal to the other member 
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states. For this reason, perhaps it becomes more important to influence the framework and the 
benchmarks, than the actual outcome. 
An additional feature of this case is that most of the work was conducted in the Council 
and its different formations. Again, this shows that the issue was not controversial amongst the 
Member States. In fact, the European Council’s December Conclusions basically served as a 
rubber-stamp for the work that had been conducted in all of the Council formations during the 
semester. The acknowledgement of the European Council through the Conclusions is still 
important because this is the proper institution designed to make decisions on such a strategy. 
Hence, the inclusion of the Council work in the European Council’s Conclusions made it even 
more binding. Moreover, it locked in the priorities that needed to be included in the future 
Commission’s proposal. 
5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: PROMOTING AN ECO-EFFICIENT 
FRAMEWORK TO ADOPT ‘GREEN’ POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
5.4.1 Environmental Policy in Sweden 
Sweden has a very innovative and extensive environmental policy, using a variety of policy 
instruments. The country is considered a frontrunner in the area (Kronsell 2004, Jänicke 2005, 
Fouché 2008).  The overarching goal of Swedish environmental policy is to achieve sustainable 
development while encouraging economic growth. It centers around sixteen (16) environmental 
quality objectives, for which legislation have been passed; they constitute the Swedish 
Environmental Code (Karlson and Kuznetsova 2007). These quality objectives center on 
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elements such as climate change, energy, chemical reductions, water quality, public health, etc. 
(Ministry of the Environment 2004) Overall, the precautionary approach is used. Many general 
principles are entrenched in the code: the burden of proof is on the companies to make sure they 
are as environmentally friendly as they can be. The polluter pays principle is also applied.  The 
monitoring and reporting of the policy is shared between different governmental and non-
governmental entities. 
One of the particularities of Sweden’s environmental policy is its assumed transversal 
nature, touching not only on the environmental sphere, but also on the social and economic areas. 
As such, many economic instruments (essentially a ‘green tax system’) have been designed to 
achieve environmental objectives, as research in Sweden found that regulation alone was not 
enough (Johansson 2000a). A carbon tax was introduced in Sweden in 1991, in complement to 
the more general system of energy taxes (Johansson 2000a, b, Ministry of the Environment 
2004). Sweden was one of the first European countries to adopt such an instrument.  
The logic of the carbon tax is that it affects everyone: from the individual to companies. 
A carbon tax is a fee placed on greenhouse gas pollution. It puts a monetary price on the costs 
imposed on the national economy, communities and the planet by greenhouse gas emissions and 
the global warming they cause. The idea behind the adoption of this instrument is that it would 
encourage a shift by households, businesses and industries to cleaner technologies, which would 
in turn increase the demand for energy-efficient products (i.e. an increase in biomass and biofuel 
use) and help spur innovation and investment in green solutions.  
The carbon tax has different levels according to the sector to which it is applied. For 
example, the tax increases in areas that use fossil fuels such as transportation and heating. In 
addition, the tax is quite high for households and the service sector (27 euros per ton in 1991 and 
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114 euros per ton in 2011), but low for sectors subject to international competition (7 euros in 
1991, 34 euros outside of EU ETS in 2011 – zero within EU ETS ) (Institute for European 
Environmental Policy 2014).  Over the years, and due in part to the establishment of such 
instruments, Sweden was able to challenge the idea that reducing CO2 emission will slow down 
economic growth: between 1990 and 2006, while reducing 9% of its emissions, Sweden’s 
economy enjoyed a 44% growth in fixed price (Johansson 2000b, Fouché 2008). 
5.4.2 Towards European and International Negotiations on Environmental Policy 
Since the accession of Sweden in the EU in 1995, the country played a very important role in the 
elaboration of a European-wide environmental policy (Liefferink and Andersen 1998). The 
country often seeks to go further into strict regulation, rather than try to move towards the most 
common (often lower) denominator. 
5.4.2.1 Pre-EU Presidency Preparations 
Intending to initiate discussions in meetings during the Presidency on the establishment 
of market instruments at the European level such as green taxation, the Swedish government 
commissioned a report “A European Eco-Efficient Economy, Governing climate, energy and 
competitiveness” from the Stockholm Environment Institute, an independent international 
research institute (Nilsson, et al. 2009). The institute provides knowledge, expertise and policy 
advice to the Swedish government on environmental matters. The government relies heavily on 
the support of the institute for the country’s political endeavours in climate and environment 
matters, almost creating a relationship of dependence to it (Statskontoret 2010). 
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The report serves as the basis for Sweden’s efforts to promote its environmental policy 
agenda at the European level. It introduces and promotes a new concept at the European level: an 
“eco-efficient economy”23. The idea behind this term is to combine environmental policy with 
mainstream economic policy in order to achieve competitiveness. Market-based instruments, 
new standards, and governance tools are proposed to be used towards the achievement of more 
environmental friendly activities and initiatives. They are thought to be an efficient way to 
“internalize the costs of pollution created by economic activity” (Nilsson, et al. 2009: 3). The 
report covers many sectors of the economy and praises the combination of different instruments, 
but one that comes back often is the creation of tax to lower carbon dioxide emissions.  
In May 2009, a few months before Sweden took over the EU Presidency, the government 
announced that it would be formally pursuing the elaboration of a carbon tax at the European 
level during its mandate (EurActiv.com 2009n). This will was reiterated later in June by the 
Swedish Prime Minister Reinfeldt when he declared that “we need to initiate discussions on how 
economic instruments can best be utilised in climate policy. I believe tools such as a carbon tax 
and emission trading, if designed well, can play a key role in addressing climate problems” 
(Euractiv.com 2009d). The EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) was considered inadequate by 
Sweden as it covers only around 40% of the greenhouse gas emissions (EurActiv.com 2009j). 
Despite the boldness of Sweden’s announcement, the discussions over the adoption of an EU-
wide carbon tax would not be the first ones taking place on this issue: discussions over different 
European Commission’s proposals took place since the early 1990’s. Carlgren, Sweden’s 
Minister of Environment, and other politicians had been criticizing the European Commission 
for delaying the debate on the adoption of this tax (EurActiv.com 2009n). By the time it was put 
                                                 
23 The term « eco-efficient economy » was not created by the Swedes. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
first introduced this concept in the early 1990’s. (World Business Council for Sustainable Development 2000) 
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on the Swedish Council agenda, many countries in Europe had adopted similar practices of eco-
taxation. It was the case of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. 
In addition, France was thinking about introducing a carbon tax for 2010 (EurActiv.com 2009g).  
In tandem with Sweden’s announcement, a European Commission’s draft for a Council 
directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the 
taxation of energy product and electricity began to circulate in mid-summer 2009 (Paleokrassas 
2009). The Commission’s initiative, proposed by the Commissioner for Taxation and Customs 
Union, Laszlo Kovacs, precisely aimed at creating an EU-wide carbon-tax (COM (2009) 
XXXX). The proposal aims at harmonizing practices among member states since there were 
concerns that national carbon taxes would distort competitiveness and the internal market, and it 
pursued the objective of creating an incentive to attain EU carbon reduction goal. There was also 
general agreement amongst Commission officials that the EU-ETS was not enough to attain the 
2020 targets, and that energy taxes could efficiently supplement it (Rankin 2009). Hence, the 
idea of the EU-wide carbon tax had been floating for many years, but without any action taken to 
concretise it. Sweden’s announcement and Council work program was the impetus needed by the 
Commission to go ahead with the proposal (EurActiv.com 2009b, Rankin 2009). 
5.4.2.2 The EU Presidency Term 
When Sweden took over the Council Presidency in July 2009, the Climate and Energy 
package had already been adopted under the French EU Presidency in 2008, so the specific 
targets to achieve were set and not under discussion. As the Copenhagen conference was going 
to take place in December, one of the main objectives of the Swedish Presidency was to find an 
EU agreement to bring to the table at the international post-Kyoto negotiations. The members 
needed to demonstrate that the EU would make considerable efforts to achieve its goals, and to 
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help others achieve theirs. Financial discussions pertaining to the achievement of internal EU 
environmental goals and how the EU can support the developing world in achieving theirs were 
of particular importance. Discussions and possible adoption of the tax was seen as a strategic 
way to leverage greater commitments at the international stage, as discussions on funding had 
stalled: “The revenue could be used both to compensate lower-income households and also to 
build trust between developed and developing countries, simply putting money on the 
Copenhagen table”, Kovacs said (Euractiv.com 2009f). 
The first discussions on the EU carbon-tax took place during the informal council 
meetings between ministers in July (from 24-26, with the environment ministers) and October 
(1-2, with the economics and finance ministers). Much of these meetings looked at the upcoming 
Copenhagen negotiations, but they also involved discussions on a long-term approach to the 
environment in the EU, with the objective to promote Sweden’s approach to an eco-efficient 
economy and the creation of the EU carbon-tax (Sweden Ministry of the Environment and 
Ministry of Enterprise Energy and Communications 2009). “The focus of these meetings was 
how coordinate the political agendas for climate change, energy efficiency, innovation and 
competitiveness – with the aim of creating synergies and safeguard growth and sustainability” 
(Ministry of the Environment 2009). The Swedish environment minister, Andreas Carlgren, 
declared that “Sweden can set a good example by showing how the climate challenge can be 
combined with initiatives to strengthen the economy. During the Presidency, we want to 
highlight EU job and growth opportunities by investing in energy efficiency, renewable 
resources and recycling” (EurActiv.com 2009l).  
The informal ECOFIN meeting proved to be the most important as the EU finance 
ministers talked precisely about the EU carbon tax covering sectors not part of the ETS (Collins 
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2009). However, the introduction of the carbon tax was only generally discussed during that 
meeting. Moreover, the Taxation Commissioner Laszlo Kovacs declared that he was not 
expecting “to come to an agreement on a CO 2 tax before Copenhagen” (Collins 2009) and that 
“there were not many reactions [during the meeting] but those reactions were all positive” 
(Euractiv.com 2009f). Only the Commission’s draft was presented at the meeting.  
On October 29, the Environment Council meeting took place and centered on the renewal 
of the Lisbon strategy, which was coming to an end in 2010. This meeting was the cornerstone in 
the adoption of an eco-efficient approach for the EU: the Council conclusions reflect this by 
integrating the concept for the development of a post-Lisbon agenda framework (Council of the 
European Union 2009b). Moreover, in the Conclusions, the Commission is invited to propose 
initiatives to mainstream eco-efficiency in the new Lisbon strategy and to “develop proposals on 
market based instruments (…) as foreseen in the Commission’s green paper on market-based 
instruments” (Council of the European Union 2009b: 4). Although the carbon tax is not 
specifically identified in the Conclusions, it is nonetheless one of the instruments present in the 
Commission’s green paper to which it refers, and it had also been recently under discussion 
(COM (2007) 140 final). Consequently, this meeting proved to be important for the endorsement 
of an eco-efficient approach for the EU by all member states and to set the agenda for the 
development of an EU-wide carbon tax. 
The international context with the upcoming Copenhagen conference and institutional 
obstacles made it even harder for the submission of a proposal to be decided within a short time-
frame. Indeed, tax decisions require unanimity in the Council and the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty was still in limbo. Therefore, discussions on EU-wide carbon taxation would take time, 
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especially considering that some countries want to retain their taxation prerogative or maintain 
their low prices (EurActiv.com 2009b).  
Many discussions on the carbon tax took place at the ministerial level, but they never 
reached the European Council: none of the European Councils’ Conclusions refer to it (Council 
of the European Union 2009 [15265/1/09], European Council 2009 [EUCO 6/09]). Moreover, no 
formal proposal ended up been presented during the Swedish Presidency despite the country’s 
push. In spite of this lack of activity, many countries started to raise their voice against the 
project, namely the UK and many Central and East European countries, the same protesters as 
with the Energy and Climate Change package (EurActiv.com 2009b). At the end, the proposal 
for an EU-wide carbon tax was left to the next Commission to come up with a formal proposal to 
present to the Council, as it was obvious that the proposal would not have make the cut in the 
Council during the Swedish Presidency. (EurActiv.com 2009b). 
5.4.3 Analysis 
This case is not an entirely failed example of policy uploading led by the Swedes because they 
were able to set the agenda for future initiatives, and to frame them. This is demonstrated by the 
endorsement of the concept and approach of eco-efficiency, which was brought about by the 
Swedish Presidency in EU’s vocabulary, and the identification of precise market-based 
instruments to be proposed in the future, like the EU-wide carbon-tax. However, policy 
uploading did not occur with regard to the adoption of the carbon tax. 
Many variables made it difficult for the Presidency to specifically pursue the adoption of 
the carbon-tax. First, the international context, with the economic crisis and the upcoming 
Copenhagen conference for Climate Change, made it difficult for the Presidency to devote the 
 141 
resources necessary to effectively push for negotiations on a carbon-tax. Most resources involved 
in the environment/climate dossiers were assigned to the preparation of the Copenhagen 
Conference and securing EU’s position for it. The economic crisis created enthusiasm with the 
concept of eco-efficiency, but simultaneously generated concerns with specific market-
instruments measures for certain EU countries. 
Secondly, institutional changes taking place were also an impediment. Despite an existing 
draft proposal from the European Commission, which could have made things easier for the 
Presidency, the timing was mediocre. The European Commission’s mandate was coming to an 
end in early 2010. Thus, it would have been difficult to pursue the project of the carbon tax with 
two different commissioners, as the EU legislative process takes a long time.  
Thirdly, with the Lisbon Treaty being implemented, not only does unanimity need to be 
secured in the Council, but the European Parliament also needs to approve it in order for the 
carbon tax to be adopted. The division of interests among members in the Council during the 
Swedish Presidency’s semester would likely cause a unanimity vote to fail. Some EU members 
were reluctant to adopt an EU-wide carbon tax because they want to keep their fiscal autonomy 
and felt that adopting such an instrument at the European level would interfere with their sole 
competency. This situation can explain why the tax had only been discussed during informal 
Council meetings. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter illustrates how Sweden played the role of agenda-shaper during its Council 
Presidency, and succeeded in uploading some aspects of its national policies at the European 
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level. The uploading of general policy aims occurred in both cases looked at, but with the EU 
carbon tax, Sweden did not achieve it. This shortcoming in uploading the EU carbon tax supports 
the argument that policy instruments can be more difficult to upload than general policy 
objectives, despite other favorable factors being present such as expertise and being a leader in 
the policy area. However, it is true that the EU carbon tax had not been officially put on the 
Presidency’s work programme, and that the international agenda relating to environmental policy 
had already charged, hence limiting resources devoted to the issue. Henceforth, the extent to 
which Sweden really wanted to push for the adoption of the EU carbon tax during its Presidency 
is also questionable. It seems that Sweden was trying harder to put the issue back on the agenda 
for the future, than trying to reach a decision on it during its term. For this reason, not only was 
Sweden an agenda-shaper with eco-efficiency in the environmental realm, but it was also an 
agenda-setter when considering discussion on EU Carbon tax and the actions it produced. 
Although the policies discussed in this chapter are concentrated in two different areas, 
employment and environment, they both touch on a broader policy narrative on long-term EU 
economic growth used by the Swedish Presidency. Within this context, an interesting differential 
feature of these two cases is how the economic crisis created an opportunity for action, or not, 
and how the Presidency used it. Whereas, in the case of the discussions on Europe 2020 Strategy, 
the economic crisis logically created the need for intervention in the area of employment, it was 
not the case in the area of environmental policy. Indeed, the Swedish Presidency had to work 
harder in framing the economic crisis as an opportunity for reforms that would include new 
environmental standards, with the hope of bringing economic growth in the long-run, through the 
use of the concept of eco-efficiency. But it proved to be successful if we consider that the 
concept and what it entails have been received positively by the other Member States. 
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Despite been a leader in the area of environmental policy, the Swedish Presidency 
retained the services of outside expertise with the production of a report on eco-efficiency. This 
choice was quite strategic. It helped the Presidency to present its approach in a more global and 
integrated manner, which strengthened the impression of neutrality from the chair concerning the 
discussions to come, especially with the fact that many options regarding instruments were 
included in the report. However, it proved not to be efficient for the uploading of the policy 
instrument. Outside expertise was not used with regard to labour/gender equality policies for 
influencing Europe 2020 strategy.  
One reason that could explain the difference in strategy has to do with the ultimate goal 
of the EU policy under discussion. Taxation powers are a country’s sole decision, and would 
require unanimity in the Council, which makes it more difficult to accept. Hence, it could be 
seen as threatening from a sovereignty point of view. If the EU carbon tax proposal is accepted, 
it is also legally binding and forces implementation at the national level. The eco-efficient 
approach was adopted more easily than one of the instruments aimed at implementing an eco-
efficient economy. This is not the case for Europe 2020 strategy, which is using OMC, thus 
providing flexibility in the willingness of the implementation of policy recommendations at the 
national level. 
Another difference between the two cases is the influence of institutional limbo on the 
process of uploading during the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Whereas the impact of this 
situation was almost non-existent in the case of the ALMP, it proved to be more important in the 
case of the EU carbon-tax, probably because the environment was more discussed at the 
European Council level with the Copenhagen conference coming up.  
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An additional interesting factor concerning the Swedish Presidency has to do with the use 
Sweden made of the European Commission. In both instances, Sweden did not challenge the 
European Commission’s prerogative of initiative. It worked with it or paralleled its actions, 
which ultimately influenced the decisions taken in the Council formations or in the European 
Council. 
To summarize, the two Swedish cases suggest that general policy objectives can be 
uploaded more easily than precise policy instruments; that a Presidency’s influence may be 
easier at the beginning of the policy process, but might not be essential for successful uploading; 
that been a leader in a policy area is facilitating the uploading process, but it might not guarantee 
its success; that it is necessary to devote resources and be ambitious with the intention of 
uploading for it to be successful. 
 
 145 
6.0  THE UNITED KINGDOM 2005 COUNCIL PRESIDENCY AND THE 2010 
BELGIUM COUNCIL PRESIDENCY 
This chapter looks at two cases: the United Kingdom and Belgium. These cases were selected 
because they offer an additional comparative perspective on the previous cases. The case of the 
UK was chosen because the country is a large EU Member State, a unitary one with strong 
policy capacity. Its Presidency occurred in the second part of 2005, under another organizational 
system than the trio-presidencies. The Belgium case also took place during the second part of the 
year, in 2010, and it was chosen because it is a federal country with moderate policy capacity, 
and it offers a first glance at an EU Presidency under the rules of the Lisbon Treaty and prospects 
of uploading under that Treaty. Both the UK and Belgium had experience with the holding of the 
Council Presidency. In addition, the two cases are instances of failed uploading. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections: one focusing on the case of the United 
Kingdom and the other on the case of Belgium. For each case, a review of the national 
coordination of EU policy is provided along with an assessment on policy uploading during the 
EU Presidency term. 
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6.1 THE UK’S EU PRESIDENCY 
The assessments on the UK’s EU Presidency  usually consider it to be quite successful in 
fulfilling its agenda objectives, but not necessarily those of its own making as it relied on the 
other EU institutions (Whitman 2006b, Whitman and Thomas 2006). Moreover, observers 
generally agree that the Presidency was efficient and fair (Best 2005). 
Tony Blair was the Prime Minister when the UK took the EU Presidency term, and it was 
the second time he held the chairmanship of the Council.24 During 2005, European issues were 
quite salient at the domestic level in the UK, with the process of ratification of the Constitutional 
Treaty engaged and debates on the EU budget rebate. However, with the ‘no’ referendum votes 
on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty that took place in France (on May 29th) and the 
Netherlands (on June 1st), London decided to suspend the debate on the Treaty, and it was 
decided by the Council to slow down the ratification process in the Member States. Discussions 
in the Council on solutions for the adoption of the Treaty would resume only in 2006. Hence, the 
UK avoided domestic debate on the Constitutional Treaty during its EU Presidency.  
The UK’s EU Presidency work program is organized around three priorities: economic 
reform and social justice, security and stability, and Europe’s role in the world (UK Presidency 
of the EU 2005). Many issues that the UK’s EU Presidency inherited for its Presidency were 
unavoidable, such as negotiation on the EU Budget 2007-2014, linked to reforms in the Common 
Agricultural Policy, and the opening of accession talks with Turkey. The work program 
originated from the 2004-2006 multi-annual Strategic Programme, which was designed for the 
                                                 
24 The UK had the EU Council Presidency in 1998, and Tony Blair got elected as Prime Minister for the first time in 1997. 
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Irish, Dutch, Luxembourg, UK, Austria and Finnish Presidencies (Whitman 2006b, Whitman and 
Thomas 2006). 
6.1.1 The National Coordination of European Policy 
The national coordination of European policy in the United Kingdom is very centralized. At its 
center is the European Secretariat, which is a small unit in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office 
comprised of about 24 officers, for which more than the majority comes from the departments, 
and one-third are ‘Fast Stream’ administrators. The Secretariat performs five main functions: it 
oversees and manage inter-departmental coordination; it ensures coherence and consistency with 
existing governmental policies; it coordinates UK’s position on major policy issues; it supervises 
the system of parliamentary scrutiny; and finally, it acts as a consultant and advisor (Kassim 
2000). When intervention is necessary between departments, two procedures are available to the 
Secretariat. One rests on informal procedures, involving only the officials with minutes but no 
official paper published. In case this procedure does not resolve the issue, a more formal process 
is available. A formal meeting of the subcommittee on European questions is called for, with 
officials and senior officials; but Ministers are rarely directly involved in these meetings because 
their officials are already regularly in contact with them. The Secretariat may also intervene 
when it considers that the direction taken by a department threatens to establish a technical or 
legal precedent that may be undesirable. Aside from these type of interventions, the burden of 
European policy-making in UK rests with the departments. 
Each department is responsible for dealing with EU matters within its field and take the 
lead in the formulation of UK’s position. They are also responsible for consulting with other 
departments, for which the European Secretariat makes sure it happens. Internal departmental 
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arrangement for dealing with EU business can be very different from one department to another. 
The Prime Minister also plays an important role, but only with regards to ‘high politics’ or when 
issues are politically salient.  
The UK Permanent Representation (UKREP) also played an important role in 
implementing coordination in Brussels. Officials come from the foreign ministry and home 
departments, which grant the UKREP negotiating and technical expertise to conduct activities in 
the Council working groups. UKREP is one of the largest among the Permanent Representations 
of EU Members. In 2005, it had an estimated 130 officials working for it. The UKREP is 
considered to be highly proactive, with the main goal of intervention in early stages of any 
European legislative process in order to maximize the influence it can have on proposals. It is 
also considered to have closer relations with its capital than other representations, as it is in 
constant touch with Whitehall (Kassim 2000). 
It is generally evaluated by practitioners and observers that the UK coordination system 
is quite effective, with UK representatives that are well briefed on issues and are consistent with 
regard to the position they have to defend (Kassim 2000). Moreover, a large number of senior 
officials have experience with EU issues because they typically have served in Brussels, either at 
the UKREP or in European Institutions (Kassim 2000). However, this expertise on European 
issues and how to deal with them is uneven among the departments.  
Although UK’s coordination system is effective, it has some weaknesses. The fact that it 
is highly centralized can sometimes create problems in case of division at the core. For example, 
the politicization of EU issues at the domestic level by politicians can impede administrative 
coordination, especially in cases when the government’s majority is slim. Often in these cases, 
the civil servant experts are replaced by political crisis management officers from the political 
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center (Kassim 2000). Apparent inflexibility is another difficulty faced by the UK’s highly 
centralized coordination system. In the UK coordination system, once a decision has been 
adopted on the position to be defended, it is difficult to step outside of it, which can increase 
difficulties in bargaining and finding consensus at the European level (Kassim 2000). 
6.1.2 Assessing Uploading during the UK’s EU Council Presidency: The Example of the 
Working Time Directive 
As I mentioned earlier, the UK had to fulfill an EU Presidency’s agenda that was mostly driven 
by legislative imperatives that had previously been set. Moreover, big issues such as the EU 
Budget were on the table, which also involved reforms in the CAP. But an additional issue 
important for the UK was the revision of the working-time directive (UK Presidency of the EU 
2005). First adopted in 1993, the directive aimed at limiting weekly working time to a maximum 
of 48 hours in all Member States25. As far back as 1993, divisions among the countries were 
strong. On the one hand, Member States like the UK were in favor of a liberal approach giving 
individuals the choice for working as much as they want, in line with the country’s national 
legislation. On the other hand, other countries such as France or Sweden, wanted to limit even 
further the number of hours employees could work with the argument of promoting health and 
safety at work (Bishop 2004, Copeland 2010).  Ultimately, the UK was able to negotiate an opt-
out from the 1993 working-time directive, under the condition of  revision seven years after 
implementation (Copeland 2010). 
                                                 
25 It is still possible for Member States to limit even more the number of hours one can work.  
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The Commission issued a proposal in September 2004, and the revision started to take 
place during the EU Presidencies of the Netherlands (second part of 2004) and of Luxembourg 
(first part of 2005). The main elements under discussion were on the use of the opt-out and the 
period of reference for the calculation of working hours. The UK’s position remained the same 
as in 1993: according to its long working hours culture and regulation frame, it defended the 
position of individual choice, a long period of reference for the calculation of worked hours, and 
the need for flexibility (House of Lords European Union Committee 2004). Consequently, the 
UK wanted the opt-out to remain available. However, after the first read, the European 
Parliament called for the abandonment of the opt-out (Laitner 2005). The negotiations in the 
Council took longer than expected, deadlocked, with all countries keeping their position, pro or 
against the opt-out, making it impossible to secure enough votes for its adoption (BBC News 
2005). Consequently, the UK ended up in the driving seat for finding a solution to the impasse.  
The ideological divisions in the Council were the same in 2005 as in 1993 (Broughton 
2005, Copeland 2010). However, with the 2004 enlargement round, new Member States 
modified the balance in the Council. Poland, the Baltic countries, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Malta 
declared that they were in favor of the opt-out (Buck, et al. 2005, Copeland 2010). Moreover, 
Britain was able to reach an arrangement with Germany; it would support the opt-out in 
exchange for Britain to support the Take Over Directive (Copeland 2010).  
A compromise was proposed by the UK Presidency during the December Employment, 
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (ESPHCA). The proposal strongly reflected 
the UK’s interests by pushing for an indefinite use of the opt-out (Copeland 2010). But it ended 
up been rejected by fifteen of the Member States, who favored the regulatory approach 
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(Whitman and Thomas 2006). Consequently, the issue was pushed for resolution during the next 
Council Presidency under the Austrian government. 
6.1.3 Analysis 
The example of the working time directive constitutes a failed policy uploading. It shows that not 
only does the will to upload needs to be present, but also that once the legislative process is well 
advanced, the influence of the Presidency on the outcome is very limited, even when means and 
resources are devoted to defend the interests of the Presidency, and even when the chair is held 
by a ‘big’ country. In the case of the working time directive, the UK did not try to upload its 
national policy as maintaining the status quo with the opt-out was already revealed to be a 
challenge. This case also illustrates how a Presidency can fail at taking the role of the honest 
broker, agenda setter or shaper. As the UK had strong vested interests in the outcome, it was 
unable to propose a compromise suiting a majority of Member States under the qualified-
majority voting rules. 
6.2 BELGIUM’S EU PRESIDENCY 
The Belgium EU Council Presidency took place from July 1st to December 31st, 2010. It was the 
12th time the country held the Council Presidency. However, national circumstances were much 
different this time around, as the country was headed by a caretaker government. Despite this 
situation, and as many analysts have pointed out, the lack of government did not produce the 
expected disaster, nor did it prevent the country from holding a productive Council Presidency 
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(Beke 2011, Drieskens 2011). This was mainly due to the experience acquired by the members 
of governments in other international institutions (Drieskens 2011) and the federal nature of the 
Belgian system. These elements are particularly important and are discussed in detail in later 
sections of this chapter. 
During its Council Presidency, Belgium was able to truly start implementing the Lisbon 
Treaty as it was intended. The previous Council Presidency held by Spain for the first part of 
2010 served as a transition period, with some challenges posed by Prime Minister Zapatero to 
Van Rompuy, newly appointed as the ‘semi-permanent’ president of the European Council 
(Forelle 2010, Beke 2011, Heywood 2011, Van Hecke and Bursens 2011). As an official pointed 
out, the objective of Belgium was to “set good precedents, manage to execute the full potential of 
the Lisbon treaty and create something long lasting” (in Bunse, et al. 2011:55) 
Generally, the programme of the Belgian Council Presidency concentrated on achieving 
the Community’s agenda, as proposed by the European Commission. The absence in the 
programme of national objectives was strongly noted by many analysts and officials from the 
Belgian governments (Bunse, et al. 2011). The Belgian Presidency focused on five key priorities. 
The first objective was to tackle the ongoing economic crisis, with a package of measures to 
increase surveillance of financial markets. The second one concerned social cohesion and the 
fight against poverty. Third, the environment and climate change were important, with 
preparations for  the December UN climate conference in Cancún (Beyers and Bursens). Fourth, 
under the justice and home affairs category, Belgium aimed to implement the Stockholm 
Programme launched in 2009 under the Swedish Presidency. Finally, with regards to external 
relations, Belgium wanted to continue with the EU’s enlargement policy, including putting into 
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place the EU’s new diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Belgique 
2010). 
6.2.1 National Coordination of European Policy 
Belgium has a very complex coordination system with a variety of actors involved: the system is 
fragmented and decentralized in nature. All levels of government, federal and subnational 
(regions and communities), are equal in power for decision-making and they each have their 
areas of policy competency. As a result, all levels of government are involved in decision-
making in the EU Council. In addition to the different levels of government involved, political 
parties can also play a crucial role. Because of the divides existing in the Belgian society and in 
the electoral system, governments are often formed of a coalition of political parties. As a 
consequence of this, and in order to keep the coalition working, ministerial autonomy has been 
reinforced in the process (Kerremans 2000). Therefore, when issues have not been politicized by 
the other political parties, ministerial autonomy prevails. Thus, each ministry has developed its 
own way of organizing and dealing with issues on the EU agenda (Kerremans 2000, Beyers and 
Bursens 2011, Criekemans and De Ville 2011). With this decentralization and fragmentation, the 
difficulty with the Belgian coordination system is to obtain a unitary policy position at the 
European level as there are many veto players. To achieve this, some institutional instruments 
have been created, but mostly, the system relies on a consensus norm (Kerremans 2000). 
Consensus building is very important in the Belgian system as the number of EU policies are 
increasingly touching more and more, partly or completely, the competencies of the subnational 
entities. 
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One of the most important bodies in the coordination of EU policy in Belgium between 
the level of governments is the Directorate for European Affairs (DEA) within the Federal 
Ministry if Foreign Affairs (MFA). The DEA is important because it offers a weekly meeting 
venue for all levels of government to discuss and reach consensus on decisions that are 
considered politically sensitive. It only offers secretarial and logistical support. The meetings are 
attended by ministers concerned with the topic on the agenda, according to which sectorial 
Councils are meeting the following week. In addition, these meetings are also always open to 
representatives at the federal level of the Prime Minister and the deputy Prime Ministers, 
representatives of the Minister-Presidents and officials from the Belgian Permanent 
Representation. The objectives of these meetings are to transmit the important information to the 
minister who will seat and represent the country in the EU Council meetings (Kerremans 2000, 
Beyers and Bursens 2011, Criekemans and De Ville 2011).  
It is crucial that a consensus be reached during these meetings, otherwise two options are 
left available: either the country will abstain when it’s time to vote in the Council, or meetings 
with higher representatives of the government will be held in order to reach a consensus. These 
other meetings are taking place at different levels. The first one is called the Interministerial 
Conference for Foreign Policy (ICFP), and involves only the ministers themselves. If consensus 
is not reached in those meetings, the issue is transferred to the other committee, the Consultation 
Committee, composed of the federal Prime Minister and his vice prime ministers as well as the 
minister-presidents of the subnational governments. In each of these committees, a decision can 
only be reached when all parties approve it, otherwise the country will abstain from voting. 
Another instrument exists to facilitate Belgium representation in the EU Council: “on the 
spot coordination”(Kerremans 2000, Beyers and Bursens 2011).  The delegation of Belgium is 
 155 
composed of two individuals at the ministerial level: the leader of the delegation and the 
assessor. The leader of the delegation is a rotating position between the governments having 
competencies on the issue. The assessor’s role is to inform the leader of the delegation what the 
other parties’ positions on the issue at hand are and to directly negotiate with them in order to be 
able to vote when an issue is raised by the EU members in the Council configurations. 
While Belgium held the Council Presidency in 2010, some changes were made to this 
usual procedure26. The governments decided to deviate from the rotation system during the 18 
months of the Spain-Belgium-Hungary trio-Presidency, invoking the need for consistency during 
this period (Criekemans and De Ville 2011). The decisions of the delegation leaders of the 
different Council configurations were negotiated between the governments. Criekemans and De 
Ville (2011) observed that these negotiations were not as conflictual as could be expected and 
that the choices were more pragmatic due to national government instability. 
6.2.2 Preparations of the Council Presidency and Facing National Challenges 
A state secretary for the upcoming Council Presidency, Olivier Chastel, was appointed in March 
2008, under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, during the summer 2008, 
two deliberative bodies were created in order to plan the Belgian Presidency: a ‘Follow-up 
group’ and a ‘Task Force’ (Criekemans and De Ville 2011). The first group was political in 
essence: headed by Chastel, it was composed of representatives from the cabinets of the federal 
ministers as well as representatives from the subnational minister-presidents. The aim of the 
group was to prepare for the political aspect of the EU Presidency, mainly the strategic choices 
                                                 
26 The system remained the same in the previous Belgian Council Presidencies. 
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of issues to be put on the trio and Belgian Presidency programmes. The objectives of the Task 
Force were to focus more on the details of the issues on the programme and serve of 
administrative support. The DGE chaired the Task Force and the group was composed of 
officials from the ministries responsible for the preparation of the Presidency and coming from 
different governments. Both of these bodies were dissolved at the beginning of the Council 
Presidency. 
As mentioned earlier, the federal government was still a caretaker one at the beginning of 
the country’s Council Presidency. Federal elections took place in June 2010 but did not lead to 
the formation of a government, so the decision was taken to continue on with the caretaker 
government for the duration of the Council Presidency. The advantage of this decision was that 
politicians who were ministers before, who gained international experience, and who knew their 
dossiers stayed in their position for managing more effectively their actions at the European 
level. On the other hand, it also meant that Belgium did not have the capacity, legitimacy and 
willingness to pursue a national agenda at the European level. These elements, combined with 
the fact that power is shared at the European level between the subnational and federal 
governments, affect how leadership under this system is exercised and it illustrates how it can be 
difficult to achieve. Even though the subnational governments were not affected in the conduct 
of their business by the federal instability in the country, more than the majority of the seats 
reserved for chairing the Council’s configurations were assigned to federal politicians (Belgium 
2010). 
While politicians struggled with national legitimacy issues, other groups of individuals 
were strengthened by the need to conduct day-to-day activities. One major impact the inability to 
form a government at the federal level had for the organization and the conduct of the Council 
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Presidency has been to strengthen the position of civil servants (Van Hecke and Bursens 2010, 
Criekemans and De Ville 2011). In essence, the Belgian bureaucracy (both comprising of 
subnational and federal public servants) provided the stability and expertise the country needed 
to pursue its obligations at the European level (Van Hecke and Bursens 2010). 
6.2.3 A New Type of Council Presidency 
6.2.3.1 Changes Brought with the Adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced the position of a ‘semi-permanent’ Presidency. Its mandate 
is for two and a half years (renewable once), and the person who holds it is elected by a majority 
vote of the member states. Herman Van Rompuy, who was for a short period of time the Belgian 
Prime Minister, held this position from 2010 to 2014. The main purpose of the president is to 
prepare the Council’s work, ensure its continuity and work to secure consensus among member 
countries (OJ 2010/C 83/01). The creation of this position was aimed to ensure a more stable 
leadership at the heights of the Council, and make sure that the international impact of the EU 
remain stable whether a small or large country holds the Presidency (Barber 2010). This change 
is important because it shows that the European Council is taking a turn in becoming more 
supranational despite its fundamental intergovernmental nature (Lewis 2003). 
The design of the Council has not changed with the Treaty, but there have been some 
changes with regards to decision-making procedures. In order to make decision-making more 
efficient, Lisbon increases the application of qualified majority voting (QMV) in new policy 
areas, as well as increasing issue areas under the co-decision procedure with the EP. This is an 
important change for matters that are highly sensitive for member states, especially in areas 
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relating to asylum, immigration, police co-operation and judicial co-operation in criminal matters 
(OJ 2010/C 83/01). The QMV is now the most common form of vote within the Council.  
The changes in voting procedures are important as it can impact the efficiency of the 
institution (for the proponents of change towards the QMV as opposed to the status quo with 
unanimity) or it can be perceived as threatening the sovereignty of a country (Sieberson 2009). 
Moreover, the new measures will shape the possible coalitions within the Council. Pre-Lisbon 
voting strategies and coalitions under the QMV27 are easier to achieve because the rules are not 
as definite. However, it remains a possibility that the change in the voting procedures will not 
change much of what is already going on in the Council because the institution is well-known for 
its reliance on consensus-based decision-making and rarely take votes (Lewis 2003). 
Lisbon is interesting because it defines more precisely than previously adopted treaties 
the domains in which the EU has exclusive action, and in which its actions are shared with the 
national governments. Moreover, by elaborating on this, the Treaty of Lisbon also manages to 
entrench general long-term objectives that need to be respected. The EU now had possibility for 
action in areas that require the cooperation of all in order to promote EU’s growth. As such, there 
are references in the Treaty with regards to climate change and energy security, the promotion of 
high level of employment, the safeguard social protection and fight against exclusion, and the 
importance of many economic and social services (OJ 2010/C 83/01). 
                                                 
27 Under the Nice Treaty, QMV needs to meet the following criteria:  a majority of the countries must be in favour, with a 
minimum of 255 votes (on 345). Countries may ask if it is representing at least 62% of the European population to confirm the 
adoption; however there is no obligation to ask for a count. 
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6.2.3.2 Policy Uploading under the Lisbon Treaty: Preliminary Assessment 
As much as the Belgian civil service was empowered by the conduct of day-to-day 
business of the Council Presidency due to national government instability, the lack of interest for 
pursuing national preferences was also reflected in the place given to Van Rompuy. First, the 
Belgian Presidency had announced that it wanted to implement the Lisbon Treaty by helping 
Van Rompuy to take his functions (Euractiv.com 2010a, b, c). Hence, Prime Minister Leterme 
declared that the Belgian Council Presidency would adopt a low profile (Franck and Van 
Deursen 2011). An additional element that facilitated the cooperation between the Belgium EU 
Presidency and the new European Council Presidency was that Van Rompuy had previously 
been Prime Minister of Belgium. Consequently, the Belgian officials involved in the EU 
Presidency knew him well because they had worked with him before and vice versa (interview 
#17). With the centrality of Van Rompuy’s position, the Belgian Council Presidency took a 
supporting rather than a leadership role. In essence, the Belgian Council Presidency became an 
invisible EU Presidency at the service of Van Rompuy. This, combined with a caretaker 
government, did not constitute favorable conditions for the uploading of national policies. 
Despite that the Council Presidency’s work programme had been constituted before the 
collapse of the national government, and with the consultation of all political parties involved in 
the coalition caretaker government and subnational governments (Euractiv.com 2010c, Van 
Hecke and Bursens 2010), none of the issues on it were particularly significant for Belgium as a 
unitary actor. As a high Belgian official puts it: “the interests of the EU are Belgium’s interests” 
(interview #17). Moreover, it inherited the issues the Spanish Council Presidency did not manage 
to deal with or resolve during its term, such as the financial supervisory package and legislation 
on hedge funds, agenda elements dictated by the economic crisis. 
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6.3 CONCLUSION 
The cases of the United Kingdom and Belgium show that political will and intention for 
uploading need to be present in the first place for uploading to be considered. The cases illustrate 
that even countries that have good levels of policy capacity and experience with the holding of 
the EU Presidency may willingly chose not to promote their national policies or interests. 
Sometimes it is for the benefit of the European institutions, as in the case of Belgium, or it can be 
in the Member State’s own interests when the status quo is preferred to change, as it was the case 
for the UK. 
The case of the UK shows again that the advancement of the EU legislative process has a 
great impact on the possibility of actions for the holder of the Presidency. The more advanced 
the legislative process is, the less likely it is for the EU presidency to influence the outcome. And 
this is true, whether or not the process follows the co-decisional procedure or not. 
The case of Belgium also shows that domestic political instability may not hinder the 
regular conduct of a Council Presidency. This is due to the well-prepared national civil service 
and to the role played by the new European Council Presidency, held by Van Rompuy. The new 
institutional format combined with the lack of ambition to upload national policy proved to be 
the most important variables in this case for explaining the failure of uploading. 
 161 
7.0  COMPARING NATIONAL POLICY UPLOADING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
This section seeks to compare the cases and analyze the hypotheses presented in chapter 2. The 
process under which national policies are successfully uploaded, or not, tells us about the 
conditions needed for it to occur. Keys are political intention for uploading, the nature of the 
policy proposed, the policy capacity in the policy area of the proposal, leadership exercised by 
the individual holding the chair, and how advanced the policy process is at the European level. 
7.1 REVIEW OF THE HYPOTHESES 
This section analyzes the hypotheses presented earlier in chapter 2. Each individual hypothesis is 
stated and then answered in line with the cases studied in this book. Table 7.1 shows a summary 
of the cases. 
As a reminder to the reader, policy uploading is defined as the upward transfer of national 
policies to the European level. In essence, policy uploading is the opposite of Europeanization, 
commonly understood as the influence of Europe on national polities. Uploading is considered 
successful when the country holding the Council Presidency is able to transfer specific elements 
of its national policy at the European level. Policy uploading is understood as a specific type of 
successful policy output at the European level. 
 
 162 
Table 2. Summary of Cases 
 Country Uploading Success Uploading Failure 
France 
(Second semester 2008) 
European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum 
Energy and Climate Package 
Czech Republic 
(First semester 2009) 
x Energy Security and 
Immigration Policy 
Sweden 
(Second semester 2009) 
Europe 2020 and 
Eco-efficiency 
Carbon Tax 
United Kingdom  
(Second semester 2005) 
x Working Time Directive 
Belgium  
(Second semester 2010) 
x x 
 




The Presidency evolved into an influential institution providing the office holder with a 
comparative advantage to shape the EU’s agenda and policy outcomes in line with its national 
interests. Accordingly, I expect to find that there is an intentional push for the uploading of 
national policies to the European level from the country holding the Presidency. 
This hypothesis takes roots in the literature on liberal intergovernmentalism, which 
emphasize the supremacy of member states for leading European integration, in opposition to 
supranational institutions (Moravcsik 1998). I go in the same direction as some Council 
Presidency studies and challenge the notion that the Council Presidency is neutral and that its 
supranational nature prevails in all instances (Tallberg 2006, Bunse 2009, Panke 2010b). 
Moreover, I confront the idea that it is near impossible for member states to take advantage of 
the Presidency to conduct significant policy output because the time-span is considered too short. 
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The cases reviewed in this book show that the intention to push for the uploading of 
national policies may not be present in all policy areas during a given Presidency’s term or may 
not even exist during a Council Presidency. Despite France’s ambition to pursue its national 
policies at the European level with the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, it did not 
show the same level of motivation in promoting its national environmental policy through the 
negotiation of the Climate/Energy Package. France invested much time and many resources in 
promoting its Pact at the European level (travel to the Member states’ capitals, money, meetings, 
etc.) but not as much in the case of the Package. Moreover, as it was shown in the chapter on 
France, it had more interest in making sure the Pact was adopted, especially with regard to its 
domestic audience, than for the Package. Nicolas Sarkozy and Brice Hortefeux made many 
declarations on the importance of securing the Pact (EurActiv.fr 2007, Sarkozy 2007a, Avril 
2008a, Marthaler 2008, Setton 2008), but not as many regarding the Package.  
Similarly, the Czech Republic did not demonstrate the same level of uploading intent 
between Energy Security and Immigration Policy. It pushed more for the uploading of Energy 
Security than for Immigration Policy. As explained in chapter 4, energy security is an important 
policy concern for the Czech Republic since its democratization and liberalization. In addition, 
not only are its citizens evaluating it as an important issue, it is also a significant problem to 
many Central and East European countries. Alexandr Vondra made many declarations as to the 
importance energy security was for the Czech Republic during its EU Presidency (Vondra 
2007b, a, Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2009a, Vondra 2009). 
These differences of intention for uploading between policy areas are the basis for 
explaining the level of activities a Council Presidency may put into influencing (or trying to ) the 
negotiations and policy output at the European level. The case of Sweden with Europe 2020 and 
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the EU Carbon tax supports this assertion. Contrary to the cases of France and Czech Republic, 
Sweden was more consistent in its intent and efforts to push for the uploading of its national 
policies in the two policy fields under study. Many declarations made by Fredrik Reinfeldt, 
Andreas Carlgren and Sven Otto Littorin support this as well as the actions taken to promote the 
policies at the European level (official and informal meetings, forums, etc.) (Anderson 2009, 
Euractiv.com 2009e, i, j, l, k).  
In addition, the cases of Belgium and the United Kingdom demonstrate that the intention 
to upload a policy may not be an objective during the Presidency. Historically, Belgium has 
always been depicted as a country supporting EU integration and acting in favor of it. More than 
any other country, Belgium has the reputation to play the role of an honest broker when holding 
the Council Presidency, and to rally other Member states when conflict arises.  Hence, the 
absence of willingness to upload national policies (interview #17) is not very surprising. But 
another important variable explaining the lack of intent for upload is government instability. 
Despite the fact that the politicians at the federal level had a lot of time to spend on European 
issues because nothing was happening at the national level, their political legitimacy in adopting 
national policies at multiple levels could be questioned. Moreover, as a caretaker government, 
the federal government’s hands were tied with what they could accomplish politically because 
they had no political mandate except an administrative one for the conduct of day-to-day 
business. The only thing they did was to implement the work-programme decided before the 
formation of the caretaker government. 
The case of the UK reveals that pushing for policy uploading might not be in the interest 
of the country. Its objective was to maintain the status quo, with the opt-out, because this 
benefitted the UK’s national interest. Hence the status quo was a superior option to uploading, as 
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trying to upload its national policy could not guarantee an exact replication at the European level, 
considering the interests of the other Member states.  
 In instances of successful uploading during a Presidency, the intention for uploading is 
always there: it is a necessary condition for uploading to occur, but it is not sufficient. The cases 
of the French Council Presidency with the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, and of 
the Swedish Council Presidency with Europe 2020 and the concept of eco-efficiency, show that 
the governments intentionally pursued their national policies at the European level from the 
beginning of the policy process. 
Setting the agenda allowed France and Sweden to discuss policies that were important to 
them, outside of the pre-established community agenda. In the case of France, working without 
the European Commission enabled the Presidency to first frame the Pact exactly according to its 
own national policy and to test it against the interests of the other Member states. On the other 
hand, in the case of Sweden, the discussions on Europe 2020 were already on the community 
agenda but set to take place later, under the Spanish Presidency. The Swedish government 
decided to put these discussions on its agenda in order to upload its national policy in order to 
influence long-term EU policy.  
According to these findings, hypothesis 1 is supported: the intention for uploading needs 
to be present and a superior option to the status quo must exist for policy uploading to occur. 
Interestingly, when national policy uploading occurs, the country holding the Council Presidency 
has played the role of the agenda-setter. This has not always been the case when policy 




Hypothesis 1.1  
 
I hypothesize that uploading is more likely to occur in instances where the country wants to 
legitimize decisions on controversial domestic issues or avoid domestic pressure and political 
costs. 
 Based on the literature on venue shopping (Guiraudon 2000, Pralle 2003), I was expected 
that countries holding the Council Presidency would try to upload their national policies at the 
European level according to domestic factors. However, my findings suggest that it can also 
occur out of idealist or missionary considerations as suggested by Princen (2009). 
In some instances, governments holding the Council Presidency do want to countervail 
domestic opposition by trying to upload their national policies at the European level. This was 
the case of France with the Pact: the government faced the opposition of non-governmental 
organizations working on immigration issues, of politicians from other political parties, and from 
some citizens ((AFP) 2008). Hence, uploading the concepts of the French immigration policy at 
the European represented an opportunity to legitimize its policy, both at the domestic and 
European levels. In the latter, the European Commission was mandated to monitor the 
developments on an annual basis taking place in implementing the Pact at the national and 
European level (2008 [1344/08]). In the former, it answered electoral concerns of voters of the 
UMP by reinforcing the protectionist approach to immigration adopted at the national level, and 
ultimately put an end to demonstrations against French immigration policy and the Pact by their 
opponents.  
The successful uploading of concept contained in the Swedish Active Labour Market 
Policy does not reflect venue-shopping. Citizens were unhappy with the changes made with the 
measures contained in the ALMP by the government, but it did not constitute the incentive for 
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the government to bring about their national policy at the European level. Moreover, according 
to its national ALMP, Sweden is one of the countries that greatly exceeded the standards from 
the previous Lisbon Strategy, hence not facing great costs associated with the implementation of 
new standards. Consequently, the objective behind the uploading of this policy at the European 
level was not so much about avoiding domestic opposition or political costs. As explained in 
chapter 5, it originates from genuine willingness to achieve better standards and adopt best 
practices for the greater good of the European community.  
Although the Czech Republic did not succeed in uploading its national policy on energy, 
the motivation behind it was also emanating from the will of re-orienting European policies for 
the greater good. Indeed, not only was the country pursuing an energy security agenda 
replicating its own, but it was doing so mainly for the other Central and East European countries, 
in turn benefiting the most energy dependent states as well.  
According to these cases, this hypothesis cannot be supported. Not only can a country 
push for the uploading of their national policies to counter domestic opposition and to legitimize 
their policy, they can also try to upload their policy for the greater good of the European 
community. And with the limited number of cases in this study, both of these motivations have 
occurred with successful uploading. Thus, one is not more likely than the other for successful 
uploading to occur. 
7.1.2 Explaining Differences of Success in Policy Uploading 
Hypothesis 2 
Not all the countries holding the Presidency will have the same success in uploading its policies. 
As such, the policy capacity of the country holding the Presidency, the concentration of executive 
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power in a country, the policy proposed, and the individual holding the chair will affect the 
ability a country has to upload its national policies. 
I expect to find that the stronger the policy capacity of a country, the more concentrated 
the executive power is and the more liked the leader holding the chair is by the other decision-
makers, combined with a policy reflecting the convergence of interests of the members, the more 
likely the country will be able to upload its national policy. 
This study confirms that not all countries have the same success in uploading their 
national policies to the European level. As already demonstrated with the first hypothesis, the 
will and motivation for uploading is different from one country to another, and from one policy 
area to another for a given country. In addition, many variables influence the outcome. The book 
shows that the less restrictive is the format of the policy proposed at the European level, the more 
representative of the interests of all members is its content, the less advanced is the policy 
process, the stronger the policy capacity of the country in the area of the policy proposed, and the 
more involved and knowledgeable are the government’s officials/representatives, the more likely 
the country holding the Council Presidency will be able to upload its national policy.  
One of the most important variables is the nature of the proposed policy. Not only is the 
content of the policy proposed very important, but also the format it intends to take. The legal 
format / mode of governance the policy takes influence the willingness other countries have to 
accept it. The literature on the soft law mode of governance advances that this form of policy-
making has been used at the European level because it is better suited for responding to the 
diversity of interests in areas that are usually under the sole control of Member states, as it 
reduces the costs of implementation of those who are further away from the objectives (Héritier 
1999, 2001, Jacobsson 2004, Trubek and Trubek 2005, Bruno, et al. 2006, Caporaso and 
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Wittenbrinck 2006). The success cases in this book show that the Council Presidency has been 
more successful in uploading its national policies with the use of weak legal instruments. They 
give member states more flexibility in the implementation or give them the impression that they 
will be able to influence future decisions related to it. This is reinforced by the fact that these 
documents mostly describe general goals of the policy.  
Falling under the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum proposed under the French Council Presidency falls under the 
unanimity voting rule in the Council and the co-decisional procedure with the European 
Parliament. Hence, based on Tsebelis (2002) work on veto players, I find that this case represents 
an instance where veto players could effectively block the proposal by preferring the status quo. 
Despite Spanish threats of vetoing the Pact, the French government was able to respond to its 
demand for amendment and to upload its national immigration policy. The demand made by 
Spain was not very important in the overall policy as it represented a specific measure (the 
integration contract), which could nonetheless be maintained by France at the national level. 
Hence, the final document did not deviate much from how it was first framed by France, it suited 
all interests, and effectively reflected French immigration policy in the same time. The end 
product was a soft law document, as it was not published in the Official Journal, and it involved 
the monitoring by the European Commission of the advancement on the goals included in the 
document. Consequently, the Member states knew they would be able to influence future 
developments related to the implementation of the goals of the Pact. Moreover, more important 
negotiations were coming up in the area with the renewal of the Stockholm programme, which 
involved specific policy instruments.  
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In the case of Sweden, the use of the Presidency Conclusions, and the OMC for the 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy / Europe 2020, allowed it to facilitate the uploading of its 
national policy. The Presidency Conclusions are a binding common political commitment setting 
the orientation the EU takes. As the Conclusions often mandate the European Commission for 
their application, the Council Presidency makes sure that the orientations taken will be respected 
in the future. Moreover, the OMC allows Member states to implement the general goals of the 
policy according to their own interests because it is an “open-ended, non-binding, and non-
justiciable” (Trubek and Trubek 2005: 344). Considering this, the stakes are not as high under 
the OMC as it would be under other modes of governance. In addition, many EU countries 
already have ALMP in place at the national level. Hence, these countries supported the principles 
entrenched in ALMP, and the countries without such policies generally adhered to its goals.  
According to the veto players framework (Tsebelis 2002), the convergence of interests makes 
policy agreement easier. These factors contributed to an easy uploading of the general principles 
included in Sweden’s national active labour market policies. 
In addition to the content and format of the policy, the advancement of the policy process 
has a significant impact on the ability of the Presidency to upload its policies. Both of the success 
cases took place at the earliest stage of the European policy process. The country holding the 
Council Presidency took care of the drafting of either the full policy (the case of the Pact with 
France) or elements of it (Presidency Conclusions in the case of Sweden), without the 
intervention of the European Commission, and they led the policy process from the start. They 
were effectively able to play the role of the agenda setter. On the other hand, in instances when a 
country attempted to upload its national policy, but did not succeed in doing so, the failed cases 
in this book show that it was very difficult when it involved specific policy instruments, more 
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restrictive legal instruments for their implementation, and were taking place at a more advanced 
stage in the policy process. Although the Carbon tax discussions took place at an early stage in 
the policy process, it failed to be really put on the legislative agenda during the Swedish 
Presidency because the chances of getting it adopted within a short timeframe was considered 
limited by the government. However, the Swedish government succeeded in putting it on the 
community agenda to be brought up at another time by mandating the European Commission. 
However, I do not considered it to be a policy uploading success in this study because the 
adoption of the tax did not happen during the Swedish Council Presidency semester. 
The other failed cases mostly took place at later stages of the policy process: France with 
the Energy and Climate Package, Czech Republic with Energy Policy and Immigration Policy, 
and the United Kingdom with the Working time directive. It is harder to make significant 
changes in a policy at a later stage in the legislative process because not only have the interests 
of the other parties involved crystalized, the general elements of the policy have also usually 
been agreed upon, hence if change occurs it would only be in the margins. This can also explain 
why the countries in this study that held the Council Presidency in later stages of the policy 
process have played the role of the honest broker. 
Based on the case studies in this book, another main variable contributing to the 
explanation of successful policy uploading is the policy capacity of the country; that is, how 
effective the administrative and political structures are (Painter and Pierre 2005), especially in 
the policy area one country is trying to upload. France and Sweden possessed strong policy 
capacity in the policy areas they managed to upload. As illustrated in chapters 3 and 5 with the 
successful cases, France and Sweden did not rely on the European institutions such as the 
European Commission or the Council Secretariat, or on external expert actors, to promote or 
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shape their policies. They spent a lot of resources in these areas: significant portions of the 
Presidency budget were allocated to them. Politicians involved in the negotiations were experts 
and experienced, so too were the high public officials involved. Moreover, the coordination 
mechanisms established before and during the Council Presidency enabled them to effectively 
conduct their activities to push for uploading. In both cases, the countries were able to effectively 
use their resources to their advantage. Consequently, the policy capacity of the country holding 
the Council Presidency in the policy area it is trying to upload proved to be playing an important 
role in policy uploading.  
Although the coordination of European policy remains mostly the same in all policy areas 
in these two cases, the other elements constituting the measure of policy capacity used in it vary. 
Interestingly, Sweden’s policy capacity in the area of environment (failed case) was also strong. 
The case of eco-efficiency / Carbon tax shows that it was possible to upload general elements of 
the national policy (eco-efficiency), but that the Carbon tax remained at the stage of project and 
discussions. It suggests that policy capacity in the policy area the chairmanship is trying to 
upload does not explain by itself the failure to do so. Further, it sustains the importance of the 
nature of the policy, specific instruments and more authoritative formats been harder to upload.  
In the case of France, the policy capacity in the area of environmental policy was weak: 
the country had to ask for external experts to lead for them. In addition, politicians in this policy 
sphere were not very experienced nor were they knowledgeable in the matter. Moreover, France 
is a laggard in the environmental policy area. Combined with the other variables discussed in this 
study, it contributed to the failure for France to upload its national policy. Similarly, the Czech 
Republic’s general policy capacity is also considered to be weak. Despite the fact that the 
country spent as much money as France in conducting its Presidency, it spent resources on 
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strengthening its civil service by offering training specific for the period of the Council 
Presidency, and it hired more staff; the country’s officials lacked in experience and expertise. In 
addition, the Czech Republic relied much more on the European Commission than did any other 
countries in this study. Moreover, its coordination of European policy is fragmented in 
comparison to other systems. Overall, the Czech Republic was not very effective in mobilizing 
its resources and it contributed partly to the failure of the uploading of its national policy.  
Leadership proved to be important in securing an agreement. First, success cases 
demonstrate that the role the chair takes influenced the output. Whether they play the role of the 
agenda-setter or the role of the honest broker (Tallberg 2003, 2006), it influences its success. As 
mentioned earlier, in all the successful policy uploading cases, the country holding the chair 
played the role of the agenda-setter and were able to shape their proposed policy. France and 
Sweden’s agenda-setting followed the ‘high politics route’ (Princen and Rhinard 2006). They 
were effectively able to bring up their policy outside of the main community’s pre-established 
legislative agenda. Moreover, as shown in chapter 3 and 5, they were able to shape the content of 
the policy they proposed.  
In addition, France and Sweden are considered to be leaders and policy entrepreneurs in 
the policy areas they pushed forward, in the immigration, and ALMP and environmental fields, 
respectively. Policy entrepreneurs are agents of policy change in the settings in which they 
participate (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011). This is exactly what France and Sweden did 
during their Council Presidency. They managed to frame the debates, providing new policy 
direction with lasting effects. The fact that they are considered leaders in these policy areas as 
well helped them to increase their credibility with regard to their proposal in face of the other 
Members. 
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Secondly, the involvement of the politicians holding the chair proved to be very 
important to secure a favorable output. This proved to be true not only in the European Council, 
but also in the other council formations. Hence, not only is the Head of State of the country 
holding the Council Presidency important, but also its ministers in their policy area. 
Consequently, the degree of the concentration of power is not as important as I first thought 
because the coordination of activities and leadership qualities between politicians in a given 
policy area supplants it, as the case of Sweden shows with Europe 2020. 
 Except in the cases of the Carbon tax (Sweden) and energy security (Czech Republic), 
the Council Presidency played the role of the honest broker in all the other unsuccessful cases of 
uploading, most likely because the legislative process was already well advanced. But by playing 
the role of the honest broker, they limited their chances to push for their national policy.  
The concentration of executive power does not seem to play a role in either hindering or 
facilitating policy uploading at the European level; other variables are more important, namely 
leadership and coordination between individuals exercising leadership. 
Interestingly, one variable that was first thought to hinder successful policy uploading did 
not play a significant role. This is the case of governmental instability. The cases of the Czech 
Republic and Belgium are concerned with this variable. Administratively, both Presidencies 
were able to conduct their day-to-day business. Despite caretaker governments, politicians and 
civil servants managed to sustain the same level of activities they would have under stable 
governments. In the case of the Czech Republic, this variable is not important because the 
timeframe of the discussions on the policy it was strongly trying to upload (energy policy) took 
place in the first part of the Presidency, and the caretaker government continued in the same vein 
of interests after it took command. On the other hand, governmental instability is not important 
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in explaining the failure to upload national policy in the case of Belgium because the country did 
not have the intention to do so from the start. Moreover, since the Presidency involved political 
actors from the different governmental levels, it would have been possible to have done so in 
areas falling under subnational governments, but it did not occur. This reflects the adherence to 
the work programme of all actors involved in the Presidency, which did not promote national 
interests and policies, and the support of Van Rompuy’s Presidency. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1  
I expect to find that each of these variables may not weigh equally in each type of uploading 
(subtle or direct). 
 The success cases in this book involve only subtle uploading. As a reminder, subtle 
uploading is defined as the transfer of ideas, goals and norms from the national to the European 
level. It is considered to occur when ideas, goals or norms are entrenched at the national level in 
a given policy and expressed through official documents and/or speeches, and interviews with 
officials, find their place in official documents at the European level. Considering the two 
success cases in this study and as shown in the previous discussion of the hypothesis, they show 
that the same variables play an important role in explaining the success of their policy uploading. 
The main reason that can explain why only subtle uploading has occurred more than 
direct uploading has to do with the timeframe. It might be easier to upload general goals during 
the six months of the Council Presidency, than to try to upload a full national policy at the 
European level. This is argued in line with the findings of this study, knowing that the more 
precise the policy is with regards to instruments and targets, and if it intends to take a stronger 
legal format, the more conflictual the discussions become and the harder it is to find a 
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compromise in a timely manner, thus to upload. Moreover, the issue area in which the policy 
falls is an important factor because it affects the decision-making procedure it will follow and 
how it will be implemented. These also constitute barriers to stronger uploading and they impact 
the length of the policy process and the number of veto points and players. For direct uploading 
to occur, the convergence of interests between the member states would have to be very high 
(and potentially with the European Parliament if the policy follows the co-decisional procedure) 
for it to take place within six months. Moreover, it would have to be brought by a country not 
relying on the European Commission, with strong policy capacity and leadership. Consequently, 
only a small number of Member states fit this in any given policy area. 
7.1.3 Institutional Change Modifying the Process of Policy Uploading 
Hypothesis 3 
The creation of the semi-‘permanent’ Presidency will reduce the likelihood of national policy 
uploading. 
Belgium is the only case used in this book that took place after the implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, no successful case of national policy uploading occurred during its 
term, as the country did not intend to do so from the beginning. Consequently, it is difficult to 
test the hypothesis as I do not have variance both with the independent and dependent variables. 
But it can still give us some preliminary insights as to what differences the changes in 
institutions have created with regard to policy uploading; with the help of the other cases as well 
and the use of counterfactuals. The use of counterfactual specifically helps me to increase the 
number of cases, thus variance (Blatter and Haverland 2012). 
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As the case studies included in this study demonstrate, it was possible for Member states 
to upload their national policies only when they played the role of the agenda-setter. When a 
country played the role of the honest broker, they failed to upload their national policies. With 
the modifications introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, it is still possible for countries that hold the 
Council Presidency to influence the agenda through their work programme. But with the creation 
of the semi-permanent Presidency, it can prevent Member states from effectively using agenda-
setting and shaping strategies in a timely manner within the European Council in order to upload 
their national policies, as the position is held by an individual outside of the government of the 
Member State that holds it. If countries want to use these strategies, they would have to do so in 
the Council formations, where they remain the holders of the chairmanship.  
For example, if France’s Council Presidency had taken place under the new rules, their 
proposal for the Pact would have had to go through Van Rompuy as he would have supervised 
the European Council meetings in which the discussions took place. It would have affected the 
speed under which the agreement was actually adopted because the urgency to do so would have 
been different: Van Rompuy does not face any domestic opposition. In addition, the country 
holding the Presidency would still have to invest as much time, but the result would not be 
guaranteed. This example illustrates that the changes in the Council institution does not make 
national policy uploading impossible, but more difficult. Hence, it is possible that it will occur 




This chapter offered a comparative analysis of the case studies comprised in this book and a 
review of the hypotheses. Using the theoretical framework of chapter 2, which combines 
elements of the literature on rational choice institutionalism (Tsebelis 2002), governance theory 
(Painter and Pierre 2005, Peters and Pierre 2005b), venue shopping (Guiraudon 2000, Pralle 
2003), agenda-setting (Princen and Rhinard 2006, Princen 2009), and policy transfer (Padgett 
2003, Bulmer and Padgett 2004, Bulmer, et al. 2007a), I have uncovered the variables shaping 
the successful uploading of national policy. 
I thought the Council Presidency would act mostly out of domestic concerns when trying 
to upload its national policy, because holding this position creates a window of opportunity for 
the promotion of national interests. However, I found that it can act out of domestic concerns or 
for the common good; it does not make a difference with regards to policy uploading. These 
findings go in the same direction as what is advanced in the literature on venue shopping 
(Guiraudon 2000, Pralle 2003, Princen 2009). The reasons motivating a country to upload its 
national policy explain why a country would engage in the process, but do not contribute to 
answering my question on the conditions shaping successful uploading.  
This chapter has shown that in addition to having the intention to upload, uploading 
needs to be considered a superior option by the Council Presidency as opposed to the status quo. 
This is the first necessary, but not sufficient, condition, identified in this study for successful 
policy uploading to take place. If this condition is not present in the first place, it is very unlikely 
that a country holding the Presidency will engage in the push for policy uploading, whether 
policy uploading represents an innovative proposal or a change from currently implemented 
policy. In essence, this variable acts as a first-ordering principle.  
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Moreover, the Council Presidency needs to be able to set the agenda, frame the original 
proposal, and possess strong policy capacity in the policy area it is trying to upload. Again, these 
variables are necessary conditions for national policy uploading to occur, but not sufficient, and 
they are equally important. They act as second-ordering principles. Setting the agenda and 
framing the proposal allows the Presidency to make a first move towards policy uploading. 
Having a strong policy capacity in the issue-area make this move efficient.  
Other variables also significantly affect the prospects for uploading by the Council 
Presidency. The legal format the policy will take at the European level is very important: in this 
study, countries were not able to upload their national policy with harder legal formats. 
However, France and Sweden managed to upload their national policy under soft law 
instruments, which sped up the process of policy-making. Unsurprisingly, the findings 
demonstrate that the more convergent the interests of the Member states are over the policy 
proposal of the Council Presidency, the easier it will be to upload it. In addition, the policy 
process needs to be at an early stage for national policy uploading to be possible. The literature 
suggests that in order for policy change to occur, the proposed policy needs to represent a better 
alternative responding more adequately to the interests of the Members than the status quo and 
deemed appropriate to take place at the European level (Guiraudon 2000, Tsebelis 2002, Pralle 
2003) .    
Finally, I found that two variables did not play an important role in influencing the 
prospects for uploading: the concentration of executive power and governmental instability. 
Even if the countries that succeeded in their policy uploading endeavour have high 
concentrations of executive power, the cases diverge as to the cooperation they exhibited 
between their head of state and ministers. In France, President Sarkozy was mostly acting on its 
 180 
own, but in the case of Sweden, power was shared between the Prime Minister and his ministers. 
This is also probably due to the policy-making route policy uploading took. In the case of the 
Pact, it was only taking place in the European Council, reflecting the arguments made in the 
literature on the ‘presidentialization of policy-making in the Council’ (Tallberg 2008, Tallberg 
and Johansson 2008, Bäck, et al. 2009, James 2010). However, in the case of Sweden, 
developments took place both in the Council formations and the European Council. 
Consequently, according to my limited number of successful cases, and the variety of 
concentration of executive power that exists within my failed cases, this variable does not seem 
to be important. 
The other variable that does not seem to be crucial in explaining successful policy 
uploading is government instability. In this research project, only two cases of Council 
Presidencies were faced with governmental instability: The Czech Republic and Belgium. In 
both instances the governments were able to conduct their day-to-day businesses in relation to 
their Council Presidency. Moreover, in the case of the Czech Republic, the caretaker government 
was capable to negotiate effectively for the support of the Nabucco pipeline project, which 
represented strongly the interests of the Czech Republic and Central and East European 
countries. Therefore, because governmental instability did not have an adverse effect on the 
conduct of the Council Presidency, it is also considered to not have influence on the uploading of 
national policies at the European level. 
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes the study by bringing it into a more general context and offers 
implications from the case studies of the Council Presidencies that were employed in this 
research project to investigate national policy uploading in the European Union. I have looked at 
three main case studies (France, Czech Republic and Sweden) and two shadow cases (the United 
Kingdom and Belgium). For each of these cases, I have looked at policy uploading by focusing 
on variables considered important for policy-making within the governance and new 
institutionalism approaches. Specifically, I focused on the concept of policy capacity. In 
addition, I looked at political intention, the legal format and content of the policy proposed, 
leadership, and the advancement of the policy process at the time the proposal was made. The 
objective of this chapter is to address the broader implications my findings have, and to discuss 
future avenues of research. 
8.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
This research project looked at the role of the Council Presidency in policy uploading mostly 
before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. It contributes to the debate on the powers of the 
Council Presidency and whether or not it can effectively influence policy outputs. In this 
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respect, I have demonstrated that it is sometimes possible for the country holding the Council 
Presidency to upload its national policies at the European level.  
The general contribution of this book is the integration of national-level variables into the 
analysis of policy-making in the Council. More precisely, the emphasis has been on a period 
when a country holds the Council Presidency, and how they use the position of the chairmanship 
to upload their national policies to the European level.  
In order to look at the influence of the Council Presidency on policy-making, I have built 
a theoretical framework combining new institutionalism and governance theories. At its center, 
the concept of policy capacity has enabled me to capture national and European levels 
dimensions affecting the prospects a country has to upload its national policies. This concept has 
received little attention in the study of policy-making in the Council, but it can greatly contribute 
to alleviate some shortcomings in the literature on the Council Presidencies. It takes into 
consideration the variety of national actors involved during a Council Presidency, in relation to 
EU policy-making. As such, it unpacks the European level by considering that a country is 
composed of many leaders while exercising the chairmanship and that its effectiveness is based 
on a variety of national factors. With this concept and the other variables I looked at, it was 
possible to uncover national variables influencing policy uploading during a Council Presidency, 
which had not been looked at in the literature. 
In order to answer my research questions as to (1) why countries engage in policy 
uploading; and (2) what conditions shape policy uploading, I used the case studies method. In 
addition, I employed process tracing for my within case analysis in order to map the causal 
processes at play. This tool permits to assess which explanation should be rejected or not in 
relation to the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005, Bennett 2010). In order to look at 
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policy uploading, I used a non-random, purposive sample made up of officials involved in their 
country’s Council Presidency with whom I conducted semi-structured interviews. In total, I 
conducted 23 interviews. In addition, written primary and secondary sources consisting of 
newspaper articles, official documents, and archival materials.  
The first research question I wanted to answer with this study was: Why is a Council 
Presidency trying to upload national policies? Based on the literature on venue shopping and 
agenda-setting in the European Union, I hypothesized that the domestic situation a government 
faced would explain the choice of venue. Specifically, I thought domestic conditions such as 
political and civic opposition or domestic costs associated to the adaptation of national policies 
to EU’s standards would play an important role in justifying why a government would bring a 
national policy at the European level. However, the two success cases of policy uploading in this 
study show that not only can domestic factors explain why a country will attempt to upload its 
national policies, but so too more common good concerns. In the case of the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum, France engaged in the policy uploading of its immigration policy in 
order to legitimize its new national orientation. On the other hand, Sweden exhibited motivation 
for uploading its Active Labour Market Policies out of concerns for the common good. Based on 
its experience with economic crisis and the learnings made out of its past mistakes, Sweden 
wanted to upload its national policy for the greater good of the EU.  
The second research question this book looked at was on the conditions shaping the 
successful uploading of policies. This is the main purpose and contribution of this study. In order 
to uncover these conditions I have looked at three main case studies, each covering two national 
and European policy areas. One looked at success and failure cases of policy uploading. 
Additionally, I examined two shadow cases, the United Kingdom and Belgium. These cases 
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complemented the findings made with the main case studies. Moreover, as the case of Belgium 
took place after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it covered another institutional arrangement in 
the Council. It helped to illustrate, tentatively and with the aid of counterfactuals, how this new 
configuration of the Council with the ‘semi-permanent’ Presidency held by an external 
individual affected policy uploading.  
I have identified some necessary variables for policy uploading to occur. As a first-
ordered principle, the country holding the Council Presidency needs to have the intention to 
pursue policy uploading, which in turn needs to be perceived as a better option than the status 
quo. This is necessary, but not sufficient, for uploading to occur. As the cases of the UK and 
Belgium have shown, it is possible for countries to not have the intention to pursue uploading at 
all during their Presidency. The UK preferred the status quo with the Working Time Directive, 
and Belgium did not express any intention to pursue uploading in any policy area. 
Policy capacity proved to be central in explaining the ability of the Presidency to upload 
its national policy. Elements of policy capacity at the country’s national level such as the 
coordination of EU policy amongst high public officials, size of staff and their experience and 
expertise, whether the country relied on the European institutions (i.e. the European Commission 
or the Council General Secretariat) were included in the evaluation of its strength. In addition, 
policy capacity in the specific policy area the country was trying to upload was integrated in this 
variable. The results show that possessing strong policy capacity is especially important in the 
policy area the country is trying to upload. This variable is also considered necessary but not 
sufficient; and it works as a second-ordered principle with agenda-setting. 
Playing the role of the agenda-setter is also necessary. It enables the Presidency to decide 
which issue of its choosing will be discussed in meetings, hence making sure its policy will be on 
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the programme. But most importantly it permits the Presidency to first offer its proposal 
according to its national policy, hence to be the ‘first mover’.  
Another important variable has to do with the nature of the policy proposal brought by 
the Council Presidency. The legal format and the content of the policy are determinant in 
influencing the willingness of the other EU members to adopt the proposal. As such, the 
observations in this study suggest that softer modes of governance are more likely to be adopted 
when a country engage in policy uploading. This finding can be explained by the lack of binding 
punitive consequences associated with these legal formats.  
The content of the policy affects the adoption of the proposal according to how it fits with 
the interests of the other members, or actors involved in decision-making. Goals were found to 
be adopted more easily than policy instruments, reinforcing the reasons why softer modes of 
governance are easier to adopt. By adopting only the goals of the policy, under a soft mode of 
governance, it allows the Member states to shape more precise future measures and instruments 
needed to implement the goals. 
The stage at which the Presidency attempts to upload its national policy also affects how 
successful it will be. There is a larger window of opportunities when the policy is proposed at the 
beginning of the policy process, whereas it is much smaller in the later stages of the policy 
process.  
Two variables did not contribute to successful uploading: the concentration of executive 
power and governmental instability. The concentration of power in of itself does not affect the 
uploading of policies. What matters for policy uploading is how leadership is exercised and how 
the coordination between officials is executed. Beyond acting as an agenda-setter, the countries 
that were able to upload their national policies were generally considered leaders in the area they 
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were trying to upload, more precisely, they are policy entrepreneurs. Been leaders in the policy 
area they are trying to upload increases their credibility in face of the other Members.  
The second variable that did not seem to be influencing policy uploading is government 
instability. Although their Presidency could be considered more administrative than political 
under the caretaker government, Belgium and Czech Republic proved to be able to conduct their 
day-to-day activities.  
Another set of findings relates to the type of policy uploading that occurred. Based on the 
operationalization of policy uploading, subtle uploading (the transfer of general policy elements) 
has been the only type of uploading take place in the cases included in this study. According to 
the previous findings in this study on the preference of states for softer modes of governance, 
this is to be expected.  
Finally, with the limited post-Lisbon cases available in this study and with the help of 
counterfactuals, preliminary assessment on the impact of the semi-permanent Council Presidency 
have led me to conclude than the new design does not prevent policy uploading to occur, but 
could make it more difficult and re-orient it towards other Council formations. 
8.2 IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study on policy uploading and the Council Presidency provides the opportunity for 
reflections on what it means for the European Union, and to suggest avenues for future research. 
This research project has reinforced the view that the Council can effectively show more 
intergovernmental elements than supranational ones. In addition, one indirect aspect this research 
project has illustrated is with regards to the challenge made by the Council to the Commission’s 
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prerogative of policy initiation. In all successful cases, the Council Presidency took the liberty to 
initiate the policy process and to draft the policy (i.e. the European Pact on immigration and 
Asylum under the French leadership), or to substantially influence the Commission’s proposal by 
integrating elements of the future policy into the Council Presidency’s Conclusions (Europe 
2020).  
At the theoretical level, this research project has contributed to the literature on policy 
transfer by focusing specifically on uploading. As noted in the second chapter, most of the 
studies related to EU policy transfer have looked at the ‘downloading’ side by focusing on 
Europeanization – the effect of the European Union on Member states. The findings of this study 
suggest that the relationship goes both ways: the EU takes policy directions directly influenced 
by the Member states, through the Council Presidency. Moreover, the literature on policy 
transfer usually considers that the transfer is voluntarily imported (Stone 1999) by countries. 
This book has shown that it can also be exported and be imposed in some way through the 
Council Presidency, which constitutes a specific period in time, but only when conditions are 
gathered to maximize its occurrence.  
In addition, this study also speaks to the literature on executive power in contemporary 
governments. In chapter 2, a review on the literature on national executive discussed how 
European integration created a need for the centralization of power with national executives. 
However, my research findings suggest that the ‘core executive’ is more important than national 
executives, especially if the country is willing to maximize its influence on the policy process by 
uploading its national policy.  
One avenue for future research would be to look more precisely at the post-Lisbon Treaty 
period. First, to look at policy uploading in cases of Council Presidencies after the adoption of 
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the Treaty, beyond Belgium. And secondly, to compare the findings with those in this study. 
This would allow for a better portrait on how the institutional changes brought by Lisbon have 
changed policy uploading, or not. 
Another avenue could be to look at the implementation of uploaded policies. The 
definition of what constitutes successful uploading in this study has delimited the interpretation 
of results. As such, this study has focused only on one aspect of policy-making in relation to 
uploading: from the proposal to the output. However, it is possible to consider that the 
implementation of policies can be just as important in evaluating successful uploading in order to 
find out how lasting the effects of uploading are. It is possible to think that policy uploading 
through soft law instruments can encourage deviations that may denature the original intent of 
the policy. 
On the other hand, it may be possible to set only the agenda for policy uploading to take 
place during the Council Presidency, and to effectively continue to influence the policy process 
in order to achieve uploading. Without going in details, it seems this might actually be what 
happened with the adoption of the EU Carbon Tax with Sweden. The Swedish Council 
Presidency set the agenda during its term, but failed to upload its policy during it. However, the 
Prime Minister and his Ministers have consistently followed up the developments of this 
instrument thereafter.  
Finally, one other avenue for future research could be to look at policy uploading in other 
contexts, in a way to expand the number of cases for increasing the generalizability of findings in 
this study. This could be done with countries holding the chairmanship for a certain period of 
time on a rotation basis in organizations and in which policies are adopted. For example, this is 
the case of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Economic Co-operation in 
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Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), etc. 





SPECIFIC MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE GRENELLE’S GROUP ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND ENERGY 




1-Renovating energy requirements for building to reduce energy consumption of 20% in the 
tertiary sector, and 12% in the residential sector by 2020. To achieve this, also create banking 
and financial tools to take into account the savings (subsidized loans and guarantee funds); 
specific objective for energy-saving certificates; etc. 
2-Launch a programme of technological change for new buildings aimed at generalizing positive 
energy buildings by 2020. Adopt new regulation on heat; make it obligatory for new buildings to 
have a certain proportion of renewable energy and material that store carbon. 






their 1990 level 
1-Create the means to measure transport emissions accurately 
2-Before constructing new roads, evaluate globally their coherence and their impact on 
environment and on the economy before taking the decision, 
3-Produce a national plan for the development of non-road freight 
4-Rationalise the use of car and bring down the average CO2 emissions of cars already on the 
road from 176 to 130g of CO2 per kilometer by 2020 by combining regulation and incentives: 
regulations setting a limit of 120g; lowering the speed limit; create an annual ecological friendly 
sticker; etc. 
5-Reestablish the real cost of air travel 
6-Allocate a substantial part of resources from environment taxation to the AFITF (agency for 
financing transport infrastructure in France) for financing alternative transport infrastructures to 







1-Make territorial climate/energy plans obligatory 
2-Develop voluntary plans for developing public transport, encouraging gentle transports and 





1-Reorganizing tax arrangements concerning the environment and energy by adopting a “climate 
energy contribution” (or carbon tax) levied on products with a high carbon or energy content 
(fuels). (i.e. tax on import goods in function of their CO2 emissions) 
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2-Steering public aid towards project that are sparing in their use of carbon and energy 
 
Cease relying 
on carbon and 
reduce energy 
production 
1-Increase from 9% to 20% the proportion of renewable energy in the final consumption of 
energy by 2020, aiming for 25% if possible 
2-Amplify research and development efforts to prepare for the energy of the future 
3-No agreement on the future of nuclear facilities in France 
 
Source: Ministère de l'Écologie, du Développement durable, des Transports et du Logement. 
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